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The extent to which inhabitants in Rural Communities in Senegal are able to derive benefits from 
natural resources located in their zones may be largely contingent upon their ability to ask for 
what they are entitled to. Gaining more political clout in order to make claims to their fair share of 
access to their forests requires local community members to act more like citizens rather than 
subjects who have to endure imposed forms of government. The 1996 wave of decentralization 
placed forest management decision making in the hands the democratically local elected 
government, the Rural Councils that would henceforth act as the representative of populations in 
the Rural Communities. The 1998 modifications made to the Forestry Code permitted the 
commercial exploitation of forests through the mandatory application of a technical document, 
called the Forest Management Plan. In order to assist the underfunded and under- resourced Rural 
Councils and to make the exploitation of forests more participatory as well as environmentally 
sustainable, two projects: the World Bank’s PROGEDE and USAID’s Wula Nafaa were 
implemented. The projects produced the Forest Management Plans and introduced new 
institutions, Forest Management Committees that would function. 
 
In this set of three papers, I examined institutional processes around access to forest resources, 
that is, the ability to derive benefits mainly from wood-based charcoal production and commerce 
in the in the Tambacounda region. Using the Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) Choice and 
Recognition framework, I explored the conditions under which higher-level institutions like the 
central government and international development agencies chose and recognized the local 
institutional partners they did. The type of institutions chosen to manage and regulate the forest 
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and the charcoal sector at the local level influenced the patterns of engagement with recognized 
authorities and the distribution of access to lucrative charcoal sector among the villagers. 
Participation involving democratic elements or democratic institutional infrastructure is believed 
to allow for participation from members of society who otherwise might not possess the 
advantage of being socio-economically or politically ‘equipped’ to participate in decision-making 
settings and processes that make their representation binding or adequate. It was found that the 
choice and recognition process took place over various arenas at the higher level and I identified a 
set of attributes that are factored in the choice and recognition of local institutions.  
 
The second paper brings out how the institutional choices made higher up unfolded on the ground 
using the example of gender-focused action of projects in a decentralized forest management 
context. I examined how institutional set-ups affect a historically marginalized group such as 
women with respect to their participation in a male-dominated livelihood earning sector like 
charcoal. Constrictive aspects of their social roles and economic precariousness intersects with 
elite capture of charcoal sector, creating a greater barrier for poorer, non-elite women to break 
through as charcoal producers or charcoal entrepreneurs.  The third paper showed the ways in 
which institutional choice and recognition opened the gates for elite capture, whereby a 
disproportionate amount of benefits from charcoal production and trade is appropriated by a small 
group of people possessing access qualifications, that is, social, political, economic advantages 
allowing them to dominate. The flaring up of charcoal niche elite capture within the Rural 
Communities has implications for the asymmetries in the level of development between the urban 
and the rural parts of the country.  
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When significant amounts of revenue derived from a common local resource accrue to only a few 
elites in the Rural Communities, it becomes more profitable to invest large amounts in urban 
zones, thus depleting the rural areas of locally generated wealth. 
 
This study drew largely from the qualitative data from interviews, observation and questionnaire 
surveys collected during fieldwork extending from the beginning of 2012 to mid-2013. The main 
conceptual framework guiding this research was Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) 
Institutional Choice and Recognition with additional analytical lenses relevant to the questions 
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Under an immense star-shrouded sky, surrounded by huge baobab trees, sat a group of villagers in 
front of a small stove heating a teapot. The youngest of the group were fanning embers to make 
attaya (sweet tea). Several village youth were present at this gathering, many of them finishing 
their high school diploma, still considered to be a high level of education in the remote rural 
zones of Senegal. The youngsters started talking about their future plans, the jobs they desire to 
have to earn a living and the ones they will not have the chance to pursue. “I would like to join 
the army or the police force. Wouldn’t I look mighty in that uniform!” said one of them jovially 
but aware that such a highly enviable a line of duty is out of reach of most people in this small 
village nested in a forest far from any place that could offer appealing income generation 
opportunities. The discussion moved on to how they like eating meals made of the leaves of the 
big trees, a double entendre about the deprivation suffered by the villages in that zone. A meal 
made of leaves is consumed when food is scarce. A person in attendance sitting beside me started 
telling me, “this type of development  feels like a trap; we now find ourselves in a situation where 
we have to get this and that job, such and such amount of money and always be pursuing material 
possessions and achieving things that are very difficult in this environment. It feels like such a 
burden imposed on us…; life without running after such things used to be so much better, simpler 
like it used to be in the past.” The majority of the youth, given the chance, would still choose the 
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occupation with the potential of earning the most income. This was one instance among the 
numerous encounters with the local populations sharing their perspective on the rush towards 
wealth-based development. 
  
A few months later after that night’s conversation in the small village in the Kolda Region, the 
closing ceremony of one forestry project took place on a celebratory note at a posh hotel in the 
capital city, Dakar. The Wula Nafaa (‘wealth of the forest’ in Bambara) project, funded by United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), aimed at helping local populations to 
generate wealth through the production, processing and sale of products from forest and other 
natural resources. “We have made a very visible impact,”1 was the concluding remark made by 
the director of Wula Nafaa. The visible impact of the project is perceptible to anybody reading the 
Wula Nafaa project reports and anybody standing at the junction of the Missirah-Tamba main 
roads, watching the truckloads of charcoal passing by on their way to Dakar. The difference from 
previous years being that now the bigger share of the charcoal on those trucks are now produced 
by villagers in the Rural Communities2 and not by a few big urban-based merchants and their 
migrant laborers. Rural Communities (Communautés Rurales) in Senegal are the most local 
administrative subdivisions governed by democratically elected local government, the Rural 
Council. Rural Communities comprise of a number of villages, on average ranging from 30 to 80 
villages. 
                                                             
1 The reasons attributed to those impacts were the taxes collected from charcoal produced from the forests located in 
rural regions, the production process being overseen by forest management committees created by the project. The 
rural populations were helped to better exercise the powers transferred to them, thanks to the good governance 





These two descriptions of fieldwork experiences are indicative of the comparative disadvantage 
of rural regions in accumulating wealth and the inclusion of villagers in benefitting from the 
process of rural development. They also bring into question the portrayal and assessment by 
donors of the accomplishment of natural resource-based development interventions. Since several 
years, as villagers pointed out, all kinds of donor-supported projects have come and gone. Who 
benefits from such projects? How have they re-ordered the ways in which local institutions 
manage access to forest resources? Why and how were those local institutions chosen to do so? 
The research for this dissertation was carried out to provide answers to these questions. The 
veneer of the project’s ‘successes’ was scratched to reveal how national priorities for 
decentralized forest management along with forestry projects imbued with Western canons of 
development practice generate unbalanced access to forests and forestry markets among rural 
populations.  
 
The dissertation investigates the relation between decentralization supported by donor-funded 
forestry projects, the participation of local populations in decision-making about access to forests, 
and improvement in rural development. To accomplish this, the dissertation is organized into 
three papers each covering one of three focal points: 1) the conditions under which higher-level 
institutions choose their local institutional partners, 2) how the recognized institutions condition 
access to forests resources through the case of gender mainstreaming in forestry-based projects, 
and 3) the rural development implications of elite capture of the local institutional arrangements 





Under Senegal’s 1996 decentralization laws and 1998 forestry code, Rural Communities 
represented by their elected rural councils (the most-local level of local government), have gained 
the right to manage and to use forests within their jurisdiction.3 The democratic decentralization 
reforms of Senegal that were crafted to enable local populations to have an equitable control over 
and access to their forests are only partially producing the expected outcomes. Many segments of 
rural populations are still excluded from lucrative forestry activities (Ribot & Larson, 2012; 
O’Brien, 1971; Boutinot, 2005). From the stage of inception of policies or projects to that of their 
implementation, there are various institutions involved in the shaping of participatory and 
developmental outcomes of those policies and projects for populations in rural regions. Local 
institutions chosen and recognized by higher-level institutions such as the national government 
and international agencies to implement reforms, therefore, influence the access to forests and the 
distribution of benefits derived from the resource among the inhabitants of the Rural 
Communities. 
 
I examined how local institutions are chosen by higher-level agents such as the Senegalese 
Central Government and international development agencies so as to be assigned the function of 
managing access to a natural resource vital to income generation in Rural Communities. The way 
local institutions are used, and by whom, influences the participatory and democratic character of 
the decentralization process, becoming a contributing factor as to who in the Rural Communities 
gets to benefit from forest resources. The observed inequalities in access to decision-making 
arenas and in the accumulation of returns from forests hindered the overall development at the 
                                                             
3 Powers are to be devolved to the presidents of rural councils who are democratically elected to control access to 
community forests: the signature of the president of the rural council is required before anybody can extract any 
resources from the forests.  
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local level, the very same zones where the wealth was generated. The spatial distribution of 
wealth-generation opportunities within Senegal is greatly skewed in favor of urban zones, having 
implications for the enduring underdevelopment of the rural zones. 
 
Decentralization is defined as the transfer of powers and resources from higher levels to lower 
levels within a political-administrative system of government (Mahwood, 1983). There are 
different forms of decentralization, but the form that this research is concerned with and which is 
considered the stronger form that theory recognizes as most beneficial in terms of democratic 
outcomes, is democratic decentralization. Democratic decentralization occurs when resources, 
power and tasks are devolved to lower-level authorities who possess a certain degree of autonomy 
and who are duly accountable and responsive to the people they are serving (Ribot, 2004; Manor, 
2005). Since decentralization can offer the institutional infrastructure to deepen democracy and 
enhance equity, it was considered by many theorists, policy makers and development agencies to 
be an appropriate medium through which to implement projects. 
  
Efforts to create wealth from forests in the study zone were supported by two projects: USAID’s 
Wula Nafaa and World Bank’s PROGEDE. These projects created Forest Management 
Committees (FMCs), structures to implement project actions and provide assistance to the local 
populations and the Rural Council to adapt to and build wealth from forest resources in a 
decentralized context.  The analysis of institutional choice – the process through which higher-
scale agencies, such as these projects and government agencies, choose the institutions they will 
work with in the local arena – aims at understanding why certain institutions (and not others) are 
being chosen and recognized by the central government and donor agencies. ‘Recognition’ 
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involves the conferring of powers and legitimacy of the chosen institution by transferring powers, 
through partnership in projects or being involved in decision-making activities. Institutional 
recognition goes beyond mere acknowledgement of the existence of an institution to also include 
the strengthening or even creation of the chosen institution’s authority through the transfer of 
powers to them (Ribot, Chhatre, Lankina, 2008). Inquiry into the effects of institutional choice 
provides insights into the stunted political representation process, subverted resources, and 
weakened local government that sometimes leave people with few alternatives but to fall back 
onto the existing dyadic arrangements of patronage that perpetuate inequalities or onto new 
institutions that may offer only palliative fixes (Beck, 2008; Von Doepp and Villalon, 2005). 
Institutional choice and recognition made by higher-level institutions are shown in this 
dissertation to be linked to differentiated access to forest resources in the Tambacounda region of 
Senegal. 
 
The institutional landscape of rural Senegal is characterized by a multitude of institutions with 
varying degrees of authority over forest resources. By choosing the institutions they want to 
partner with, the World Bank’s PROGEDE (Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management) 
and USAID’s Wula Nafaa (Agriculture and Natural Resources Management) projects have 
reshaped the politico-administrative structure of forestry resource management in rural Senegal. 
These two forestry projects were used as an entry point for analyzing how institutional choice and 
recognition by higher-level institutions shape representation, hence effective participation of local 




The plural nature of the institutional terrain of rural Senegal has important implications for the 
functioning of a democratic decentralized resource management because of the authority and 
resource reconfigurations among the chosen institutions. 
 
Paper 1: The first paper entitled “The process of institutional choice and recognition for the 
decentralized forest management in Tambacounda, Senegal” explains how the mix of local 
institutions entrusted with forest resource management is an outcome of choices made by the 
national government and international agencies. To explore how local institutional partners are 
chosen by national and international institutions in a decentralized forest governance context, I 
used Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) ‘Institutional Choice and Recognition’ framework 
which provided the overarching conceptual lens and Grindle’s (2005) “Process of Policy and 
Institutional Reform,” to operationalize the analysis of the institutional choice component . Forest 
management committees run by the members of the public were created and chosen by USAID 
and World Bank projects to work with the democratically elected local government (the rural 
council) and the forestry services. The analysis revealed that although the new multi-institution 
configuration presents the potential for democratic resource management, the ensuing division of 
tasks among the various chosen institutions created new opportunities for collusion among elites 
who captured positions in the chosen institutions. Such an elite capture involved a small number 
of favorably placed villagers intercepting a disproportionately large amount of benefits from 
forest resources and excluding the majority poor of the population.  
 
Paper 2: A case study of gender mainstreaming in the two projects illustrate the effects of 
institutional choice at village level. It was found that rural communities can now legally produce 
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charcoal in their forests but not everybody within those rural communities is able to gain from the 
opportunities offered by this change. One of the initiatives of the two projects to promote 
equitable access to forest resources was through increasing the participation of women in forest 
resource management and exploitation. Despite the provisions made by the projects to include 
women in forest management and use, profits from wood-based charcoal production accrue 
mostly to women in privileged groups or to the male family members of those women. The 
second paper entitled “Instrumentalizing gender: When elite capture intersects with gender-
focused actions of forest resource management projects in Senegal” shows how participation, an 
important component of gender-responsive approach, is construed differently at the various stages 
of projects’ life cycle. These differences in rendition of participation in its conceptualization or 
application in turn affects who among the villagers in the rural communities gets access to 
charcoal production and trade. The analysis demonstrated how elite capture shapes the 
participation of women in this case. It was found that the avenues opened for women to 
participate in the management and productive use of forests do not challenge the specific gender-
biased contextual contours of rural societies in Tambacounda that have historically prevented 
women from thriving economically. Due to lack of consideration to the socio-economic 
stratification present within the female rural population, the current focus on local governance and 
project efforts to involve women in the forest management and the charcoal sector have favored 
elite women over poorer and less advantageously positioned women. 
 
Paper 3: The factors contributing to and the implications of elite capture spans various scales as 
shown by the first paper, which addresses supra-national and national forces, and the second 
paper, which probes into the local dimensions. The third paper: “Institutional Recognition and 
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Elite Capture in the Forestry Sector: Implications for development outcomes of Wula Nafaa in 
Tambacounda, Senegal” is sequitur to both the first and second papers. This third paper outlines 
the linkages between intra-rural differential access to a natural resource-based productive 
opportunities and the regional disparities in the levels of development and wealth movement 
between regions. In Senegal, the locus for rural development offered by democratic 
decentralization is an institution: the democratically elected Rural Council. Evidence indicated 
that decentralized forestry was accompanied by intensification of elite capture in the charcoal 
sector at a local level leading to specific patterns of wealth accumulation within villages. 
Institutions such as the Rural Council and the FMCs which have the function of democratically 
representing and engaging inhabitants instead enabled only a small group of advantageously 
placed elites to grab and dominate the access to forest resources. Elite capture not only excludes 
poorer groups from entering the lucrative charcoal business but has implications for contributing 
to the existing spatial disparities in development between the remote rural regions and the 
urbanized areas. Urban centers remain magnets for capital investment even for wealth generated 
in the rural zones. 
  
This research explored institutional blockages using the institutional choice and recognition 
framework of Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina (2008).  Representation when conceived as a function 
of accountability4 and responsiveness is essential to keep in check the calculated choices fuelled 
by the self-preservation and/or predatory instincts of institutions that govern as well as ensuring 
                                                             
4Formal mechanisms of accountability through which citizens have the possibility of holding their representatives 
responsible for the decisions and actions taken. Ability and ease to legal recourse, polycentricity, independent or 
third-party monitoring, transparency, free media, civic education, the practice of public discussion, participatory 
processes, discretionary powers, proximity of leaders, administrative dependence and social movements are all 
aspects that give indications as to the accountability mechanisms at work. 
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that they respond to the populations’ needs and aspirations (Przeworski et al., 1999; Beck, 2005; 
Young, 1994). The objective of exploring institutional arrangements and blockages was to find 
context-attentive institutional configurations with that might strengthen politically guaranteed and 
legally protected representation. 
  
The remainder of this introduction, section 1.2 provides the background to the case study 
presented in this dissertation. Sub-section 1.2.1 offers an account of Senegal’s forestry sector; 
describing the forests and policies and sub-section 1.2.2 covers the institutional arrangements for forest 
management in Senegal. Parts 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 present descriptions of the two forestry-development 
projects studied (USAID’s Wula Nafaa and the World Bank’s PROGEDE). This chapter ends 
with section 1.3 with an outline of the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
 
1.2 Background  
Senegal’s forests are an important natural resource providing urban households with cooking fuel 
in the form of charcoal. Eighty four percent of households depend on wood-based fuels for their 
basic energy needs (mostly cooking): 26% rely on charcoal and 58% on firewood. Biomass 
continues to dominate national energy consumption patterns (58%), as compared to oil products 
(38%), and other energy sources (4%) (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Forests are a source of local and national wealth in Senegal. Charcoal merchants based in urban 
regions, however, have typically been the beneficiaries of forest commerce. There is a constant 
tension in Senegal between urban need for charcoal, urban-based merchants seeking to maximize 
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profits from forests and the needs and aspiration of rural forest-dependent populations. Now that 
decentralization of forest management facilitated the transfer of charcoal production opportunities 
from the hands of the urban-dwellers to those of rural inhabitants, there are tensions emerging 
within the rural communities. Charcoal production and commerce is a lucrative sector generating 
considerable amounts of wealth in the rural communities that have taken up charcoal production. 
Charcoal-derived wealth, however, is accumulated by a few rural charcoal producers, reflecting 
inequalities in forest villagers’ abilities to benefit from the forests.  
 
Forest resource-based development and energy diversification projects sponsored by USAID and 
the World Bank respectively intervened to assist rural populations to gain greater profits from 
forests while also managing the forest resource in an environmentally sustainable and 
participatory manner. These projects, despite aiming at increasing local incomes through 
institutional configurations to promote inclusive or participatory forest management, were 
incapable of benefitting all villagers equally. The project were less beneficial to members of rural 
communities lacking livelihood opportunities.  
 
The following section describes the zone under study, forest resource management in rural 
Senegal, the two forestry-related projects studied, and the institutional arrangements implemented 




1.2.1 Senegal’s Forests and Policies 
 
Senegal has an area of about 196,720 square Kilometers with a dry, Sudano-Sahelian, climate and 
a rainy season extending from July till October. Fifty eight percent (58%) of the country’s twelve-
million inhabitants are rural. The vegetation consists of steppes, savanna and sparse forest cover 
that varies between 45% and 71% (if all forested zones are considered). Each year, 45,000 
hectares of forests are lost to forest fires, agricultural expansion or human settlement 
encroachment, overexploitation for wood extraction, expansion of mining areas. The bulk of 
wood-based fuels used in Senegal are supplied from the southern and south-western zones (Kolda 
and Tambacounda), which account for the country’s existing standing wood stock (World Bank, 
2010). The projects I have studied were located in Tambacounda, one of the larger charcoal 
production zones. 
 
Forests in Senegal are divided into two categories: (i) the domaine classé (classified forest) and 
(ii) domaine protégé (protected forest). The domaine classé takes up 31.7% of the country’s land 
surface area and consists of ‘classified’ (meaning gazetted or reserved) forests, areas under 
reforestation and restoration, integral natural reserves, national parks and special reserves. The 
domaine protégé comprises of forests that are not within the domaine classé and not part of the 
land belonging to the local communities and that are used for settlement, agriculture and livestock 
farming. The domaine protégé occupies 6,500,000 hectares and its management is under the care 
of the local government (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Both the domaine protégé and classé were under the direct management of Forestry Services until 
the decentralization in 1996 when the forests under the domaine protégé were placed under the 
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care of the elected local governments. In both the domaine protégé and classé zones, the 
authorization for hunting and other exploitation purposes was regulated according to codes and 
decrees laid out by the Forest Service, an executive branch of the Ministry of Environment 
(Hamel, 2010). 
 
Fig.1.1. The zones in green depict the forested areas in Senegal. The richer zones (darker) are the 
ones where most of the charcoal production takes place. 
 
(Source: PROGEDE) 
Senegal’s 1996 Decentralization Laws5 transferred formerly centralized powers, including powers 
over natural resource management, to three orders of local government: the region, the district (la 
                                                             
5 Law No. 96-06 of March 22, 1996 pertaining to the Local Government Code and the Law No. 96-07 of Mars 22, 
1996 portant transfert de competences aux regions, communes et aux Communautés Rurales.  
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commune) and the Rural Council (Communauté Rurale). Certain components of the Forestry 
Code - Law no. 93-06 February 4, 1993 and its implementing decree no. 95-357 of April 11, 1995 
- had to be modified to accommodate the innovations made by the decentralization laws (RdS 
1994, 1998). Those include the ability of the State to grant the management of a part of the forest 
to local government, on the basis of a management plan and the possibility to local governments 
subsidies on the national forestry funds according to the terms set by decree. The 
decentralizations reforms, thus, aim at establishing the power of local governments to manage 
forests belonging to the state and handed over to the local communities. The local government 
can enter into contracts with other parties regarding forests they have been entrusted to manage 
and can recruit forest agents for the surveillance of their forests. The local government, however, 
can exercise their rights to exploit the forest only while respecting the prescriptions of 
management plans approved by the State (RdS, 2003). The decentralization was a radical 
departure from previous policy. It gave elected local government the ability to sign off on any 
commercial activities in its area, and it gave them the right to allocate use and commercial rights 
in the protected forests in their jurisdiction. 
 
Despite these gains, the forest service has not allowed this devolution to fully take place. The 
resources has been degraded over the past several decades by forest fires, overgrazing, excessive 
exploitation of forests, clearing of forested lands. The Forestry Service has maintained a discourse 
that forest degradation is due to haphazard and unrestrained use by local populations. On these 
grounds, the Forest Service has argued that they must continue to control management due to the 




1.2.2 The Institutional Arrangements for Forest Management in Senegal 
 
The government of Senegal elaborated a Forest Development Master Plan (Plan Directeur de 
Développement Forestier- PDDF) in 1981. This was the first home-grown policy document 
establishing a strategy to guide forest resource conservation to promote more investment in the 
forest sector. The Forest Development Master Plan was then revised in 1989 to take into 
consideration the changing national and international context resulting in the Senegal Forest 
Action Plan (Plan d’Action Forestier du Sénégal – PAFS, 1993). Emanating from the Senegal 
Forest Action Plan were options aiming at the conservation of forest resources and maintaining 
socio-ecological balances as well as satisfying the need for forest products. The Senegal Forest 
Action Plan allowed for formalization of the participatory approach and integrating forestry in 
rural development.  
 
With the onset of the decentralization process under the 1996 Decentralization Law, the Senegal 
Forest Action Plan was revamped to accommodate the transfer of powers to manage 
environmental and natural resources to the local government and the resulting document is what 
is known as Senegal’s Forest Policy6 (Politique Forestière du Sénégal – PFS) in 2005 (Hamel et 
al., 2010; World Bank, 2010).  
 
 
                                                             
6 Note that the forestry policy in law is the Forestry Code. This document is the policy vision and the general set of 
tenets that follow from the forestry code. Forestry activities are legally held to the articles of the Forestry Code and 
not to this general policy document.  
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The main prescripts of Senegal’s Forestry Policy are: (i) greater responsibility handed to local 
governments, (ii) community forest management and use, (iii) equitable wealth creation and 
distribution, (iv) durability of achievements made by interventions, (v) eco-geographical zones 
approach, and (vi) promoting a gender-sensitive approach.  
 
The 1996 decentralization laws make provision for the transfer of forest management powers to 
Rural Councils and the clause L.3, Chapter 1of the Forestry Code: Law No.98-03 of January 08, 
1998, offer the specifics about forest management with respect to charcoal production. Clause L.3 
states that forests can be exploited only after the granting of a permit for exploiting the forest and 
the issuing of which requires payment of fees. Furthermore, Clause L.4 stipulates that exploitation 
permits are to be delivered by the Forestry Services but the exploitation should be contingent on 
the prior authorization of the President of the Rural Council and complies with the prescriptions 
of the approved management plans. Clauses R.19 and R.20 in Chapter II of the decree 98-164 of 
February 20, 1998 of Forestry Code hold that the permits cannot be retroceded or sold and the 
Forestry Services has been given the responsibility of ensuring that the forest exploitation has 
been carried out according to the management principles for the sustainability of forest resources. 
 
The Forest Service issues a limited number of permits that allow the transportation of charcoal 
from the zones of production to the market (usually the city of Dakar) each year. There are two 
types of permits, one for each category of charcoal producer: (i) the external charcoal producer’s 
permit which is used by the big charcoal merchants based in Dakar and other cities and (ii) the 
local charcoal producer’s permit destined to the producers who are inhabitants of the Rural 
Communities. A transportation permit is only delivered upon the presentation of a record of 
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production and a voucher handed over by Forest Management Committees (FMCs) that are 
constituted of and run by inhabitants of Rural Communities where the charcoal is produced. This 
transportation permit document locally known as ‘permis de circulation’ is to certify that the 
charcoal being transported out of the Rural Communities is from within the zone designated for 
charcoal production for that year and that the required charcoal taxes have been paid by the 
producer (see Fig. 1.2.).  
Fig. 1.2. Shows how the tax paid on each bag of charcoal is distributed (in Wula Nafaa zones).  
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The 1996 decentralization process restructured authority over natural resource management 
through the devolution of that authority from the Central State-level government to the local 
democratically elected representative body, the Rural Council. The 1998 Forestry Code provided 
the technical guidelines for how the forests are to be managed if the inhabitants of the Rural 
Communities were to exploit them. According to the Forestry Code, any forests under the 
governance of the Rural Council require a Forest Management Plan (FMP) plan laying out the 
technical guidelines to be followed to allow for sustainable exploitation of forests and 
administrative and financial procedures for a more organized management. Forest Management 
Plans consist of the time-specific and geographically specific programming of the management of 
forests for the realization of benefits – economic, cultural and environmental. That management 
plan is required by law for all forests that are 20 hectares or more in size. 
 
To implement the prescriptions of sustainable forest management and the institutional in a more 
organized manner, each of the two projects set up their own type of forest management 
committees in the zones where they intervened. In the USAID zones, they were called ‘Conseil de 
gestion de forêt’ (Forest Management Councils) and in the PROGEDE, the committees were 
called ‘Comité de gestion des forêts’ (Forest Management Committees) but throughout this 
document I will call these all of these committees Forest Management Committees (FMCs).  With 
the fund created through payment of charcoal taxes, the FMCs would carry out projects 
concerning forests designed within their annual work plan. Before decentralization, such projects 
were under the aegis of the forestry agents but now tasks like tree planting, the hiring of forest 
guards and fire-fighting are carried out in collaboration with the local population grouped and 
organized into FMCs.  
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In 2008, a development policy circular was written by the Government of Senegal about meeting 
the demand for household fuel in an environmentally sustainable manner. The main points of that 
policy move included improving both supply and demand sides of fuel wood and wood-derived 
resources by encouraging participatory community forest management as a means of ensuring 
sustainable wood fuel supply management and providing alternative sources of energy via 
diversification of energy sources, and research and development of, for instance, cooking stoves. 
 
The management plans that the Forest Service could control. The plans were complex and 
cumbersome such that rural councils were not able to develop or propose them and the forest 
service itself claimed not to have the finances to develop them. Hence up until 2005 there were 
very few management plans. This meant that control over the forests remained with the Forest 
Service. Here is where development projects stepped in. PROGEDE of the World Bank and Wula 
Nafaa of US Agency for International Development (USAID) were already in place as forestry 
oriented local development projects. They both decided to fund the development of management 
plans in order to promote sustainable forest management and to help promote the decentralization 
of forest management so that forestry could serve the development needs of rural populations. In 
the next two sections, I introduce these two projects.  
 
Both projects aimed at supporting, at least in rhetoric, the national decentralization and forestry 
policy positions – local representation in management for the purposes of sound forest 
management and local development. The projects had stated objectives to be pro-poor and to 
support gender equity in forest decisions and benefits. Their intervention contributed of the 
projects in turning decentralization into a motor for equitable local development, pro-poor, or 
200 CFA Francs  




supportive of women as they had initially aimed to do. Below I describe the two major 
development projects, Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE that have been deeply implicated in the 
development and implementation of forestry policy in Senegal. These projects are the focus of 
this dissertation.  
 
1.2.3 Wula Nafaa (Agriculture and Natural Resources Management Program) 
Wula Naafa is an environment and development project financed by USAID and implemented by 
a US-based contractor, International Resources Group (IRG). The activities of the USAID’s 
Agriculture and Natural Resource Program or Wula Nafaa (WN) in Senegal are within the 
framework of two Strategic Objectives which were agreed upon by the USAID and the 
Government of Senegal. The Strategic Objectives consist of: (i) Sustainable increases in private 
sector income-generating activities in selected sectors, and (ii) improved local delivery of services 
and sustainable use of resources in targeted areas. The objective of Wula Nafaa is to contribute to 
poverty reduction and to sustainable local development by increasing rural communities and 
producer revenues through handing responsibility to local authorities and encouraging 
decentralized, integrated and participatory resource management (USAID, 2008). Wula Nafaa is 
implemented as a two-phase project: Phase I, February 2003-May 2008, Phase II from 2009 to 
2013. 
 
The principal goal of Wula Nafaa has been to “contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable 
local development by increasing rural communities’ and producer revenues through handling 
responsibility to local authorities and encouraging decentralized, integrated and participatory 
resource management” (USAID, 2008).  An important component of Wula Nafaa’s approach is 
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the integration of an administrative and financial management system (the GAF – Gestion 
Administrative et Financière) that defines the procedures for collecting and spending revenues 
generated from forest taxes. In addition to the re-organization led by decentralization, the 
implementation of the Wula Nafaa project required another layer of reorganization of powers 
among the already existing institutions- and the newly created ones –the FMCs. This re-
organization involved a ‘sharing’ of tasks related to forest management whereby Rural Councils 
share powers with the other institutions: the project-created FMCs and the Forestry Services, all 
the guidelines of which are laid out in the Forest Management Plans produced by the projects.  
 
Through its Rights and Responsibilities component, Wula Nafaa provided support to local 
communities by putting 77,000 hectares of forest under community management all while 
following the laws and regulations enacted by the Government of Senegal. Wula Nafaa 
introduced approaches involved assigning greater responsibility on the members of the local 
community in managing their forests. The people were organized into Block Management 
Committees: the forest of Sita Niaoulé is divided into three blocks, therefore has three Block 
Management Committees. A Block Management Committee constitutes one management unit for 
a part of the forest. Each managed part of the forest is called a ‘block’ (see Fig. 1.3.). Each block 
has its own bureau composed of a president, vice-president, secretary general, an assistant 
secretary general, a technical officer, an assistant technical officer. The blocks were delimited in 
such a way so that each block contains approximately the same worth of wood fuel and other non-
timber products. The blocks are further sub-divided into parcels so as to allow for a rotational use-
pattern of eight years – that allows for a fallow period sufficient for the regeneration of the forest, 
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based on research results of Arbonnier and Faye’s 1988 study.7 All the Block Management 
Committees are subjected to the authority of the Council of Forest Management, situated at the 
apex of the whole structure and chaired by a member of the Rural Council (See Fig. 1.4). 
to an overall increase in wealth generation from forests at the local level but less far-reaching was 
the success  
 
Fig. 1.3. Division of Sita Niaoulé forest into three blocks according to its Management Plan 
 
 




                                                             
7 Arbonnier, M. & Faye, B. (1988) Etude de la forêt classée de Koumpentoum, Projet d’Aménagement et de 
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Fig. 1.5. Administrative and Financial Management Structure for forests under Forest 
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Wula Nafaa’s emphasis on a consensual procedures approach type of management system 
translated itself through activities involving participatory processes in the conception, drafting 
and adoption of documents for the administration and financial management and the setting up of 
the management structures. Furthermore, the project offered training to the members of the 
management structures in procedures and tools in Administrative and Financial Management. The 
bureau of the Block Management Committees was provided with a locale, materials such as work 
documents and furnishings. The Wula Nafaa field staff (facilitateurs) would pay regular visits to 
guide the office bearers and oversee their activities as well as provide feedback to the project 
staff. 
 
1.2.4 PROGEDE (Projet de gestion durable et participative des énergies 
traditionelles et de substitution / Sustainable and participatory energy management) 
 
PROGEDE is a World Bank project supported by the International Development Association and 
Nordic Development Fund. The first phase of the project, PROGEDE-I, was implemented by the 
Government of Senegal from 1997 to 2004. PROGEDE-I’s objective was to improve the 
management of wood resources, limiting their use through energy savings measures and 
improving the capabilities of the public sector to effectively coordinate and control the sector 
(Intelligent Energy – Europe). According to World Bank reports, PROGEDE I has been 
acclaimed to be the first project involving heavy reliance on active participation of the local 
community and has since then become a model for similar interventions in the forestry sector. 
The success of PROGEDE-I attracted the support of the World Bank for the second phase of the 




PROGEDE’s development objective is to contribute to an increase in the availability of 
diversified household fuels in a sustainable and gender equitable way, and to contribute to 
increase the income of participating communities while preserving the forest ecosystems. The 
project has four major components: 
- The institutional reforms of the charcoal value chain that will address the political 
economy and equity issues (income and decision making) especially in the supplied 
regions and the whole country in general. It will support central and decentralized 
government. Local government as well as communities for the implementation of the 
reform. 
- The sustainable wood fuel supply management will finance technical assistance, logistical 
support and equipment to central and decentralized forestry services, local collectivities. 
- The promotion and diversification of modern household energy will finance technical 
assistance, logistical means and equipment for the directorate of Petroleum Products and 
Household Energy (DPHE) and private entrepreneurs to support massive production and 
dissemination of improved stoves and alternative wood fuel. 
- The institutional arrangements for project implementation will support government 
institutions and community organizations to play their rightful roles in scaling up the 
program; hence the consultants will play a more catalytic, supportive and advisory role. 
(World Bank, 2010). 
 
The FMCs created by PROGEDE were initially called CVGD - Comité Villageois de 
Développement, a unit created for each block of the forest was divided into. All the CVGDs 
would then report to the CIVGD – Comités Inter-villageois de Gestion et de Développement – 
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Inter-village Committee for Management and Development was the inter-village committee, 
overseeing the functioning of all the CVGDs of the forest. The CIVGD are comparable to the 
Block Management Committees of Wula Nafaa as the members of the executive unit at this level 
possess clout conferred by the dint of being the interface between the local producers and the 
authorities immediately higher up in their respective institutional hierarchies. In the case of Wula 
Nafaa, that authority would be the President of the Forest Management Council who is also a 
member of the democratically elected local government. However, for PROGEDE, the CIVGD 
would report to the project or donor agency staff through the project field staff (called animateurs 
in the case of PROGEDE) instead of the democratically elected local government.  
 
Fig 1.6. illustrates the internal structure of PROGEDE’s Forest Management Committee, formerly 
known as the CIVGD and now renamed as CGF (Comité de Gestion des Forêts). The second phase of 
PROGEDE saw a re-arrangement in the composition of the structure and the linkages with other 
institutions such as the Rural Council. The criteria for membership in the new forest management 
committees proposed in 2013 were (1) only villagers who are not charcoal producers be eligible 
to be members of the executive bureau of the structure, (2) candidates for positions in the bureau 
should be sufficiently literate in French language, (3) gender parity among the village level 
representatives; it should mandatorily consist of one man and one woman both having a minimum 
required level of French from each village. There would be 15 members in a committee per each 





Fig. 1.6. PROGEDE II’s new forest management structure, CGF – Comité de Gestion des Forêts 
replacing the structures exiting in phase one. 
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1.3 Outline of dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 delineates the theoretical axes along 
which this research was carried out, mainly decentralization and democratic representation, theory 
of access and elite capture. The main conceptual framing that guided research question 
formulation and the operationalization of analysis were Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) 
Institutional Choice and Recognition Framework. This overarching framework was used in 
conjunction with additional conceptual framing in each respective chapter. The second portion of 
Chapter 2 is devoted the hypotheses and research questions and third portion describes the data 
collection methods.  
 
The third chapter entitled “The process of institutional choice and recognition for the 
decentralized forest management in charcoal-producing zones of Tambacounda, Senegal” offers 
insight into the conditions under which the institutional choice and recognition process takes 
place. Based on Grindle’s (2005) “Process of Policy and Institutional Reform,” institutional 
choice is explained as a product emanating from various arenas of policy conception and project 
design involving higher-level institutions. I advance a set of criteria that are taken into 
consideration by higher-level institutions when choosing the local institutional partners to 
recognize; to give powers and resources to. 
 
Chapter 4: “Instrumentalizing gender: When elite capture intersects with gender-focused actions 
of forest resource management projects in Senegal.” demonstrates, through gender-focused 
actions of development agencies, the effects of institutional choice within a Rural Community. 
This case study reveals how the recognition of specific institutions affects the outcomes of efforts 
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to involve women in the charcoal sector, a male-dominated income-generating sector. Inspired 
from Cornwall (2003) and Arnstein (1969) and based on fieldwork observations, I examine how 
the concept of participation which is at the core in ‘sound development practice, is construed 
differently and used opportunistically at the various stages of project design and implementation 
by various institutions and structures. The participatory approach unfolding in a decentralized 
context, consolidated elite capture through the involvement of some women while the women 
who do not possess the access qualifications remain excluded from wealth-generation 
opportunities.  
 
The fifth chapter: “Institutional Recognition and Elite Capture in the Forestry Sector: 
Implications for development outcomes of Wula Nafaa in Tambacounda, Senegal.” exposes the 
broader implications of local-level elite capture. It delves into the shift of elite capture of the 
charcoal sector to the Rural Communities after the onset of decentralization. The resulting intra-
local disparities in access to forest resources is illustrated through the emergence of a hierarchy 
among rural charcoal producers. The presence of this hierarchy whereby there are a few big rural 
charcoal producers and smaller producers earning less from their product, concentrates the 
revenues from a common local resource into the hands of a small group of elites who might not 
invest in the rural zones but in the urban zones where returns are higher.  The entrenchment of 
skewed access to forest resources and accumulation of wealth contributes to the disparities in 
rural and urban development. The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, highlights the main findings of 
this dissertation and brings out the contribution it makes to theory, literature and methods. It 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMING AND METHODS 
 
2.1     Conceptual Framing  
The first subsection entitled “The Institutional Choice and Recognition Framework” presents the 
conceptual framing that guided the approach to the research questions. In the second subsection, 
“Elite capture as a function of access”, the phenomenon of elite capture is explained using a 
Theory of Access outlining how elite capture and recognition of specific institutional 
configuration shape unequal access to forest resources for populations in the Rural Community.  
“Institutions, Decentralization and Democracy: Following the rules while eroding the substance?” 
the third section describes how following laws and regulations to the letter without adequate 
attention to making their content meaningful in terms of bringing positive transformative changes 
for the local populations. The fourth section: “Representation of Citizens,” introduces how 
institutional recognition determines the local institutions that will be available and endowed with 
resources for the villagers to interact concerning forest resources. By so doing, the recognized 
institutions also define who among the members of the local population can participate as a 
citizen or not in a democratic decentralized forest management context.  
 
2.1.1 The Institutional Choice and Recognition Framework 
In the chapters of this dissertation I use the choice and recognition framework to assess the 
reasons that elected local governments do or do not empower local citizens. The concept of 
choice and recognition is built around the notion of ‘institutional choice’ put forward by Bates 
(1981) and Taylor’s (1994) ‘politics of recognition’. When used in conjunction, those two notions 
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can help explain how higher-level institutions shape the policy outcomes, and particularly 
democracy outcomes, at local level. The local institutions that outside actors, what I will call 
‘intervening agents’, choose to partner with, and the agency and the actions of those chosen 
institutions in turn, are influenced by institutional recognition: the bringing into being of 
institutions and conferring of powers upon them, thus legitimizing the authority of the chosen 
institutions. Recognition molds the dimensions of democracy: representation, citizenship and 
public domain, which are crucial for determining how democratic a decentralization process turns 
out to be. When applied in the context of researching a decentralized mode of natural resource 
management, the concept of choice and recognition sheds light on the various processes at play 
that result in the building of institutional infrastructure enabling local populations to engage with 
those who govern them, and the fostering of accountability and responsiveness from those who 
make and act on decisions on their local populations. 
 
The suitability of this approach for studying the motives behind formal decision-making practices 
and procedures is justified by its broad applicability: it provides a heuristic of studying the high 
politics of choice (institutional choice) without having to leave out “the people” part from the 
analysis. The mix of institutions chosen to secure economic development permitted the 
entrenchment of enormously powerful private interests in the charcoal production sector in 
Senegal. This choice can become an important source of the durability of policies and practices 
with negative effects on equitable distribution of economic benefits when non-representative 
institutions are selected. It can also, if intervening agents aim for democratic outcomes, present 
political opportunity for the previously unrepresented or misrepresented community members 
(van de Walle, 2001; Bates, 1981). The study of institutional choice offers insights on ‘windows 
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of opportunity’ at policy and institutional levels, for bending the path-dependency that scholars 
have so often used to explain institutional rigidity (Putnam, 1994; Evans, 1996).  
 
Of crucial relevance to this research project, apart from examining the rationale behind 
institutional choice, is the study of effects of those choices. This is made feasible through the 
‘recognition’ component of the framework which helps us to evaluate how well articulated8 the 
political system is – that is, the degree to which representatives can be influenced by the people. 
The effects of recognition – the acknowledgment of a local institution that has been chosen as a 
local partner – influences the representation, citizenship and public domain dimensions of 
democracy.  
 
The effects of institutional recognition will be influenced by the type of goals that the externally 
funded programs want to achieve. Based on the existing literature, higher-level institutions are 
more inclined to choose project goals with substantive objectives over the procedural goals of 
democracy (World Bank, 2010; USAID, 2011). Such a preference has been attributed to several 
reasons such as expediency in the execution of tasks; the belief that using institutions that involve 
mostly civil society would equate to democracy; an anti-government stance resulting from a 
disenchantment based on the government’s track-record and the conscious or unconscious 
tendency to create spaces that privilege certain economic activities that promote prebendalism9 
(Ribot and Oyono, 2005). Thus, this penchant for certain types of goals and the ensuing choice of 
                                                             
8 Chhatre (1998) defines ‘political articulation’ as the “degree to which citizens and citizen groups can influence 
policy through democratic institutions” 
9 Prebendalism occurs when elected and government officials feel entitled to a share of public funds and government 
revenues even if they legally are not authorized to do so. 
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local institutions to achieve them may be a product of the need to maximize benefits for certain 
groups or in the self-interest of the state (North, 1990; Bates, 1981). Such types of goals also lend 
themselves to policy designs currently used by donor agencies and central governments but may 
not be the best arrangements to meet needs and aspirations of the majority of the local 
community. Simultaneously, the need to manufacture certain forms of success out of those 
projects overlooks the procedural aspects such as the presence of a terrain that will enable 
democratic culture to flourish (Baviskar, 2004; Conyers, 2007). Reconciliation of both types of 
goals is possible but is most potent if an enabling environment is already existent, evincing the 
necessity of goals emphasizing merging procedural aspects with instrumental ones. 
 
2.1.2 Elites and Access 
Elite capture occurs when privileged groups of people manipulating decision-making arenas and 
agendas and monopolizing or misappropriating benefits and resources at the expense of the non-
elites. Elite capture can performed in different ways by different types of elites. The group of elite 
is not confined kin-based or hereditary government arrangements but has to be extended to 
include a wider range of actors such as government officials especially forestry agents, members 
of forest management committees set up by the projects as well as members of the democratically 
elected local government. 
 
Zooming in the rural communities reveals that, after the onset of decentralization and with the 
advent of projects, there has been a reconfiguration in the elite capture scene with an 
intensification and spreading of patron-client relationships within the rural communities. In the 
past, the foresters used to connive with the urban-based merchants to extract as much profits from 
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charcoal made in rural areas. Now that charcoal business is no longer the turf of only the urban-
based merchants and their long-standing allies, that is, the foresters, the many newcomers, that is 
the rural-based producers have now established themselves and have started co-opting any actor 
who could reinforce their position and increase their ability to produce and sell more charcoal or 
to siphon off privileges that would allow them to do so. This aspect reveals the dynamism of elite 
domination which is characterized by a process of ‘elite continuity, transformation and 
replacement’ through which elites cooperate, compete and reconcile their differences. This 
somewhat intractable nature of elite capture can make it pernicious to participatory initiatives. 
  
Specific types of elites develop in different contexts and I have used Ribot and Peluso’s theory of 
access to conceptualize ‘elites.’ Ribot and Peluso (2003) define access as the “ability to derive 
benefits from things”, in this case, forest resources. The conceptualization of elites in terms of a 
group of individuals possessing access qualifications (see Fig. 2.1.) allowing them to gain and 
control access prevents confinement to only certain attributes such as high social class, male, 
wealthy, therefore avoiding the rigidity of an absolute elite/non-elite binary. When seen through 
the lens of theory of access, the blurring of certain social dividing lines would take place because 
of mutual interests; influences between economic bases, forms of social and political 
organization. For instance, a rural charcoal producer of higher social rank (such as that of a 
village chief) may not have the access qualifications to sell their charcoal on the urban market and 
therefore may defer to another, lower socially-ranked rural charcoal producer’s control of access 
to the market. The elites would pool their access qualifications to consolidate their economically-
based ties through the capture of the new bureaucratic forms of management. This elite capture 
combined with the differential access to markets in the cities led to oligopsony in the charcoal 
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sector at the rural level described in the third paper. The charcoal sector offered a new niche for 
those who were qualified to control access forest resources, making them part of the ‘charcoal 
niche elite’ group. There are overlaps between those who form the ‘charcoal niche elite’ and those 
who are elites in other economic or social sectors highlighting the cumulative aspect of how elites 
construct their control over access. 
 
The various groups of elites have different motivating factors and different opportunities. Forestry 
services officials seek to control access to technology and knowledge about forests while a 
member of the rural council might want to have the reigns of the bank account where all the 
charcoal taxes are deposited. Foresters often use their political clout and their knowledge of the 
bureaucratic machinery to retain power over forest resources, making even non-technical issues 
sound as if they require some kind of scientific expertise. To maintain the legitimacy of their 
authority, forestry services officials play their act as indispensable technicians whose arguments 
have incontestable scientific soundness to the hilt. As Ribot (2007) points out: foresters impose 
justification based on seemingly technical arguments and are unopposed even when their 
arguments are specious. This is backed by their long-standing image since the colonial era and 
now as a branch of the central government having the authority to use repressive force that often 






Fig. 2.1. Shows the different types of “access qualifications” that lead to variation in the ability to 
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2.1.3 Institutions, Decentralization and Democracy: Following the rules while 
eroding the substance? 
Debates on the models of democracy that African countries need to adopt abound in the literature 
(Ake, 1996; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Villalon and VonDoepp, 2008; Beck, 2008). Many 
African countries have adopted the procedural forms of democracy without corresponding 
widespread and deep actualization of substantive effects of democracy such as inclusiveness and 
economic redistribution. Procedural democracy meeting the minimal requirements such as the 
holding of elections in order to be qualified as a democracy but which are not sufficient to 
systematically equate to substantive democracy.  
 
Senegal enjoys the reputation of one of the better-faring democracies of Africa albeit with certain 
‘deficiencies’ that earn it the designation of being a ‘clientelistic democracy’ (Beck, 2008). 
Scholars claim that there are important linkages between democracy and effective 
decentralization (Cohen & Peterson, 1999; Ribot, 1995). Ribot (2009) puts forward that, for 
democratic decentralization to operate effectively, the “first and most important step is to choose 
democracy by working with or building democratic institutions” which can formally be held 
downwardly accountable. Inclusion and representation in the local arena are shaped by the way 
institutions come into being (how they are recognized) which in turn influences the ways they 
operate; hence the need to explore the building and functioning of institutions as a fundamental 
component of participation and accountability. Local democracy is unlikely without the presence 





According to North (1990), institutions are human-devised structures that are meant to create 
order and constraints for human activities, anything from political, economic to social. Institutions 
can be both formal, such as rules, laws and informal, such as social norms, codes of conduct. 
Although certain types of institutions dealt with in this research conform to a formalist 
categorization (like the central government, elected local government, project-created forest 
management structures) others may not be neatly reified as such, not conforming to any specific 
legal-formal definition. Indeed, the character of the formality of the institutions may not be 
indicative of the actual nature of transactions taking place or the type of constraints that are being 
complied to. For instance, government officials and members of civil society may willingly 
consent to corrupt practices regarding activities regulated by the forestry services, illustrating how 
institutions considered to be formally structured are embedded in informal rules or constraints.  
 
In conjuncture with North’s definition, the frame of reference used to conceptualize institutions 
for this research will also be based on Galvan’s definition (Galvan and Marcus, 2003), that is, 
institutions were considered as being “regimes of coordination among the layers of elements…: 
more formal and visible layers (formal organizations and formal rules) as well as deeper, less 
visible, informal layers (informal rules, habituated patterns of action, as well as values, attitudes 
and beliefs. Institutions work to coordinate behavior to the extent that they establish 
correspondence and synergy among...these layered components.” Recent discussions about the 
roles of associations and relationships of "social capital” provide useful insights about the chosen 
institutional strategies shaping access of local populations to forest resources (Bebbington & 
Kopp, 1998; Vira et al., 1998; Evans, 1996). This “social capital” is conceptualized in terms of 





Democratic decentralization reforms consisting of the establishment and empowerment of 
democratically elected government at the local level have been widely promoted. Underlying this 
thrust for democratic decentralization is the need to provide local populations in Rural 
Communities with institutionalized political representation with the hope that it will result in 
functioning local democracy (Boutinot, 2002; 2005; 2007; Ribot, 2004). Democratic 
decentralization is valued because of the multi-dimensional benefits are theorized to provide: 1. 
efficiency, 2. equity, 3. service provision, 4. participation and democratization, and 5. national 
cohesion (Bardhan & Mookherjeee, 2006; Ribot, 2004). In theory, representation, as it is 
established in local institutions through democratic decentralization, plays an important role in 
shaping the equity and efficiency dimensions of economic development. In practice, 
representation has been shown to shape how benefits from forestry resources are distributed 
within local populations (Ribot 2004; Bazaara, 2006; Ribot, Lund and Treue, 2010). 
 
Democratic decentralization allows for representation in the form of a formalized link between 
the individual, household and community and state, becoming a process that can influence the 
political economy of access to forests. Representation is a mechanism that can enable citizens to 
be active and exert influence on policy rather than just be mere subjects who have to endure the 
effects of policies applied to them. It is this empowering transformation, from subject to citizen 
that can endow community members with the ability to influence those who govern them (Ribot, 




According to Ribot (2007), “well-structured elected local government may appear to be a good 
choice for sustainably improving local public-sector accountability and service delivery.” He 
holds that despite possessing this potential for democratic representation and inclusive 
participation of local community, the elected local governments, especially the Rural Council, in 
Senegal are circumvented by the central government and the donor agencies. Ribot adds that the 
Rural Council, the most-local democratically elected government, has been handed inadequate 
resources and lack any significant discretionary power over forest resources, hindering 
democratic representation. Seen in the light of arguments provided by Ribot, the recognition of 
the Rural Council would be conducive to representation of local populations in decision-making 
and action related to forests. As democratically elected representatives, the Rural Council would 
be downwardly accountable to the local populations by being responsive to the populations’ needs 
and aspirations. 
 
Paper 1 dissects the institutional recognition process to examine the reasons for the distribution of 
authority and resources among the local institutions involved in forest resources the Rural 
Community level.  The Rural Council is the most procedural-democracy compliant institution at 
the local level in Senegal but lacks the logistical means of managing its local population’s 
sustainable exploitation of forests for the commercial production of charcoal. Instead, structures 
run by the members of the public: the Forest Management Committees (FMCs), were created and 
recognized by the donor-funded projects to implement policy and project activities. Not having a 
legal status per se, the FMCs were accommodated by the Rural Councils because the FMCs 
shoulder a large part of the forest charcoal production administrative and management 
responsibilities and are an integral part of the implementation of Forest Management Plans. While 
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the Forestry Code makes the implementation of Forest Management Plans mandatory for any 
commercial exploitation taking place in the Rural Communities, it does not lay out the specifics 
of the modes of accountability between the FMCs and other local institutions. It then becomes the 
appendage of donor agencies that also provide the technical assistance and draft the Forest 
Management Plans on behalf of the Rural Communities, to define the institutional relation that 
FMCs have with the Rural Council.  
 
The mix of institutions, currently operating in Senegal are creating a kind of pluralism that 
bolsters elite capture; the government and projects chosen partners who may work for vested 
interests and not for the community due to their lack of local accountabilities (Platteau, 2004; 
Platteau and Abraham, 2002). The Rural Council is thus by default ‘dispensed’ of its democratic 
representation functions for most of the forest management issues because tasks are now shared 
between the FMCs and the Rural Council. This diffused pertinence of the Rural Council in the 
charcoal production management institutional arrangement and the presence of an institution 
operated by the public further dispossesses marginalized groups of democratic representation or 
access to decision making and resources. 
 
2.1.4  Representation of Citizens 
The extent to which citizens in the Rural Communities are able to derive benefits from projects 
like Wula Nafaa, PROGEDE may be largely contingent upon their ability to ask for what they are 
entitled to. Gaining more political clout in order to make claims to their fair share of benefits 
requires local community members to act more like citizens rather than subjects who have to 
endure imposed forms of government (Agrawal, 2005; Mamdani, 1996). The exercise of such 
45 
 
citizenship depends on the presence of a public domain that consists of “the resources and 
decisions under public control that are the basis for public decision making (Ribot, 2004).” 
Citizenship is, thus, the ability of the people to be politically engaged and to shape the polity in 
which they are involved (Ribot, 2009). Being a citizen means being entitled to certain civil, social 
and political rights, irrespective of one’s identity and interests. 
  
Shaping active citizenship is a key element towards achieving local democracy. The public 
domain, following Ribot et al. (2008), defines the space of representative democracy: the domain 
of public powers that citizens have rights to influence. Harnessing the agency of such a 
citizenship means increased meaningful engagement of local populations with representatives and 
their ability to demand accountability. The liberal-democratic/Westphalian (LDW) citizenship  
consist of the idea that  individual political actors  and the state enter a ‘social contract’ whereby 
the individual  consents to being governed  in exchange for certain privileges and protection from 
the state (Purcell, 2003).The Westphalian concept of citizenship implies equality in relationship 
between citizens and those who govern them, which in this case would signify that all citizens are 
entitled to equality in political representation. The discussion about elite capture throughout this 
dissertation confirms Pitkin’s (1972) assertion that citizens cannot be considered as political 
equals when it comes to representation. Their different resources and different access criteria give 
citizens different abilities to influence their representatives and their effective participation in the 
management and use of their forests.  
 
Paper 2 looks into the participation of a specific group of citizens: women, to bring out how the 
constrictive character of their social roles and economic precariousness, exclusion from political 
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arenas become mutually constitutive factors in becoming charcoal producers or charcoal 
entrepreneurs. The political engagement of citizens not only permits for effective dialogue 
between citizens and those who govern them but also to keep the latter in check. Citizenship is 
not bounded and context-independent but rather an abstract construct that needs to be rethought 
according to the situation that real social actors find themselves in (Reed-Danahay and Brettell, 
2008). The form of citizenship that will be most pertinent to this research project is one that goes 
beyond the mere legal status recognized by the nation-state to encompass the element of 
participatory citizenship; citizens are political actors that form part of a political sphere. It is 
widely accepted that the participation of citizens is essential for meeting democratic and 
development goals of projects, calling for partnerships among different kinds of institutions at 
local, national and international scales (Ito, 2008). Citizens can shape the local democracy 
outcomes of institutional choices after those choices have been made by higher-level institutions. 
Participation involving democratic elements or democratic institutional infrastructure may allow 
for participation from members of society who otherwise might not possess the advantage of 
being  socio-economically or politically ‘equipped’ to participate in settings and processes that 
make their representation binding or adequate (Ribot, 2007). 
 
Representation consists of two main elements: accountability and responsiveness.10 Effective 
representation takes place when representatives are responsive to the needs and aspirations their 
people and when the people under their jurisdiction are able to hold their leaders accountable, that 
                                                             
10 Representation is a function of different types of relationship between interests and outcomes: (1) 
“responsivesness” -relations between signals and policies (2) “accountability” – relations between outcomes and 




is, are able to sanction the leaders who deliver or do not deliver (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 
1999; Markowski & Tucker, 2006). According to Urbinati and Warren (2008), for representatives 
to be responsive: (i) they must have the authorization to take action, (ii) the action taken by the 
representatives should promote those who are represented, (iii)people should have the necessary 
tools to hold their representatives responsible for their actions.  Past scholarship has shown that, at 
the level of local government, institutions must gain legitimacy in order to survive (Vira et al, 
1998; Crook & Manor, 1998; Manor, 2005). Such legitimacy needs to be buttressed by a 
sufficient amount of discretionary power that endows local governments the autonomy to 
introduce modifications and make decisions that are most befitting to specific situations to 
respond competently to the needs of local communities. Accountability is another crucial element 
in ensuring that representatives live up to the responsibility entrusted upon them and are 
answerable for their actions both upwardly (to higher-level institutions) and downwardly (to 
citizens). 
 
2.2 Hypotheses and Research Questions  
The hypotheses and associated research questions stated in this section served as a starting point 
that led to interrogation and analysis of more specific aspects of the institutional re-arrangement 
concerning access to forest resources that resulted from institutional reconfigurations. Those 
institutional reconfigurations resulted from institutional choice and recognition. Fieldwork 
provided the opportunity to identify the most empirically compelling manner to answer the 
research questions. Hence I focused on three different aspects that would offer actionable angles 
for rural development linked to natural resource exploitation, the problematization of the 
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participatory approach used by projects and the process of institutional reform at the conception 
stage. 
 
To explore how institutional choices affect representation, the first hypothesis posed was: 
Higher-level institutions acknowledge the importance of incorporating substantive aspects 
of democracy in meeting project goals yet the choice of local institutions made by donors 
and central government is not conducive to democratic representation in rural 
communities. Substantive democracy is a form of democracy whereby all groups in society are 
represented and can participate in political processes. It is a form of democracy that functions in 
the interest of the governed (Cox, 1997; Heller, 2000; Diamond and Morlino, 2005). Substantive 
democracy comprises of the meaningful effects of democracy, going beyond the abidance of the 
norms of procedural democracy such as the holding of elections.  
 
The main research questions with respect to hypothesis 1 were: (1)Why and how do higher level 
institutions choose the mix of institutions they want to partner with at the local level? (2) How do 
higher-level institutions balance their focus among the different components of project goals? 
Goals consist of attaining outputs that are quantitatively measurable such as the changes in the 
amount of charcoal produced, the number of attendees at workshops organized by the project and 
also a component for the building or enhancing of democratic institutional platform for achieving 
increased participation and representation, (3) How do institutional choices made by higher-level 
institutions affect representation taking place through local institutions? This question answers 
how institutional choices sustain or disrupt the skewed distribution of power and resources among 
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local institutions even when the project goals explicitly consist of or favor the substantive 
outcomes of democracy. 
 
In spite of the decentralized management system already in place in Senegal, the lack of 
representation of local community members, especially of those who are not privileged, is very 
palpable. The introduction of Forest Management Committees to manage forest resources favored 
the maximization of charcoal production and efficiency in the delivery of services over the 
democratic representation of the Rural Communities. One of the canons of development practice 
is the inclusion of local populations in projects through participatory approaches and institutions. 
Involving the villagers in the forestry-related projects not only allowed for the project-created 
FMCs to grab local workforce to run the FMCs but it allowed for the interventions to bear the 
hallmark of being socially sensitive through the recognition of democratically elected local 
institutions or institutions formally incorporating participation of villagers. By doing so, the 
interventions attempted at building equity in access, especially of those who are likely to be 
unjustly prevented from benefitting from their forests, that is, marginalized poorer segments of 
the rural societies.  
 
This hypothesis rests on the premise that if the institutional environment at the local level is to be 
conducive to democratic representation, then higher-level institutions need to choose local 
institutions that have formal mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness. In the case 
studied, the chosen local institutions were coordinated around charcoal production, based on the 
institutional configuration preferences of the donors, all of which were encapsulated and set as 
prescriptions in the Forest Management Plans produced by the projects for the Rural 
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Communities. Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE each set up their own FMCs endowing them with 
powers to manage forest resources albeit positioning them differently with respect to the 
democratically elected local government. 
  
The probing of the conditions under which the choices also shed light on why higher-level 
institutions are still able to continue targeting normatively closed outcomes by applying formulaic 
approaches to project implementation. The policy and project outputs and outcomes that higher-
level institutions seek to achieve fit their calculations but often fall short of creating an enabling 
environment that can allow for structurally deeper changes that are more meaningful for local 
communities. Most policies require, for the purpose of being evaluated as successful, the 
accomplishment of goals with outcomes that can be quantified, especially in material terms 
(Baviskar, 2004). In choosing their local partners, higher-level institutions have to factor in 
meeting goals that produce economic and social effects that can be tangible expeditiously 
(Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Smoke, 2007). Additionally higher-level institutions are 
predisposed to choose what appears to be ‘technocratically correct’ to them rather than calibrating 
their intervention around building more durable inclusive access to forest resources and a greater 
degree of ‘local responsiveness.’  
 
Hypothesis 1 was accepted because it was found that despite the purported concordance with the 
ideals of democracy by higher level institutions in the choice of their local partners, democratic 
representation was effective mostly with respect to securing higher charcoal production 
allotments for the Rural Community as a whole but not in enhancing equity in access to forest 
resources among the various groups of villagers within the Rural Community. Comparison 
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between the two project phases of both Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE shed light on the changes in 
the ideology behind goal formulation, implementation approach and the associated triggering 
factors as well as any modifications in the relations with the local government. 
 
The FMCs are institutions that do not have formal responsibilities to represent – in contrast to the 
democratically elected Rural Council. Although they require the participation of the local 
population to function, the FMCs do not possess built-in mechanisms offering all and any 
members of the local community the opportunity for meaningful participation and to create an 
institutional environment amenable to rectifying distributive inequalities. The primary function of 
the FMCs is to perform administrative and technical tasks to assist the Rural Council, but the 
presence of the FMCs also pluralized the institutional landscape, creating a situation that could 
deflect the domination by any single institution.  The participatory mode of operation is taken as 
the guarantor for these institutions being inclusive and downwardly accountable. Indeed, the 
mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability of the Rural Council were weakened because of 
the distance created between the democratically elected representatives and rural charcoal 
producers with the recognition of project-created institutions (the FMCs) that have the capacity to 
accomplish administrative and forest management tasks but are unable to substitute for the 
democratic representation functions.  
 
The second major axis along which this research was carried out concerned the conditions under 
which a proliferation of local institutions can lead to stronger or weaker local representation. 
Understanding how choice and recognition plays out in the context of institutional pluralism and 
how that in turn influences representation warranted hypothesis 2: A plurality of local 
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institutions that are not subject to overarching local representative authority leads to 
‘pluralism without representation’, creating opportunities for elite capture.  
 
This hypothesis addressed how, in an environment typified by the multitude of institutions: 
customary chiefs, private businesses, local governments and administrative bodies, there is a 
situation of pluralism without representation emerges. This refers to a situation whereby the 
advantages conferred by the synchretic processes and polycentric systems: multiplicity, 
interdependence, adaptive malleability, negotiated collaboration are overridden to undermine 
representation. Syncretism (Galvan, 2007) and polycentricity (Ostrom, 2009) can both be aspects 
of pluralism; the salient feature of syncretism being the transformative process that ensues from 
the recombination of institutional elements with diverse characteristics and polycentric system 
being one whereby citizens are able to organize and adjust government at different levels and 
scales and the presence of counter-powers that keep institution in check. 
 
‘Pluralism without representation’ resulted out of a combination of factors including 
representative institutions being partially recognized for the management of forests and the flaring 
of elite capture capacitated through the network of chosen and recognized institutions. 
Administrative efficiency was achieved through task specialization: 1) the Rural Council being 
the gatekeeper for any project activity implemented in the Rural Community and representing the 
Rural Community when dealing with other institutions, while 2) the FMCs were made in charge 
of the administrative procedures concerning charcoal production and became the ‘go-to’ 
institutions for rural charcoal producers and 3) the Forestry Services retained their policing and 
technical advisory roles with respect to forests. Under such configurations, the lack of democratic 
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representation was exacerbated for those who needed to be represented the most about issues of 
access to forest resources as the democratic representation responsibilities could not be 
outsourced to the FMCs. The occurrence wherein institutions outside of the legal-administrative 
structure, such as the FMCs, are chosen and entrusted with public powers without incorporating 
mechanisms of downward accountability left those institutions vulnerable to elite capture with the 
result that individuals who are already privileged continue to capture the benefits of project 
interventions (Galvan and Marcus, 2003; Ostrom, 1996). Whether the FMCs were subjected to 
the authority of democratically representative institution, that is, the Rural Council such as in the 
zones covered by Wula Nafaa or were expected to function as institutions that are parallel 
(possessing similar functions and power) to local elected government is sustained in order to 
prevent any political interference like in the PROGEDE zones, the configurations did not 
guarantee democratic representation.  
 
The second hypothesis was accepted because the findings show that there is institutional 
pluralism without representation in the Rural Communities studied. The proliferation of 
institutions chosen to carry out forest management took place out of need for specialization to 
achieve efficiency and fulfilled requirements for participation and democracy mostly 
procedurally. The strongest democracy attribute of Rural Council, that is, the possibility of 
villagers to obtain responsiveness through mechanisms of accountability went underused under 
the institutional setup recognized for forest and charcoal production management in rural zones. 
The institutional pluralism offered incentives to the elites at the local level to team up and 
monopolize access to forest resources. 
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2.3   Methods 
The type of data collected for this study was qualitative in nature. The case study research design 
type was used to give direction and to systematize the inquiry. The methods used to collect data 
were chosen according to the type of data required for this research project, that is, both 
descriptive and explanatory in nature. Yin (1993) defines the case study method as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, addresses a 
situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and 
uses multiple sources of evidence.”  
 
The main methods of data collection included interviews (structured or loosely structured), 
questionnaire surveys, observation, literature review and analysis of documents and other 
unobstrusive methods. The four questionnaire survey instruments were targeted at (1) the local 
authorities, (2) members of local communities, (3) project staff and government and donor agency 
officials (4) households of selected villages in Tambacounda. 
 
The research project was organized into four broad phases: 1st Phase: Literature review of project 
documents, legal codes, laws and relevant scholarly work. Synthesis of data from secondary 
sources as well as primary sources so as to depict the backdrop against which the current action is 
playing out and to identify the contextual variables, 2nd Phase: Studying recognition in the rural 
regions, 3rd Phase: Studying choice of higher-level institutions 4th Phase: Analysis of data- 





Fig. 2.2.The methods of data collection for the case study  
 








The research drew largely from a repertoire of qualitative methods to obtain primary data. Field 
work in Senegal was carried out over a period of 17 months, from January 2012 to August 2013, 
to collect such data. Formal and informal interviews were be used to understand practices of 
villagers, charcoal producers, members of rural councils, government officials, traditional leaders, 
and project officials. Participant observation, focus group discussions, questionnaire surveys 
helped in better grasping the different kinds of social, political, cultural dynamics at various levels 
of rural life in Senegal. Structured and unstructured interviews as well as direct observation 
served to understand the logic and dynamics of the donor agencies, government officials, project 
implementers, policy champions and to assess the ways in which the resulting institutional 
choices shape representational practice. ‘Studying-up’ (Nader, 1993) provided useful insights in 
the dynamics at the stages where higher-level institutions decide and plan for policies and projects 
to implement them are made as well as the relations among institutions across the hierarchy 
involved in forest management. Such an approach avoids the overreliance on examining only the 
communities ‘recipient’ of development aid or policy action to also include the study of those in 
higher-level institutions who design the projects and implement them. The data gleaned from the 
 
CASE STUDY 
 Interviews (structured or loosely structured) 
 Observation 
 Literature review and analysis of documents 
 Questionnaire surveys 
 Other unobstrusive methods 
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questionnaire for studying-up, aimed at officials of higher-level institutions: the international 
donor agencies, the implementing agencies, the national government unearthed how the 
implementing staff thought of and conceptualized the processes and approaches adopted by the 
policies and projects they were implementing. The studying-up interviews shed light on the 
‘bureaucratic cultures’ that prevail in the higher-level organizations and the ideologies behind the 
choice of local institutional partners, providing more detailed or unpublished information about 
the projects, the future plans, about the relations they have with each type of authority in the 
villages as well what are the factors they believed influenced the choice of institutions. 
 
I carried out 58 ‘studying-up’ interviews in Dakar, Tambacounda, either using an interview guide 
or unstructured interviews using main research questions as lead. Another set of structured 
interview administered among nine implementing staff of the projects and forestry services to 
survey their understanding of participation and democracy and their factors affecting them. The 
group of interviewees for the ‘studying-up’ included officials of the USAID, World Bank based in 
Dakar, the implementing staff of Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE in Tambacounda and Kolda, 
officials of the forestry services, Senegalese rural development branches, researchers in research 
institutions and NGOs in Senegal, officials of the Ministries of Environment, Decentralization 
and Finance. Observation for ‘studying-up’ involved shadowing the officials when they would go 
out on missions or hold meetings and workshops in the rural zones. Attending meetings such as 
that about the renewal of PROGEDE’s FMCs held in Tamba also provided opportunities to 
interact with the officials and other stakeholders and observe how the decision-making process 




The data obtained from the primary sources was triangulated with and complemented by 
secondary sources of data such as the media, government documents, publications from donor 
organizations (World Bank, USAID) and the relevant scholarly literature. The linkages among the 
institutions was presented in the form of an institutional map (see Fig.2.3.). The institutional map 
in Fig. 2.3. portrays the institutions that occupy the institutional landscape of forest sector 
management. The map locates the institutions at the various scales: the local, regional, national 
and global levels. It also shows which ones among the institutions received deconcentrated 
powers (in the blue boxes) or decentralized powers (in the green boxes) from the Central 
Government. Both PROGEDE’s and Wula Nafaa’s Forest Management Committees (in the red 
boxes) are entities run by villagers, not part of any other institution possessing a legal status in the 
politico-administrative system but expected to work with the Rural Councils and Local Forestry 
Services. The institutional mapping provides a panoptic view of the institutions playing a role in 
forest management and the regulation of charcoal production, helping in the visualization of the 
location of each institution on the institutional landscape. The location of each institution on the 
map is based on the decision-making powers and resources held by each institution which also 
determines the direction of any transfer of power and resources and to some extent, that of 
accountability. The legal texts and project documents officially defined the role and powers of 
institutions while interviews with actors within those institutions revealed how the institution 
evolved and performed. Interviews and surveys at the local level revealed the effects of the 
institutional choices; the form recognition took in practice on the ground. This was evaluated 
through questions about the adequacy and meaningfulness of the chosen institutions to the local 
populations in exploiting for commercial charcoal. Interviews and questionnaire surveys with 
local leaders offered insights into how the local institutions interact which in turn impacted on the 
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outcomes of democratic representation and participatory practices used by the projects. Oral 
testimonies, serving as substitute for archival data, were used to gather information about the 
institutional history and footprint and how power balances among institutions have changed over 
time in the rural zones.  
 
To examine institutional choice and recognition, the interviews conducted were around the 
following elements (i) responsiveness, (ii) accountability, (iii) the structure of institutions, (iv) the 
administrative procedures involved in charcoal production and commercialization, (v) the level of 
material well-being of villagers, (vi) allegiance to political institutions, (vii) satisfaction with the 
level of democracy, (viii) access to benefits from forestry resources, (ix) participation in 
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This study used consisted of three main groups of survey consisting of questionnaire instruments 
and guided interviews: 
  
1) Household surveys  
The household surveys were carried out in a total of six villages: Koar, Dianwelly, Majialy, 
Madina, Gorel Bocar, Sita Niaoule. A total of 138 carrés (extended households) were surveyed 
about the following: number of people in each extended household (EH), number of people 
involved in forest-related activities in each EH, number of people engaging in charcoal 
production in each EH, number of people engaging in agriculture, number of people engaging in 
other activities, use of revenues derived from charcoal production (categorized as agricultural, 
marriage, motorbike, cattle, other expenses), migrants per EH, participation in meetings, whether 
or not active in meetings, the type of house they lived in. Apart from the close-ended questions 
about the aspects mentioned above, the participants in the surveys were requested to provide 
additional details whenever applicable about the countries where the villager’s kin member 
migrated to, the level of education, the most responsive local institution. 
 
The sampling method of households was purposive, that is, they were selected based on the 
availability of household members to participate. The villages themselves were selected after 
weeks and months of observation was carried out in those villages to be able to have a good grasp 
of the micro-dynamics so as to have as representative of a sample as possible of the village being 
surveyed. Living in the villages enabled participatory observation, facilitating the identification 
















Fig. 2.4. House Type 1: Huts, made of thatch, branches, mud and wood. It is the type of dwelling 




Fig.2.5. House Type 2: Zinc roofed house, owned by villagers who have a comfortable living 
standard. Zinc-roofed houses cost less than concrete-roofed houses but they are indicative of the 






Fig. 2.6. House Type 3: Concrete-roofed house. Owned by the wealthiest villagers. 
  
I applied some degree of stratification in the sample selection of households. Stratification, 
whenever applied, was along the lines of income/material well-being to offer a cross-section that is 
most representative of the society being studied for the household survey and it was based on 
gender and participation in projects for the surveys of members of local communities. 
 
2) Local leaders’ questionnaire survey and interviews 
The sample of local authorities for the questionnaire survey consisted of members of the Rural 
Councils: Presidents of Rural Council and elected members, members of the FMCs, village 
chiefs, local forestry service, members of the community who play a prominent role at the local 
level. The sample size for the questionnaire survey was 15 and respondents were from the Rural 
Communities of Missirah and Koar. Interviews of local leaders in villages outside these two Rural 
Communities were also carried out to provide a more robust analysis of democratic representation 
in Rural Communities as well as tracing the trajectories of charcoal production and institutions 
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engaged in forest management in those additional villages: Makacoulibantang, Sare Bidji (Kolda), 
Ndam, Thietty, Sakar (Kolda), Oudoucar (Kolda).  
 
The interviews were carried out in a systematic way wherein, the members of the executive 
committee for each FMC of each block were interviewed along with in-depth interviews with the 
RCPs of the Rural Councils studied, the foresters and officials of the sous- prefecture for each 
Rural Community, the village chiefs of the villages surveyed,  
 
3) Rural population questionnaire survey and interviews 
A questionnaire survey was carried out among 30 villages selected randomly to gauge variables 
of accountability, responsiveness of local institutions and their participation in the projects. 85 
interviews were conducted in villages of the Rural Communities of Missira and Koar. Purposive 
sampling based on snowballing method was largely employed because it allowed the selection of 
people based on characteristics allowing the contribution of a variety of experiences, thus the 
depiction of a fuller picture of the situation. Triangulation with information obtained from 
relevant interviews was carried out to further ensure that validity of data obtained through the 
surveys. 
  
Data from the interviews and questionnaire surveys were translated from French to English. The 
responses were grouped according to their relevance to each research question, for example, those 
that answer questions about choice, recognition, responsiveness or accountability. The data from 
the interviews was used to map out the political and economic allegiances, connections among 
villagers who are members as well as non-members of the Forest Management Committees and to 
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gauge the effect of leaders on representation. The questionnaire survey of households in the 
Tambacounda region provided data about the populations’ socio-economic situation and also to 
record changes brought about by access to forests, the advent of projects and changes in 
representation. Outputs include an accurate description the context within which the current 
decentralized forestry resource management is operating, the relationship among various factors 
influencing choice and recognition that will give an indication of the level, type, strength of 
representation. The case studies were constructed for each rural community delineating the 
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THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND RECOGNITION FOR 
DECENTRALIZED FOREST MANAGEMENT IN CHARCOAL-PRODUCING 
ZONES OF TAMBACOUNDA, SENEGAL 
 
3.1  Abstract 
In Senegal, the mix of local institutions entrusted with forest resource management is an outcome 
of choices made by the national government and international agencies. This paper explores how 
local institutional partners are chosen by national and international institutions in a decentralized 
forest governance context. In the Tambacounda region of Senegal, Forest Management 
Committees (FMCs) run by the members of the public were created and chosen by USAID and 
World Bank projects to work with the democratically elected local government (the rural council) 
and the forestry services. Although the new multi-institution configuration presents potentials for 
democratic resource management, the ensuing division of tasks among the various chosen 
institutions created new opportunities for collusion among elites who captured positions in the 
chosen institutions. Such a capture involved a small number of favorably placed villagers 
intercepting a disproportionately large amount of benefits from forest resources and excluding the 
majority poor of the population. Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) ‘Institutional Choice and 
Recognition’ framework provided the overarching conceptual lens and Grindle’s (2005) “Process 
of Policy and Institutional Reform,” was used to operationalize the analysis of the institutional 
choice component. 
Key Words: Institutional choice and recognition, studying-up, forest management projects 
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3.2  Introduction 
In Senegal, forest resources are essential in meeting Senegal’s domestic energy demands (Tappan 
et al. 2004; World Bank, 2010).  Ensuring the supply of forest-based fuel to Senegal’s urban 
centers and the creation of income-generating opportunities for the rural communities required a 
reconfiguration of the local institutional mix for managing the resource. The country’s 1996 
decentralization laws and 1998 ‘decentralized’ forestry code allowed the rural communities, 
represented by the elected local Rural Councils, to have the right to manage and commercially 
produce charcoal in their forests. Critical are the institutions that manage access to the natural 
resources are vital to the livelihood of local communities, especially in poor rural regions where 
income-generation opportunities are scarce. The local-level institutions chosen and recognized by 
the higher-level institutions influence the way that local populations have an equitable control 
over and access to their forests. 
 
The mix of local institutions managing forest resources in rural Senegal is explained in this paper 
as an output of the process of institutional choice and recognition led by national government and 
international agencies. The local institutions implementing policy reform and project actions were 
chosen to serve several specific purposes. In this case, the purposes were mainly to achieve the 
goals of meeting the increase in demand for wood-based charcoal in Senegal’s urban centers in an 
environmentally sustainable way, wealth creation in the rural charcoal-producing zones where the 
forests are located, and to enhance the forest resource management abilities of the rural 
communities through supporting participatory and democratic institutions. These goals and the 
local institutions chosen to help achieve them were decisions taken by higher-level institutions. 
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The analysis of institutional choice – the process through which higher-scale agencies choose the 
institutions they will work with in the local arena – aims at understanding why certain institutions 
(and not others) are being chosen and recognized by the central government and donor agencies 
(Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina, 2008). Institutional recognition involves the acknowledgement and 
support of the chosen institution via the transfer of powers to them, partnership in projects or their 
involvement in decision-making activities (Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina, 2008). Institutional 
choices are made by higher-level institutions in order to have local partners to implement the 
strategies adopted by the state and donors and to involve local rural communities in the execution 
of the project. Since powers and resources tend to be concentrated at the centers, be it the national 
government of Senegal or the international agencies located in the West, they have to be devolved 
or transferred from those higher-level institutions to selected local ones. This study examines the 
process through which the institutional choices are made as these choices have implications for 
the establishment of democratic decentralization – a goal of government and of the projects.  
Democratic decentralization is believed to foster democratic representation at the local level. 
Democratic representation is framed as accountability and responsiveness of leaders to the people. 
It could be considered as a means of politically empowering a wider swath of the populations in 
those rural communities and keeping in check the calculated actions fueled by the self-
preservation and/or predatory instincts of those who have significant economic interests and who 
are well positioned to exploit the institutional machinery (Przeworski et al., 1999; Beck, 2005; 
Young, 1997; van de Walle, 2001). 
 
Developing managed exploitation of a profitable natural resource at the local rural level in Africa 
involves a whole set of policy and institutional reforms. The state and the customary authorities 
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are no longer the sole managers and custodians of commercially exploitable forests in Senegal. 
There are now additional institutional nodes that share those forest management functions. Each 
institutional node represents one institution delimited by its own sets of rules, being a composite 
of actors, powers ascribed to it and any mechanisms of accountability. In addition to the 
democratically elected local government known as the Rural Councils and the Ministry of 
Environment’s Forestry Services, there are now forest management committees created by 
externally funded forestry project interventions: the World Bank’s PROGEDE (Sustainable and 
Participatory Energy Management) and USAID’s WulaNafaa (Agriculture and Natural Resources 
Management) projects which have become part of the forest resource management institutional 
landscape. Those committees provided additional institutional nodes for the sustainable 
management of forests and for the control of access to commercial charcoal production. They 
were placed under the authority of elected local governments and supervised by the Forestry 
Services local brigade already active prior to project implementation. 
 
This article examines how and why higher-level institutions such as the central government and 
international organizations choose institutions for managing access to forests and benefits from 
wood-based charcoal production in rural Senegal. The current choice of institutions, denoting a 
strong shift in forest management from state-managed to ostensibly citizen-managed, was 
leveraged through decentralization. The decentralization reforms of Senegal and forestry projects 
have created a new public local management that allows for greater private economic access to 
the resource for rural dwellers. The findings reveal that despite the overall increase in charcoal 
production by local producers, the chosen institutional arrangements have stunted political 
representation, leading to the weakening of participatory practices for the poor and marginalized 
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in relation to access to forest resources. The chosen mix of institutions has facilitated the 
interception of opportunities and benefits from forests by a small group of elite villagers and 
favorably placed officials. Access to forests and distribution of benefits has improved only for 
certain groups of villagers since charcoal production has been opened to rural communities.  
 
Driving this inquiry were the following questions: What specific mix of institutions – including 
the elected local governments – would best foster a democratic local context that could also 
achieve local environmental and developmental objectives? Under what conditions and why do 
formal state and donor actors choose such institutions? What are the effects of the actual choice of 
local institutions on access to wealth-generating opportunities from natural resources for different 
categories of local people? This paper responds to these questions by exploring the choice of local 
institutions by higher-level institutions in the decentralized management of charcoal-producing 
forests in the Tambacounda region of Senegal. Furthermore, this study also adds to the existing 
scholarship on democratic representation and charcoal production in Senegal which has until now 
been concentrated on the struggle of removing the monopoly of urban-based merchants and their 
long-standing stalwarts: the foresters of the forestry services so that rural communities can have 
access to charcoal production in their forests. The focus on the post-decentralization transition 
phase of forest management exposed how institutional choice and recognition has influenced the 
outcomes of democratic representation in the rural zones studied.  
 
Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s institutional choice and recognition framework is used in this study 
to explore the factors underlying the choice of local institutions and the effects of the recognition 
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that those choices generate (Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s 2008). To operationalize the choice 
component, I devised a schema (see Fig. 3.1.) based on Grindle’s (2005) “The Process of policy 
and institutional reform” model. A combination of the Ribot et al. and Grindle framings is used to 
examine the conditions under which higher-level institutions choose the mix of institutions they 
want to partner with at the local level. Grindle’s model conceives of the process of policy and 
institutional reforms as an interactive one; wherein the choice of institutions to implement policy 
reforms are shaped by the interests and institutions in various arenas. The different arenas 
identified by Grindle are: agenda setting, design, adoption, implementation and sustainability of 
policy implementation and institutional re-arrangements. Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s 
framework proposes how to analytically approach an action, that is, institutional choice and 
recognition, which has profound implications for how  institutions shape access to a natural 
resource at the local level and how they affect the effectiveness of decentralization. Ribot et al’s 
framework provides a conceptual receptacle for Grindle’s model, situating it in a larger 
continuum of the policy process, that is, Ribot et al.’s framework tells us where to look and 
Grindle’s model tells us what to look at there while this study tells us what was found when the 
gaze was shifted in the direction of where policy and institutional reforms are planned and why it 
mattered using empirical evidence from where the reforms unfold. Ribot et al’s framing starts at 
the point where local institutions are selected to implement policy and Grindle schema takes into 
account factors preceding and affecting that stage. Ribot et al.’s framework extends into the phase 





The main methods of primary data collection included interviews, observation (both participant 
and unobtrusive) and questionnaire surveys. From the167 interviews carried out, around 49 were 
semi-structured and structured interviews of officials of line ministries: Ministry of Environment 
and donor agencies (USAID and World Bank), the staff of PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa projects, 
and also officials of the Forestry Services which is the executive branch of Ministry of 
Environment as part of ‘studying up.’ The element of choice was empirically researched using 
“studying up” methods (Nader, 1972) looking at the upper and middle institutional structures, 
enlarging and furthering the field of vision to include the architects of projects and policy reform 
and the sources of ideological constructs underlying the selection. The recognition part was 
researched by fieldwork in the villages of mainly two Rural Communities in the Tambacounda 
region to studying the structures lower down the hierarchy, describing why the institutional 
landscape for forest resource management is what it is. Three questionnaire surveys administered 
provided data contributing to a deeper understanding of the context. 
 
3.3  Background 
PROGEDE and WulaNafaa are the two largest and longest standing forestry projects in Senegal. 
PROGEDE (Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management) is financed by the World Bank 
and WulaNaafa (Agriculture and Natural Resource Program) is funded by USAID and 
implemented by the US based contractor, International Resources Group (IRG). PROGEDE 
whose first phase was from 1998 to 2004 and whose second phase is from 2010-2016 has the 
main goal of meeting an important part of the rapidly growing urban demand for household fuels, 




The project development objective is to increase the availability of diversified household fuels in 
a sustainable way and to increase the income of affected communities while preserving the forest 
ecosystems (World Bank, 2010). 
 
The activities of WulaNafaa (WN), whose first phase was from 2003 to 2008 and the second 
phase from 2009-2014, are within the framework of two strategic objectives which were agreed 
upon by the USAID and the Government of Senegal. The objective of WulaNafaa was to 
contribute to poverty reduction and to sustainable local development by increasing rural 
communities and producer revenues through handing responsibility to local authorities and 
encouraging decentralized, integrated and participatory resource management (USAID, 2008). 
 
The democratic decentralization reforms of Senegal, inscribed in the decentralized forestry laws, 
were crafted so that local populations would have control over their forests via democratically 
elected local leaders. These reforms are not, however, producing the expected outcome of more 
equitable access among all groups of people in those societies (Ribot & Larson, 2012). Several 
factors account for such a deficient outcome, but the foremost cause identified by international 
agencies was that institutions are unable to meet the demands and needs of citizens (Grindle & 
Thomas, 1989). This article examines the link between this inability and the choice-making 
process through which local institutions are/become recognized in a decentralized forestry 
management context in rural Senegal.  
 
The practical significance of institutional choice and recognition performed by the higher-level 
institutions is that by choosing specific kinds of local institutions, they also define the type of 
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citizens who they believe would be most able to use what the chosen institutions have to offer. 
Besides enhancing the capacity of the local populations as charcoal producers, the outcomes of 
those choices have not been innocuous. The creation of Forest Management Committees and 
partnering them with Rural Councils and Forestry services added to the complexity of the 
politico-administrative structure of forestry resource management while also creating openings 
for elites to capture benefits that emerge. 
 
Elite capture, whereby a small group of favorably placed villagers use their social, political or 
economic privileges to accumulate more benefits from forests at the expense of the non-elites, is 
symptomatic of the exclusionary effect that the mix of institutions has engendered (Platteau, 
2004). The international agencies’ evaluation of projects’ targets and goals do not capture the 
intra-community disparities that have started appearing with the opening up of the charcoal 
production sector to the Rural Communities. Instead the dysfunctions introduced through the 
institutional choice and recognition within those rural communities get masked behind the 
indicators showing improvement; such as the increase in charcoal produced, the rising numbers of 
participants in meetings and workshops. However, they do not tell us who among the villagers 
obtained the lion’s share of the profit earned from charcoal production and who cannot get their 
fair share and why that is so. The indicators do not tell us whose participation mattered and was 
effective or who got what out of those meetings and workshops. 
 
The self-interested compliance of the elites to the projects’ actions can be capitalized on by the 
projects. The elites being the type of citizens most apt to execute project tasks in the villages have 
become the de facto development agents. They are also most able to manipulate and divert 
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resources and power for themselves. Foregoing the input of such local-elite as de facto project 
executors would be a disadvantage for projects which are pressed by time and budget constraints 
and the need to positively impact on performance and output indicators. The entrenchment of 
patterns of accumulation of forest-based benefits by the elites has implications for the overall 
advancement of the rural community. 
 
Although greater technical and administrative capacity to manage forests and produce charcoal 
was built through the intervention of projects, inequalities in access to the resource between the 
well-off and the socially and economically deprived were strengthened due to the institutional set-
up being prone to capture by the local elites. When charcoal production was first legally opened 
to populations in the rural communities, the majority resisted engaging in that activity, perceived 
as being environmentally deleterious and socially debasing. This resistance to charcoal production 
gradually turned into an almost frenzied rush to produce what has become known as the ‘black 
diamond’ when the news about the profitability of charcoal production spread in those 
communities.  
 
The institutional landscape of forest management in Tambacounda is composed of multiple 
institutions characterized by a division of tasks among the institutions. The forest management 
committees set up by the projects and run by the villagers take care of and respond directly to the 
day to day in charcoal production administrative and financial procedures. The rural council 
oversees the functioning of the forest management committees (in the WulaNafaa project zone) 
and represents the rural community during interaction with higher-level institutions. The forestry 
services assists both the Rural Council and the forest management committees with technical and 
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some administrative support, while maintaining their policing role. When the actors in those 
chosen institutions became aware of the benefits they could derive by joining forces with each 
other, they built their informal network of elites connecting instead of competing with better- and 
less-recognized institutional nodes (Crook & Manor, 2000; Evans, 1996). Members of the project 
management committee, the Rural Council and the forestry services and bigger local charcoal 
entrepreneurs colluded to maintain control over local charcoal production mostly by giving each 
other preferential access to production permits and allowing the illegal interception and sale of 
permits.  
 
3.4 Merilee Grindle’s ‘process of policy and institutional reform’: 
Unpacking the stages of institutional choice-making 
This section describes the process of institutional choice making. The Ribot et al.(1998) 
framework identifies institutional choice as a crucial element that sets in motion a series of 
actions when a specific configuration of institutions is chosen and specific institutions are 
recognized when they are conceded with authority and resources. The schemata in Fig 3.1. depicts 
the stages of institutional choice and recognition for policy reform and institutional change in the context 
of decentralized forest management for charcoal production in Senegal. It draws from Merilee Grindle’s 
"The Process of policy reform and institutional reform”  (Grindle, 2005) framework 
operationalizes the analysis of choice and recognition by breaking it down into a process 
extending over a number of arenas, namely the 1) agenda-setting arena, 2) the design arena, 3) the 
adoption arena, 4) the implementation arena, 5) the sustainability arena. Grindle’s schema focuses 
on what happens at the higher level, addressing in a more systematic way the role of actors and 
institutions at the higher-level (as shown by Fig.2.1.): parsing actors’ intentions, ideological 
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foundations underlying projects, the ends and the means as well as any possible feedback loop at 
each stage of the choice-making process. By complementing each other, both the Choice and 
Recognition Framework and the Process of Policy and Institutional reform provide an adequate 
analytical and descriptive model of institutional processes and outcomes. 
 
Different types of interests exist in all the arenas of policy change and institutional reform. The 
interests that take precedence are the ones at the agenda-setting and design level thus influencing 
the institutions which are chosen to implement the projects or the policies. The interests and 
institutions implicated in the agenda-setting and design arenas play a larger role in bringing 
salient issues to the fore. Thus, the institutions active at those stages, namely the international 
agencies and the national government, are the architects of projects and initiators of reform. In the 
case of the current forest management in rural Senegal, the agenda-setting and design stages 
involved a confluence of interests both emerging from the actors historically involved in the 
implementation of  development interventions and laws and policies concerning forests as well as 
rooted in the prominent economic, development and environment  trends of the moment. The set 
of actors figuring prominently in these two arenas are the World Bank and the USAID and their 
respective implementing agencies (the forestry services for the first phase of PROGEDE, replaced 
by independent consultants for the second phase and the International Resource Group (IRG)), the 
Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment with its executive 
branch: the Forest Services. 
 
The agenda-setting arena is one dominated by the international agencies with input from the 
Senegalese officialdom. For instance what mandates to fund or support rests on the donor 
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agencies preference of which portfolio to support. There is now, for example, a diminished 
interest in funding forestry-related programs for one of the agencies. As an official pointed out, 
the Natural Resource Management Section of USAID-Senegal is now re-orientating its funding 
and project intervention attention towards food security issues in the Sahel and away from forest 
management (interviews, 2012). The arguments to justify those interventions, often developed 
within the confines of western universities and shaped by the agenda of donor agencies provide 
the blueprint of institutional configurations in the recipient countries aid packages (Goldman, 
2005; Easterly, 2007; Brautignam, 1992; Burkey, 1993). International actors playing the role of 
policy champions often are the international linkage, bringing what they believe to be urgent 
issues requiring external support, to the attention of international agencies. 
 
‘Policy champions’, individuals who have experience or knowledge and who can be advocates of 
the policy, can affect policies (IDS, 2007; Devlin-Foltz & Molinaro, 2010). The influence of 
‘policy champions’ in policy changes surrounding charcoal production is notable. The knowledge 
and connections possessed by policy champions across the aid industry, the Senegalese forestry 
services or part of western academia, often evolves to find its way as a shaping force into policy 
concerning the forest sector which underlies the charcoal industry. Sometimes the long-standing 
consultancy and research interests in the chain of charcoal production of that policy champion has 
translated into advocacy for democracy practices and eventually actions modifying the social and 
political implications of the charcoal industry. The pressure exerted by such policy champions in 
this case by researchers studying the subject, consultants involved at various stages of the policy 
process and institutional reform is palpable throughout. This was the case for the uproar 
especially within the forestry services and the urban-based charcoal merchants in Dakar created 
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by the showing of a film revealing the dark underbelly of charcoal industry (Ribot, 2014). This 
policy champion has also been an advocate within the funding agencies circles and has been 
particularly persuasive about the democratic decentralization stance in Community Based Natural 
Resource Management, participating in the drafting of the documents and providing conceptual 
framing to the goals and ideological approach used by the projects. 
  
The policy role of the executive can be illustrated by how the Forestry Services upholds 
discourses that orient decision outcomes in favor of interests of high/mid-level officials in the 
hierarchy. One example of such a discourse used to be the “for the national good” discourse that 
used to be heavily evoked by the Forest Services to justify why rural populations should let their 
forests be exploited by wealthy outsiders for commercial purposes – for little local benefit (Ribot, 
2009). The prominent position that the Forestry Services have had in any actions concerning 
forestry resources meant that their input such as their experience and feedback still has weight 
when decisions about forestry interventions are made. Foresters of the Forestry Services are 
cognizant of the daily matters of charcoal production in the villages and are part of information 
feedback loop with the mid- and higher-level officials in Dakar who participate in the agenda-
setting and design arenas. 
 
The question “who decides which local institution should do what?” pertains more to the design 
arena in the Grindle schema as it sequentially arrives as a preoccupation after the pertinence of an 
issue has been determined in the agenda-setting arena. During interviews, that question  
consistently fetched the answer that the role is not assigned to one single person or institution but 
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that the officials from the donor agencies and from the various ministries sit around a table and 
discuss how the project is to be implemented.  
 
The choice and the presence of certain types of institutions is based on the function of  those 
institutions, that is, the type of tasks those institutions are meant to accomplish either to fill in 
lacunae or consolidate the existing institutional infrastructure for forest management or delivery 
of administrative services (Brinkerhoff, 2001). Institutional choice is influenced by the type of 
goals that the externally funded programs want to achieve. From the project documents, it was 
garnered that higher-level institutions are more inclined to choose project goals with tangible 
output potential using procedural democracy (World Bank, 2010; USAID, 2011). Such a 
preference has been attributed to several reasons such as expediency in the execution of tasks; the 
belief that using institutions that involve mostly civil society would equate to democracy; an anti-
government stance resulting from a disenchantment based on the government’s track record and 
the conscious or unconscious tendency to create spaces that privilege certain economic activities 
that promote clientelism (Ribot and Oyono, 2004). 
 
International agencies, therefore, opted to create their structures to implement project actions 
because of the dissatisfaction about the local government’s ability to execute the project goals. In 
the recent decades, donor agencies have been more inclined towards civil-society-based 
approaches to forestry resource management while they have been more restrained towards 
choosing local governments as partners. Their discriminative reluctance to choose already 
existing democratically may close opportunities for building a stable and democratic 
representative system within the already existing politico-administrative structure. The 
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recognition of an institution goes beyond the mere acknowledgement of its authority to also 
consist of the creation and consolidation that authority which becomes a political act having deep 
implications for democracy (Ribot, Chhatre, Lankina, 2008). 
  
Underlying the penchant for certain types of goals and the ensuing choice of institutions based on 
those goals may be a product of the need to maximize benefits for certain groups or in the self-
interest of the state11 (North, 1990; Bates, 1981). Such types of goals also lend themselves to 
policy designs currently used by donor agencies and central governments but may not be the best 
to meet needs and aspirations of the majority of the local community. Simultaneously, the need to 
manufacture certain forms of success out of those projects overlooks the procedural aspects such 
as the presence of a terrain that will enable democratic culture to flourish (Baviskar, 2004; 
Conyers, 2007). Dovetailing of both types of goals is possible but is most potent if an enabling 
environment already exists, evincing the necessity of being more attentive to the broader socio-
economic and historical context. Having project goals consistent with democratic ideals needs to 
be complemented by output assessments with an emphasis on what has brought about meaningful 
changes to people in all segments of the local communities. However, the instrumentalization of 
procedural democracy by projects has meant that aspects of procedural democracy (such as 
choosing representatives by holding local elections) are used as a voucher of good governance 
and gain precedence over substantive aspects of democracy (that is, actual inclusiveness and 
representative of people by working in the interest of people). 
 
                                                             
11 “Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they or at least the formal 
rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (North, 1990). If one 
goes by this logic, then the state or central authorities would seek at all cost to maintain control over profitable 
resource bases.  
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 Although the two projects adopted different institutional configurations, the local institutions 
chosen by both projects fit the credos of participation and economic performance. Producing 
outputs to attain project objectives was ensured by choosing institutions that enshrine the value 
system shared by the donor. For instance, the democratically elected local government was 
recognized as the overhead institution by WulaNafaa, which sought to stimulate forest-based 
wealth creation through good governance and environmentally sustainability conduits. Institutions 
were also recognized based on their ability to efficiently perform the tasks set in the project plans 
in a manner unhindered by local politics to the extent possible. This was observed as being mostly 
the case in zones where the PROGEDE project is active.   
 
One of the credos of both projects was the participation of the local people because local people 
are expected to be the ultimate beneficiaries and a democracy provides the possibility of 
harnessing the checks provided by mechanisms of accountability. On the ground, this would 
translate as the application of sanctions by citizens to ensure responsiveness from the institutions 
since they operate in a democratically decentralized environment. The other credo pertains to 
economic development: the two projects examined in this study sought to transform a 
predominantly peasant population into active agents in the market economy of charcoal both as a 
means to improve their own livelihoods and also as producers of affordable domestic fuel vital to 
the country’s urban centers (Ferguson,1994). Institutions were chosen by the projects to actualize 
these two objectives that follow the local democracy and local development canons of 




Fig.3.1.The stages and process of institutional choice and recognition for policy reform and institutional change in the context of 
decentralized forest management for charcoal production in Senegal. This schema is inspired from Grindle (2005) and adapted to the 
two forestry-related projects studied.
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The exchanges among the actors in the various arenas as set out in this schema inspired from 
Grindle’s process of policy process and institutional reform model, especially between those who 
provide the ideological framework, the institutional contract design and those who oversee the 
implementation process defines the purpose of the project and how its accomplishment will be 
measured as well as what would be considered an achievement.  
 
The agenda-setting and design stages are about the higher-level institutions’ ‘officializing 
strategies’ of translating the ground-level concerns into authorized categories to be acted upon. 
During those two stages, broader project operational and tactical concerns are also taken into 
consideration and the output of that phase includes the choice of institutions to implement project 
activities. The characteristics of the implementers (project staff and government officials) and the 
interests affected gain their full importance during the adoption and implementation phases during 
which the policies and the projects realize themselves. 
  
The bureaucratic cultures as well as the intergovernmental structures need to be abided by the 
international agencies. As the head of operations of one of the projects pointed out, “we have to 
respect the sovereignty of the country we are intervening in” (Interviews, Dakar, 2012). The inter-
governmental distribution of powers concerning forest resource management is structured by the 
existing decentralization laws and forestry code. This means that international agencies cannot 
ignore or circumvent the institutions recognized by the State of Senegal in the management of 
forest resources prior to the intervention of projects which in this case are the Rural Council and 
the Forestry Services.  
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Externally-funded projects are often seen as being money cows by the Senegalese Forestry 
Services who seek to maximize personal gains by being hired to work on the projects. This 
contributes towards the exacerbation of the problem of bureaucratic capture by those who want to 
capitalize to the maximum on their position within the project (Interviews, Dakar, 
2013;2012).The government official views secondment to external projects as an opportunity to 
acquire new skills or hone existing ones through the training programs provided or extend 
network of contacts that can make them more marketable for consultancy or other jobs outside the 
public service (Interviews, Dakar, 2013; Blundo, 1998; 2011). 
 
The difference of the profile of the staff of these two projects reveals variations in the 
bureaucratic consciousness of the international agencies. The officials hired during the first phase 
of PROGEDE l were from the Forest Service however, a noticeable shift took place in the profile 
of those who were hired for the second phase of the project. For instance, regional heads for the 
project are now no longer officials of the Forest Service, but holders of qualifications to fulfill the 
requirements of those positions. The main reason put forward for this change is to loosen the grip 
that the officers of the Forest Service had over the charcoal supply chain, who exercised their 
power to assign commercial exploitation rights over forest resources in a way that unjustly 
favored urban-based charcoal traders (Interviews, Tambacounda, 2012).  
 
3.5 Institutional characteristics influencing institutional choice 
The recognition of the type of institutions to implement projects is based on a conglomeration of 
actions, choices based on the various interests and institutions in the different arenas as conceived 
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by Merilee Grindle’s The process of policy and institutional reform. In addition to analysis 
according to Grindle’s schema, we define four characteristics sought by higher-level institutions 
during their process of choosing and recognizing local partners. Those four elements are: 1) 
Efficiency, 2) Integrity, 3) Democracy/Participation, and 4) Reliability. Each of these 
characteristics connects factors emerging both from the ideological realm and the practical realm 
and are often enmeshed. For instance, the integrity element contributes to efficiency by limiting 
leakages through corruption. The democracy element is ensconced in democratic decentralization 
which offers the possibility of harnessing the participation of local populations making the 
internalization12 of costs and benefits more effective. 
 
The pertinence of this additional analytical optic is demonstrated by the difficulty for the project 
to backtrack in any major way with respect to the actions and choices made in the agenda-setting 
and design stages. By the time the project lands in the recipient zones in rural Senegal, it is too 
late to make major adjustments despite the presence of feedback loops. The feedback loops were 
in the form of evaluation meetings regrouping stakeholders, intermittent assessments made by 
independent consultants or communication between villagers and project staff. These feedback 
loops led to single learning loops comprising of straightforward problem-solving: overhauling the 
organization of forest management structures, fixing the nuts and bolts of the project when the 
functioning became egregious but not correcting mismatches at a deeper level, therefore 
perpetuating their possibility to recur. They did not involve a second learning loop at the higher 
                                                             
12 Internalization results by ‘outsourcing’ decision-making and execution to the local populations. is considered 
economically and managerially efficient because the local populations, have the advantage of making decisions  more 
socially and economically meaningful to them and less likely to opt for decisions/actions least harmful as they would 




institutions level comprising of a re-examination of those institutions of their own modus 
operandi, the logics, values and beliefs behind  to trigger a process of re-education (Friedmann, 
1987). 
 
The examination of the rationale behind institutional choices made by the higher-level institutions 
has led us to derive a set of characteristics or qualities sought in ‘candidate’ institutions. The 
activation of the initiative to induce policy reform through institutional recognition begins with 
the choice of the institutions. This can be thought of as taking place in two dimensions. The first 
dimension being that the chosen institution fits the ideology of the higher-level institutions and 
the second dimension has to do with the factors related to the delivery of the project through the 
chosen and recognized institutions. From observations and data collected during fieldwork, I 
identified four prominent characteristics sought by higher-level institutions in the institutions that 
are likely to be chosen and recognized. By understanding these characteristics we understand the 
reason behind the legitimization and recognition of certain institutions and the peripheralization 
of others.  
 
1. Efficiency –  
Administrative efficiency was the predominant type of efficiency that higher level institutions 
took into consideration while recognizing their local partners. The administrative efficiency 
incorporated considering other elements other than the service provision 
The efficiency of the interventions is measured using a repertoire of indicators whereas that of the 
decentralization is mostly gauged through the mismatch between the rhetoric in the laws and in 
practice. Efficiency in service delivery is often associated with decentralization. Relevant to this 
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case, efficiency would be in terms of the internalization of costs through localization. The wave of 
decentralization13 that swept Senegal in 1996 did not involve a form of democratic 
decentralization that would be ideal for efficiency because the powers, especially the financial 
and materials resources to manage forests that were transferred to locally elected government 
were insufficient or insignificant and the rural taxes collected by Rural Councils were negligible. 
Achieving project goals and successful policy implementation was the primary driver behind the 
recognition of Forest Management Committees. Forest Management Committee are composed of 
and run by villagers, but are outside of elected local bodies, meaning they could be removed from 
being under the control of Rural Councils (as in the case of PROGEDE II) as well as being just 
annexed to the Rural Councils (as in the case of Wula Nafaa). As Agrawal puts it “communities 
accomplish local regulation at significantly lower costs than any central government can” 
(Agrawal, 2005). 
 
The capacity of the Rural Council to manage forests, as judged by higher-level institutions and 
then by the rural councils themselves, are thought to be insufficient to accomplish the goals set 
out by the decentralization policies and the project goals, and so additional institutional ‘support’ 
was introduced by the donors. This support has been through the creation of forest management 
committees by the projects; known under different titles in each project and depending on the 
level in the hierarchy of the structure. The forest management committees for both projects are 
                                                             
13 Blundo (2011) holds that the political reasons behind the inception of the laws of decentralization in Senegal 
weighed in more heavily than the administrative and social efficacies. In that respect, the rule of law or legality was 
used both as a legitimizing ideology and a principle of organization (Ghai, 1986). The paradox is that legal texts and 
their amendments proliferate which could be a misleading indication that the ideologies vehicled by those texts are 
being internalized and lived by. It has to be highlighted that laws are not abstract norms or ‘laws of nature’ but they 
are products of decisions concerned with the creation, distribution, exercise, legitimatizing effect and reproduction of 
power (Shivji,1989; Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). 
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composed of and run by villagers but do not have a legal status. This support has been in the form 
of administrative and financial management capacity building, undertaken mostly by WulaNafaa, 
and technical skills training such as how to produce charcoal was undertaken mostly by 
PROGEDE in its zone of intervention.  
 
The focus on the economic growth as a path to development has a long track record consisting 
more often of failures than successes which set in motion a shift in the approach of international 
organizations development-related interventions (Crush, 2006; Peet and Hartwick, 1999; Nustad, 
2001). As a result, higher-level institutions have to balance their focus between the material gains 
from exploitation of nature and the social benefits that can be derived from the way that nature 
and those gains are governed. This concern has played a role in influencing how aid would be 
channeled into countries receiving them, which in turn impinges on the institutions through which 
the aid would flow. Alongside of this is the overarching political and economic outlook towards 
international aid and funding of the western countries ‘giving’ the money and the prevailing 
policies of the recipient country and their rationale for allocative efficiency which still supports 
most of this very top-down approach. (North, 1990; Brown, 2005; Sklar, 1987; Ake, 1993). 
 
The perceived need to have multiple or additional institutions in the forestry sector arises for 
several reasons ranging from addressing the improvement in economic performance of charcoal 
production and administrative task specialization to enhancing democratic practices in resource 
governance and access. Institutional configurations with several types of institutions present 
promising conditions for democratic resource management (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Urbinati 
and Warren, 2008). It could also lead to efficiency in responsiveness and service provision arising 
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from a division of tasks among the various institutions based on their strengths (Tamanaha, 2008; 
Galvan, 2008; Ostrom, 2008; Vira et al., 1998). Furthermore, each institution has its own 
mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability, providing more avenues for people to engage 
with the institution(s) they find most receptive and responsive to their needs as well as 
representative in political processes. However, the functioning of these mechanisms is marred by 
elite capture of those chosen institutions, that is, a small number of favorably placed individuals 
use those institutions as instruments to accumulate a disproportionate amount of opportunities and 
benefits excluding the non-elites. As a result, institutional arrangements sometimes leave people 
with few alternatives but to revert to the existing structures, namely patronage arrangements, 
under which they continue to be dominated by the elites. Recognized and chosen institutions may 
sometimes offer only a façade of democracy and participation, thereby reproducing inequalities, 
instead of more durable deeper changes (Beck, 2008; Villalon and Von Doepp, 2005). Thus, in 
spite of the significant support from donor agencies in terms of redressing inequalities in access to 
resource through local participation, the chosen institutional configuration in forest management 
has led to inequitable access to lucrative charcoal production opportunities within the two studied 
rural communities in Tambacounda region (Ribot & Larson, 2011; O’Brien, 1971; Boutinot, 
2005). 
 
2. Integrity –  
The efficiency factor provides the major thrust for integrity as an important consideration when 
choosing and recognizing local institutions. The conditionality imposed by the donors also 
factored in the choice and recognition of which institutions would be a good fit for meeting the 
project goals. Donors are reluctant about injecting any kind of resource into settings which do not 
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offer any sort of guarantee of penalties for or safeguards against any inefficiencies, even those 
resulting from informal and illegal practices occurring within the partner institutions. “You know 
how the American agencies are, right? One has to account for every dollar that is given out,” said 
an official of one donor agencies while referring to how stringent the monitoring and accounting 
methods are when it comes to the donors’ money (Interviews, 2012). While the concern about the 
aid going into the right ‘hands’ looms ubiquitously within international agencies, achieving 
efficiency and effective democratic practices provides the main thrust for making integrity as an 
important consideration.  
 
Capacity to limit corruption and informal transactions that could provide unfair access to the 
resources to a few and depriving those who might not be able to afford such privileged access 
despite the resource being a common one. The presence of accountability mechanisms is an 
indication of the possibility of keeping in check such transactions and ensuring integrity of 
institutions. This was important in this case study because corruption in the charcoal sector is 
rampant. It gives those with a higher socio-economic status and more resources or connections an 
advantage in gaining access to the resource. Informal transactions of influence, gifts, money, and 
illegal manipulating administrative procedures were widespread among forestry agents, some 
members of forest management committees and Rural Councils and local charcoal producers. 
There is the domination of the industry by those who have the privilege of corruption. WulaNafaa 
circumvented the direct involvement of opportunistic forestry services officials by employing 
independent consultants as project staff. There was however, a radical change in the profile of the 
project staff hired in the second phase of PROGEDE, which resembled more that of WulaNafaa’s 
staff make-up. By bringing in professional staff not affiliated to the forestry services, there was a 
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greater thrust towards enforcing the new forest management unit structures that would be more 
autonomous and less within the grips of those who divert an unfair amount of advantages in an 
unrestrained manner. Several actors, such as the charcoal producers and forestry service staff 
were disgruntled with the actions and decisions of the new staff of the PROGEDE because it 
disrupted the smooth running of their slush fund or overrode their direct involvement, hence, 
preventing them from being in contact with flows of money or access privileges. WulaNafaa on 
the other hand focused more on building the managerial capacity of the local people and 
submitted those managerial units, that is, the Forest Management Committee, to the oversight of a 
democratically elected authority: the Rural Council, which was a way of meeting the criterion for 
democracy or representation of local populations. Such an institutional arrangement met the 
procedural needs that emerged out of the formalization of the charcoal industry at the local level 
as well as the requirement of functioning under the authority of the democratically elected local 
government as stipulated by the laws of decentralization.  
 
The tweaking of the project tools such as the changes in the structure of Forest Management 
Committees as the second phase of PROGEDE reflects the necessity for additional needs 
assessment. The institutional needs of that new policy environment is left solely to higher-level 
officials or consultants who then devise participatory structures that merely require attendance 
rather than creating spaces for sustained political development. The reshuffling led to forestry 
agents who were formerly feasting on opportunities to informally earn monies by abusing  their 
power to allow illegal activities in charcoal and timber-producing forests to be posted in zones 
where minimal economic exploitation of the resource takes place, removing opportunities to earn 
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something ‘on the side’ from their official salary. 
 
Another example of how the re-arrangement of the linkages between institutions was used to stall 
corruption among conniving actors was the relegation of the role of the Rural Council to that of 
an overseer of the financial audit, without any direct links to the newly reorganized executive 
structures. This step was taken during the second phase of PROGEDE reaction to the reported the 
diversion of funds by Rural Council members in during the first phase of the project. Under 
normal circumstances, the democratically elected local government is involved in all the meetings 
organized by the projects because by law, the Rural Council is the gatekeeper of rural 
communities with no activity allowed to take place without its approval. Furthermore, two rural 
councils were asked to form one unique account for collecting charcoal taxes (for the Missirah-
Kothiary forest), one of the Rural Council presidents was reluctant for merging the charcoal tax 
coffers because that would have led to mutual co-inspection of financial transactions preventing 
any fraudulent activities from going undetected. (Meetings, Tambacounda, 2012-2013). 
 
The criteria for membership in the new forest management committees proposed in 2013 were (1) 
only villagers who are not charcoal producers be eligible to be members of the executive bureau 
of the structure, and (2) candidates for positions in the bureau should be sufficiently literate in the 
French language. These criteria were supposed to prevent vested interests of executive members 
from interfering with decisions or actions taken by them while in office and from misusing their 
power. Since members of the elite are usually more educated,  possess the literacy and numeracy 
skills necessary, and have the time to engage in political activities, almost half of the bureau was 
occupied by members who used to be directly involved in charcoal production. One of the newly 
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selected executive members in 2013 shared during an interview that now that he has got this 
position in the bureau, he is going to use this opportunity to help his family members and relatives 
to gain from charcoal production. The same bureau member had himself produced charcoal in the 
past but had abandoned it after a court case he filed against one of the banaa-banaas (middlemen) 
with whom he left his stock of charcoal in Dakar but who did not reimburse the money obtained 
from the sale of the charcoal. After this incident, it would be very difficult for him to re-enter the 
charcoal business because the social sanctioning that might prevent him from getting another 
banaa-banaa to sell his products and he is still waiting to be compensated for the remaining 
amount due from the sale of charcoal by the prosecuted banaa-banaa, added to which is his 
discouragement resulting from this bad experience (Interview, Missirah, 2012). 
 
Administrative procedures are a double edged-sword in Senegal; on one hand they help to 
regulate the production and sale of the commodity in question and on the other hand they offer the 
agents opportunities to manipulate administrative procedures to informally extract benefits. 
Interviews reveal the bureaucratic hurdles they have to overcome in order to earn income from the 
opening up of the forests to rural communities. The extent of difficulty often was related to the 
density of the network of relations of the local producer in the various spheres of life. As shown 
in Chapter 4 of this dissertation on enhancing equity in access for a historically excluded group in 
this sector, women, especially lower class, poorer women, were at a disadvantage to enter and to 
participate actively in the productive sphere, that is charcoal production, ensuing from the change 
in the governance style, that is the decentralization of forest resources. The relation the charcoal 
producer had with other members of the community or with officials or with institutions was one 
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of the factors that defined how burdensome the administrative procedures could be to a particular 
local charcoal producer. For instance, a local charcoal producer shares:  
There is a problem of documents, permits to cut trees for people who want to do so. 
They can have 20 permits but the villages are numerous. They get permits but the 
whole procedure is messy. The permits are gone early but their problems remain. It is 
the forestry services who calculated the number of permits that need to be distributed 
to the charcoal producer groups in the villages.  
The forestry services agents make inventories at regular frequencies to record the quantity of 
charcoal in production in each production block of the forests so as to estimate the number of 
permits required by each group of villages. During those inventory outings whereby the forestry 
agents would be accompanied by a member of the rural council, a member of the forest 
management structure (often the president of the secretary) revealed that sometimes the members 
of those inventory convoys would connive to falsify the quantities reported in a way that the 
figure would be inflated so that more permits could be issued. Those ‘extra’ permits are then 
captured by either the agents or their collaborators who are often people in positions of authority 
such as members of the Rural Council, members of the forest management structures and 
sometimes banaa-banaas (informal sector middlemen between producers and charcoal traders). 
In the past, regardless of those ‘extra’ permits created based on fictitious figures invented by the 






3. Democracy & participation -  
Donor agencies acknowledge the ideological appeal and the practical advantages of the direct 
involvement of the local populations; projects are designed in way to include the local 
beneficiaries at some point along the whole implementation process (Chambers, 1997; 2006; 
Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Muller and Miltin, 2007; Kothari, 2002; Beneria, 2003). Since the 
coming into force of the participatory approach as the norm of how development is practiced in 
developing countries, it has influenced the choice of institutions entrusted with the task of 
carrying out the project actions (Beard et al., 2008; Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). The core 
principle of democracy being “for the people, by the people” and elections being one of the 
procedures created and adopted for operationalizing that principle, these both underpin the ‘good 
governance’ component of the projects and the choice of institutions (Putnam, 1994; Ake, 1996; 
Edigheji, 2006). In this case, the potential of achieving an institutionalized democratic way of 
carrying out CBRNM is reified through an association with a democratically constituted 
institution, which in this case is the democratically elected local government (Ribot 2004; 
Bazaara, 2006; Ribot, Lund and Treue, 2010).  
 
Alignment of the donor agencies (albeit to varying degrees for each project) with the country’s 
decentralization reforms is also mandated by law. This meant that the recognition of the 
democratically elected local government, that is, the Rural Council was also by default, although 
the Rural Council is the institution possessing formalized mechanisms of accountability and 
responsiveness. Tapping into the participatory potential of the rural council requires an informed 
and politically savvy population. Harnessing the agency of a citizenry able to meaningfully 
engage with representatives and ability for demanding accountability could increase access to the 
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resource (Agrawal, 2005; Mamdani, 1996). The majority of implementing project staff 
interviewed said they consider the participation of people with an emphasis on the responsibility 
of local populations, good governance and the strengthening of technical capacities as 
fundamental for the good implementation of forestry-related projects. The interviewees mention 
“participation” and “inclusive approach” as a key element for successful project implementation 
but to several, participation is a “local initiative”, “responsible participation” and the necessity of 
“a bigger responsibility on behalf of the beneficiary populations”. “Good governance and 
transparency in the management of forest and financial resources” was also frequently brought up 
by the interviewees with one of them even suggesting “an internal system of control by and for 
the populations”. “The strengthening of capacities” was also brought up as important aspect to be 
realized through the “adoption of a forest management plan”, “respect of technical norms which 
allows for the guarantee of the sustainability of forest”, the “strengthening of technical and 
organizational capacities of local government and community-based organizations(CBOs) by a 
better treatment and support of transferred powers.” 
 
The consideration of citizens as political equals when it comes to representation is also 
problematic in this context (Pitkin, 1972) where not every member has the same minimum level 
of empowerment and awareness. In a democratically decentralized natural resource governance 
context, it is mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness that make participation of people 
effective. The value of democratic ways is uncontested by intervening agents when it comes to 
involving the people. The architecture of the chosen institutions that are supposed to be endowed 
with all the powers and resources to carry out policy and project goals is imbued with ideological 
framings reflecting the donor’s preference for democracy (USAID, 2008, World Bank, 2011).  
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However, by imposing certain kinds of institutions, the donors inadvertently also define what 
types of citizens are more apt to use such institutions. Exhortations about setting civil society as 
providing a counter-power is unyielding because of the quasi infeasibility of ‘making’ citizens 
who would exactly fit the institutional configurations to make the most of opportunities. Citizens 
are formed from historical processes, often specific to a society, and the expectation that a certain 
type of citizenship would put everybody on a level playing field to engage with the recognized 
institutions, even if they are democratically elected (Tilly, 1995; Lister, 2003). Instead, members 
of the local community who are more apt to capture the opportunities created through project-
supported institutional forms and reform do so at the expense of the less-privileged members of 
the rural communities.   
 
The enforcement of mechanisms of accountability was relegated to the background by the 
projects because the managerial capacity of the whole institutional setting that was prioritized.  
Moreover, it was almost taken as a given that by associating14 with the democratically elected 
rural council, that the whole polity would become automatically democratic. Relying on electoral 
modes of accountability is insufficient and incompatible with contextual specificities and work 
mostly when there are good leaders committed to improving the well-being of the whole 
community (Fieldwork, 2012; 2013; Tendler, 1997). This is demonstrated by how the Rural 
Councilors’ growing awareness of  the profitability of charcoal and of their important role in 
representing their respective rural communities at a higher level have led them to exploit that 
position. Rural Council Presidents have started negotiating for their rural communities to be 
                                                             





allowed to produce a greater quantity of charcoal. But how the permits are distributed after the 
quantity negotiated gets approved is often prone to the discretion of the Rural Council president 
who might participate in allowing his cronies to intercept more production privileges than allowed 
or adopt a more transparent and fair stance. 
 
4. Reliability - 
Reliability is defined as having the proven capacity to use resources efficiently and in all 
transparency to meet project goals and higher-level institutions’ expectations. This characteristic 
encompasses all the previously described elements but has a cumulative dimension to it, that is, it 
is a trait that the institution builds over time. 
   
This type of reliability is still being built by local institutions in Senegal, taking into consideration 
that the decentralization process is just out of its ‘stumbling steps’ phase. This means that at only 
a decade and half after the inception of the decentralization process, Rural Councils have had a 
history of only three terms until the most recent local elections in 2014. The familiarization of the 
local populations with institutions entrusted with authority and resources to manage forests, 
including where to place the Rural Council and Forest Management Committees in the 
institutional landscape, requires a lag time.  
 
The palimpsest-like mode that characterizes how donor agencies choose the institutions they wish 
to channel their resources through as development aid could be very revealing about the 
conditions that have influenced the choice and recognition of certain institutions and not others. In 
the 1960s, the state was the preferred institutional partner of donor agencies because back then, 
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they used to abide by the notion of the ‘developmental state’ (Young, 1997). Then by the 1980s 
began the epoch whereby the role of the state was being questioned especially due to influx of 
streams of economic neoliberalism which was bent on eschewing the state. In the late 1990s, 
donor agencies backtracked to an approach that involved closer collaboration with the State 
(Blundo, 2011). Changes in approaches to implementation is not only mere trying and erring. 
Macro-political and macro-economic climates together with the donors and state’s ideologies are 
good predictors of what the policy is going to be. These ideologies are expressed in the form of the 
organization’s mission goals and the type of regime of implementation (Hajek et al., 2011) prevalent can 
give indication about the undergirding ideologies. In this case, gaining an understanding of factors 
crucial to the formulation of policy guiding U.S.-based donor agencies can explain the 
development paradigm used by the donor agencies (Tendler, 1975; Brautigam, 1992).  
 
Reliability of a candidate institution is closely linked to the characteristics of project design and 
implementation because evaluation of interactions between projects and the institutions during 
project implementation is based on the project design. Project design determines the impact 
trajectory as it will determine what kind of output and outcome are expected from the chosen 
institution (Patton, 2008). The chosen institutions have to perform according to the standards set 
by the theory informing the policy champions, decision-makers and/or the donor agencies’ 
experience. Since the traditional evaluations use only a select set of indicators and do not 
incorporate process tracing of the unintended effects of the project implemented, the effects at a 
multi-scalar levels and assessment of performance against different time frames. Projects put 
chosen local institutions on a certain path that predisposes them to produce results that can either 
strengthen or weaken that reliability reputation of the institution. An example from the case study 
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to illustrate this point has to do with the differences in how each project goes about implementing 
their respective donor agency’s commitment to the ‘bottom-up’ approach. The efforts to reduce 
the distance between what the donors seek to achieve and what the local populations are 
perceived as needing in terms of empowerment through projects is brought into action through 
participatory approaches or by recognizing institutions allowing the participation of the local 
population. Several interviewees compared the Wula Nafaa project with the PROGEDE one by 
stating that the former put greater emphasis on the institutional aspect, that is, on the ways of 
organizing the local populations and building the capacity of the institutions meant to serve this 
purpose such as the Forest Management Committees. The latter concentrated on enhancing the 
technical skills of people in wood-cutting and charcoal production methods. The interviewees 
observed that although both projects brought benefits to the local communities, Wula Nafaa 
proved to be more effective and most likely to produce durable results in terms access to forest 
resources than PROGEDE, the evaluation of which revealed that more attention needed to be paid 
to institutional configurations and composition in order to reach project goals. During a meeting 
held in May 2012, in Tambacounda for assessing PROGEDE’s first phase, which regrouped 
representatives of all stakeholders, participants declared openly that PROGEDE needed to learn 
from how Wula Nafaa proceeded in its activities. 
  
The credibility for the intervening agents of the ‘candidate’ institutions is influenced by the 
reputation of their reliability and how well they share the politico-ideological bearing of the 
donors, for instance, if they abide by the same democratic ethos. The failure to perform 
adequately according to the norms set by higher-level institutions when they were chosen in the 
past, becomes part of the profile of ‘candidate’ institutions.  According to higher-level officials 
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and project implementing staff interviewed, there are many considerations when deciding which 
local institutional partners to choose. These include the quality of their performance, as 
interviewees stated “there needs to be good governance—if the institution can work in terms of 
capacity, management, and mobilization as well as in transparency”, and, “the leadership of the 
president of the rural council matters”  (Interviews, 2013). Officials also mentioned contextual 
factors that influence the performance of institutions. One interviewee brought up that, “very 
often the cultural factors are forgotten”, and another noted that, “we need to consider their 
position with respect to the ruling power; the charisma (or the popularity) of leaders.”  The formal 
status of institutions is considered to be an important factor in determining which institutions they 
work with: “the legal standing of institutions which are the point of entry plays a role as we 
cannot work on natural resources without going through Rural Council first. USAID works on 
forestry since projects like NRBAR (Natural Resource Based Agricultural Research Project), 
since more than 30 years. A lot of strategic thinking is involved in USAID'S program for 
research, tools of participation, institutional organization.”(Interviews, Dakar & Tambacounda, 
2013). 
 
The sum of these aspects mentioned by the officials influence the reliability of the institution as a 
partner for policy and project implementation. Although the quality and style of leadership within 
the chosen local institutions affect the policy and project outcomes and outputs, the choice and 
recognition of local institutions have to comply to uniformity in application. The institutional 
landscape has not only offered more flexibility to the elites but has even extended the range of 
action within which the elites can accumulate more forest-based wealth. In practice, only a few 
favorably positioned people take over newly introduced institutions or place their allies or 
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subordinates to run them. The forest management committees are institutions that are increasingly 
starting to bear the characteristics of entities with restricted membership and unequal membership 
with categories of producers able to produce only a small amount tethered to more powerful and 
bigger charcoal producers. These committees follow the prescriptions provided by the project 
documents but they do not challenge the skewed balances in access to forest resources as they 
themselves form a clique that wants to maintain the privileges of access to charcoal production 
among themselves. This mix of chosen institutions prioritized the securing of economic 
development for a select group. This dynamic allowed for the entrenchment of many rural elites’ 
economic interests.  
 
3.6 Concluding Discussion 
The choice and recognition of institutions by the state and international agencies has carved the 
institutional landscape of forest resource governance, impacting the overall improvement of the 
rural societies in Tambacounda. The outcomes of institutional choice and recognition, as 
demonstrated by the case examined in this article, have implications for the extent of the success 
of externally supported interventions, and state-led policies of decentralized forest resource 
management. 
  
3.6.1  Reconciling wealth generation and participatory governance 
The study of institutional recognition reveals the strengths and the lacunae of choosing certain 
local institutional partners and how those institutions are configured with respect to each other. 
Both projects recognized institutional configurations conducive to economic development and 
favored a participatory style of governance so as to create possibilities for inclusiveness and 
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equitability in access to forest resources. Choosing and recognizing democratically elected local 
government provided the advantage of democratic representation to the local populations but this 
was not always congruent with everybody’s wealth-accumulation aspirations. The costs of 
introducing market-oriented reforms even in a democratically decentralized context have resulted 
in the privileged few benefiting from reforms. Participation and representation often require 
disinterested cooperation that the market-oriented reforms based on models of economic 
efficiency, hence competition, might not offer (Przeworski, 1991). 
 
The costs here are social costs and institutional costs which are paid by those segments of the 
populations who should have been the ones benefitting from rather than incurring the costs. The 
social costs linked to institutions include the loss of trust in institutions that fail to be equitably 
responsive to the needs of villagers. This social cost is a major hindrance to citizen empowerment 
and undermines the very initiatives which seek to build equity in distribution of access to wealth-
creation opportunities. The social costs are again paid by the poorer, less politically and socially 
well-placed groups in the villages, resulting in lower access to forest-based income-generating 
activities for those groups and contributing to the reproduction of social inequalities. Elite capture 
prevents non-elite members of those communities from being able to count with reasonable 
certainty on the responsiveness of institution approached or leave those members with a feeling of 
helplessness about making the institutions accountable. On the other hand, the elites can rely on 
the recognized institutional mix because it opens a stable platform for coopting each other for 
sustaining mutually beneficial rackets without being sanctioned for crossing boundaries of 
formally and legally permissible transactions.  
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3.6.2  Once a winner always a winner? The entrenchment of a new cycle of elite 
capture 
 
The chosen local authorities – committees and elected local governments – each with their 
imputed distinctive mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness, did not translate into the 
harmonious, well-adjusted syncretism that can be taken advantage of by all groups within the 
local populations. An empowered local population could be considered as being an essential 
element in producing more ‘winners’ out of villagers so that they are able to take advantage of 
benefits brought about by policies and projects and to protect themselves against domination and 
exploitation (Scott, 1985;Chambers, 1983). We have found that citizenry is not, however, a level 
playing field in the charcoal producing rural communities studied. Elites are more proficient 
citizens who, even within democratic institutions, can make their needs and aspirations heard and 
have more leverage in applying mechanisms of accountability because of their privileged status.  
The expectation that with a set of development prescriptions, democratic elections and civil-
society run forest management committees, any villager would be able to transform him/herself 
automatically into a citizen skilled in applying mechanisms of accountability did not always 
translate into reality. It was most likely to do so when villagers possessed the necessary access 
qualifications to have participation calibrated to project needs (Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Blaikie, 
1989). People tap into their already differentiated sources of agency, which might not be found 
within electoral or non-electoral accountability repertoires, but there are differentiated abilities to 
use the media, legal resources, or transparency measures. The villagers with means often navigate 
their way through the institutional system social and political relations to obtain access to 
charcoal production. Villagers would go to institutions that they perceived as being able to resolve 
their issues regardless of whether or not the institution has formal mechanisms of accountability. 
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Similarly, villagers sought responsiveness from institutions that have proximity to the issues 
related to charcoal production or to which they are personally close to instead of approaching the 
local institutions that officially and legally have the authority and the resources but not lacking in 
familiarity with the issues.  
 
Thus, for their forest-related demands, the villagers did not always go to the institutions that are 
democratically constituted, such as the democratically elected local government, but as in any 
forum-shopping activity, they went to the institutions demonstrating greater ability to their 
specialized requests, which in this case was the Forest Management Committees (von Benda-
Beckmann 1981, Baviskar, 2004). In the rural communities studied, such resources are provided 
by the projects in the form of Forestry Management Committees that now handle the 
administrative and managerial tasks. These committees are more able to provide a rapid and 
adapted response and also act as a relay between the charcoal producers and other authorities and 
project staff. Such forest management committees do not have a formalized function to represent 
the local population. Yet they are delegated management responsibility by the democratically 
elected local governments – which are downwardly accountable to the public. 
  
The findings further highlight the functional relevance of considering the ‘political game’ 
prevailing in a specific location where a project is intervening in order to calibrate not only the 
choice of institutions but also how the chosen ones are to be positioned in relation to other 
institutions. Linking the forest management committees to the elected rural councils has had 
mixed results depending on the democratically elected representative leader’s, that is, the 
President of the Rural Council’s, own personal or political agenda regarding charcoal production. 
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The personal characteristics of democratically elected leaders in the different Rural Councils is a 
defining feature of how the institutional choice of democratically elected local representatives 
performs with respect to policy (Tendler, 1997). 
 
Democracy-imbued institutions are posited as a counter-powers to underlying social and political-
economic systems deemed to be discriminatory and unconducive to equity. But, at the same time, 
these institutions place the onus of action on the villager, expecting villagers to be proficient in 
using institutional tools maladjusted to their realities. The conceptualization of citizenship here 
needs to be extended and enlarged to accommodate citizen formation as constant and an outcome 
of historical processes that are place-specific; something that can rarely be induced by only an 
institutional re-arrangement but has to emerge from a combination of factors that are beyond the 
scope of one sector’s of activity. Thus, mobilizing change outside of the forest sector or charcoal 
industry related interventions becomes indispensable. Choosing and recognizing specific types of 
institutions, even if they are democratically constituted defines what kind of citizens can use those 
institutions therefore, strengthening the position of one group of citizens with specific status, 
resources and skill sets. Although progress was made in policy implementation for formalizing 
administrative and financial management of access to forest resources, they are still insufficient 
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INSTRUMENTALIZING GENDER: WHEN ELITE CAPTURE INTERSECTS 
WITH GENDER-FOCUSED ACTIONS OF FOREST MANAGEMENT 




Gender mainstreaming in Senegal’s two long-standing forestry projects, Wula Nafaa and 
PROGEDE, have marked a milestone in forest management. Since 1998, rural communities can 
legally produce charcoal in their forests but not everybody within those rural communities is able 
to gain from the opportunities offered by this change. One of the initiatives of the two projects to 
promote equitable access to forest resources was through increasing the participation of women in 
forest resource management and exploitation. Despite the provisions made by the projects to 
include women in forest management and use, profits from wood-based charcoal production 
accrue mostly to women in privileged groups or to the male family members of those women. 
This article shows how participation, an important component of the gender approach, is 
construed at different stages of projects and how it, in turn, affects who gets access to charcoal 
production and trade. The analysis focuses on how elite capture shapes the participation of 
women. It demonstrates that the avenues opened for women to participate in forest management 
and use do not challenge the specific gender-biased contextual contours of rural societies in 
Tambacounda. Efforts to involve women in the forest management and production end of the 
charcoal sector favor elite women over poorer and less advantageously positioned women, 
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overlooking that stratification among women and within local population that prevented the 
building of equitable access. 
Keywords: gender, forest resources, development projects, elite capture, decentralization, rural 
Senegal 
 
4.2 Introduction  
In the Tambacounda region of Senegal, externally supported projects work with decentralized 
local government to close the gender gap in forest management and access to charcoal sector. 
However, only certain groups of women can benefit from such efforts. This paper examines why 
the introduction of gender balance within profitable wood-based charcoal sector in rural Senegal 
faces obstacles in achieving equitable access in favor of those formerly excluded from such 
wealth-generating activities. Two projects: the USAID’s Wula Nafaa (Agriculture and Natural 
Resources Management Program) and World Bank’s PROGEDE (Sustainable and Participatory 
Energy Management Project) provided assistance to the rural communities in the Tambacounda 
region and the existing institutions involved with forestry resources, namely the elected rural 
council and the local forestry services to implement Forest Management Plans.15 In the two rural 
communities studied, the local elites (villagers in favorable political, socio-economic positions) 
captured most of the opportunities offered through the projects’ gender-oriented action. 
Meanwhile women from poorer and marginalized groups remained unable to participate in 
charcoal production and trade. The projects took the unprecedented step of promoting women in 
                                                             
15 Forest Management Plans consist of the time-specific and geographically-specific programming of the management of forests 
for the realization of profit at the economic, cultural and environment levels. That management plan is required by law for all 
forests that are 20 hectares or more in size before commercial exploitation can take place. 
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the charcoal business but have at the same time reinforced existent elite capture of benefits 
generated from forest resources. 
 
Charcoal production is a forest-based activity with a total annual revenue close to US$31 million 
in December 2015 (World Bank, 2015). It is also a sector that is male-dominated and still one 
characterized by a small number of elites capturing the biggest chunk of the profits (Jusrut, 
forthcoming). Elite capture refers to situation where elites shape development processes 
according to their priorities and/or appropriate development resources for private gain. Elites are 
actors who have disproportionate influence in the development process as a result of their 
superior social, political or economic status (World Bank, 2010; Platteau, 2004; 2008). 
 
The decentralized system operational in Senegal involves the transfer of official powers to control 
and manage forests from central government to the elected rural councils of rural communities. In 
the two rural communities studied, each project created Forest Management Committees (FMCs) 
to organize local populations into structures for managing and using their forest resources as 
required by the Forest Management Plans. The approach adopted by the projects for including the 
local communities in forest management and use so as to build gender equity holds potential as 
well as challenges. The FMCs set up by the projects were structured in such a way so as to 
harness the participation of sub-groups, including women, at the local level for the management 





The participation of women in the various institutional spaces, either created by the projects or by 
representation through democratically elected local government, provides a platform on which 
women could to be heard and be responded to. 
 
The study of the intersection of elite capture with gender-focused actions of projects is 
analytically pertinent for unearthing how such project actions have put an additional instrument in 
the hands of elites leading to more extensive elite capture at the local scale. Women in the rural 
regions of Tambacounda have historically been excluded from income-generating activities of 
significance and from holding positions to control or manage those activities. Gender 
mainstreaming unfolds in an institutional landscape already characterized by male elite capture 
with a distinctly male face. These preexisting inequalities continue to fetter effective participation 
of women in decision making and their access16 to forest resources. 
 
This paper describes the extent to which the gender-affirmative actions introduced by the projects 
have been effective in enabling women to partake in political and economic processes related to 
charcoal business in Tambacounda. The analysis included identifying the challenges of using a 
category such as gender to promote broader participation of local people in the management of 
their forests in the rural communities in the region of Tambacounda. To understand the positive 
and limiting effects of efforts enable women’s participation in forest management and charcoal 
production, we examined how participation is construed at the various stages of project 
conception and implementation and how participation translates into action at each stage (see Fig. 
                                                             
16 Access here is conceptualized as not only being able to enter productive zones of the forest but also the ability to 
derive benefits from it. 
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4.1.). The projects sought to dovetail increased participation of women in economically 
productive natural resource management with redressing gender-skewed access to forest 
resources and achieving longer-lasting wider inclusion. However, involving local populations, by 
giving them some of the responsibilities in managing those structures as well as building their 
capacity to economically gain from their forests, did not uplift the women who are most deprived. 
Women play a critical and multifaceted role in poverty reduction in the developing south 
(Boserup, 1970; World Bank, 2001). Marginalized groups such as women who have been 
conditioned to be economically subordinate to male members of their societies are also the ones 
who play less-prominent roles in public decision-making arena. Transforming women into more 
economically and politically active members through participation in forest-related activities in 
rural communities in Tambacounda could reduce poverty and improve the wellbeing of 
households (Chen, 2010) in one of the most remote and underdeveloped areas of Senegal. 
  
The creation of spaces for the participation and representation of women through forest 
management structures and local institutions are bringing women into decision-making spaces, 
but simultaneously reproducing negative discrimination, especially towards poorer women 
(Bandiaky, 2008). The forestry programs not only reproduced pre-existing hierarchies in class and 
gender but also added strata through which inequalities are introduced and which they reinforce. 
They augment inequality among rural women, widening the gap between those able to engage in 
income-generating activity of charcoal production and those who are excluded from these 
activities. In addition, the opportunities created by projects that encourage the participation of 
more women in forest-related activities are prone to capture by elite men who use women 
participating in project activities as instruments to accrue a disproportionately bigger proportion 
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of opportunities in the charcoal sector. This paper demonstrates how the forestry programs 
studied for this research, albeit creating opportunities previously non-existent for women, have 
not been able to bring about the transformative changes they claim to seek. They cannot transform 
the lives of women merely through their greater inclusion in a traditionally male dominated 
forest-based economic sector.  
 
Data providing the empirical foundation for this paper was collected during a study extending 
from January 2012 to August 2013. The methods used to collect primary data, mostly qualitative 
in nature, included a survey of households and formal and informal interviews with the villagers, 
members of Rural Councils, government officials, customary leaders, project officials at various 
levels of project organization. Observation, both participant and unobtrusive, were used to get a 
better grasp of different kinds of social, political, cultural dynamics both within the local 
populations in the recipient villages and within the bureaucratic milieu of project implementation 
and forestry services. The study took place over a period extending from January 2012 to August 
2013.  
 
4.3 Elite Capture and Gender Inequality: Framing the Questions 
Charcoal produced in rural regions of Senegal constitutes a vital source of domestic energy for 
cities in Senegal. In 1998, the central government of Senegal allowed the transfer of the 
management of forests used for charcoal production to local populations and their democratically 
elected local government, the rural council. With the onset of this decentralization process, the 
transfer of responsibilities of managing forests to rural communities entailed the creation and 
recognition of institutions that would organize and oversee the use and management of forests on 
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behalf of the rural communities. The local populations in the villages surrounding the community 
forests17, can exercise their rights to use the forests while respecting the technical prescriptions set 
in Forest Management Plans which are approved by the State (RdS, 1998). Scholars like 
Bandiaky (2008) point out how the ‘gender neutral’ nature of such decentralization reforms in 
Senegal have so far only exacerbated the exclusion of women, especially poor women, from 
profitable forest sectors such as charcoal because they do not challenge the larger context of 
inequality in which these programs are located. So, what the government’s decentralization policy 
lacked in gender-sensitivity, the project interventions sought to fill in by having a positive gender 
component integrated into project objectives or through the forest management plans they have 
assisted the rural communities in crafting.  
 
Although elite capture and gender asymmetries are conceptually different, they are both 
phenomena that exclude segments of rural populations from the benefits that can be derived from 
forest resources. This commonality called for an exploration of linkages between gender and elite 
capture with respect to forest management and use in two charcoal-producing rural communities 
in Senegal. The identification of such linkages stems from the necessity to answer the following 
questions: 1) How do policies committed to including women as participants in forest 
management and use reinforce or dissipate existing elite capture?; 2) How does elite capture 
affect women’s ability to benefit from the most profitable forest-based product, namely, 
charcoal?; 3) How does elite capture promote unequal access to forest resources among the 
various groups of women in spite of the strong emphasis on gender by forestry-related projects? 
                                                             
17 This appellation will be used throughout this chapter to refer to the forests the management of which has been 
conferred to Rural Councils. 
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This paper answers these questions via a case study of local government jurisdictions called 
‘Rural Communities’18 in the Tambacounda region in Senegal using two of Senegal’s longest 
standing externally funded forestry projects as an entry point. The empirical data presented in this 
paper describes the triggering of a cycle of elite capture through project interventions operating 
within a context where forest resource management has been devolved to the local government as 
well as one where women play a subordinate role in the economic sphere of life. 
 
Exclusion from forest benefits, that is negatively discriminated access to forest resources, is 
defined by a combination of ethnicity, class, gender and other broader structural factors that 
create economic, political boundaries or opportunities (Vijayalakshmi & Chandreshekar, 2000; 
Vijayalakshmi, 2002). For the purpose of this study women were considered as an analytical 
group of people subordinated based on gender. Using an analytical category such as ‘women’ 
sheds light on the extent to which policy efforts made to positively discriminate towards women 
improve or diminish their political inclusion and well-being. Even while implementing policies 
geared at redressing gender-based inequalities, project goals are formulated in a way that 
considers women as a homogenous group instead of a stratified one. The policies do not make 
provisions to differentiate within a specific target group so as to better address the different needs 
of the various groups of women regarding their involvement in the charcoal sector.  
 
The findings from this empirical study show that the persistence of elite capture and women’s 
subordinate social and economic position as limiting women’s ability to benefit from forests 
through charcoal production. The investigation of the connections between elite capture and 
                                                             
18 A Rural community (Communauté Rurale) is a fourth-level administrative division. Rural communities comprise 
of a certain number of villages, sometimes up to 85. In 2013, there were 340 rural communities in Senegal. 
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gender discrimination show how elite capture at the various levels has long contributed to the 
diversion of resources and opportunities to the advantage of a small group of persons. Poorer 
women find themselves unable to enter in the more profitable sectors of forest resources despite 
the training workshops and created reserved spots in the management structures. Elite capture is 
one of the foremost factors maintaining social and economic inequalities in the rural communities 
studied. Elites are instrumentalizing women through the projects’ gender components, ultimately 
counteracting the promotion of women that the projects set out to achieve. 
 
4.4 Projects and the gendering of inclusive forest resource management and 
access 
  
USAID’s Wula Nafaa’s (WN) strategic objectives consisted of: (i) Sustainable increases in 
private sector income-generating activities within the forestry sector and (ii) improved local 
delivery of services and sustainable use of resources. WN was implemented by a contracting firm, 
the International Resource Group (IRG), as a two-phase project: Phase I, February 2003-May 
2008, Phase II from 2009 to 2013. The emphasis of WN was to build the organizational capacity 
of the local communities by strengthening administrative skills and also subjecting the forest 
management committees to the authority of the Rural Councils in managing forest resources. 
  
World Bank’s PROGEDE was first implemented by the Government of Senegal between 1997 
and 2004 with the objective of improving the management of wood resources, limiting their use 
through energy savings measures and improving the capabilities of the public sector to effectively 
coordinate and control the sector (Intelligent Energy – Europe). PROGEDE’s second phase 
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(2010-2016) development objective is to contribute to an increase in the availability of diversified 
household fuels in a sustainable and gender equitable way, and to contribute to increase the 
income of participating communities while preserving the forest ecosystems (World Bank, 2010). 
 
The gender aspect has been a focal point in the second phase of PROGEDE with the application 
of the 50% men and 50% women rule when it comes to who should constitute the forest 
management committees created by the project. On the other hand, WN did not have similar 
gender-based quota, but WN did incorporate from the onset income-generating activities that 
were thought to appeal mostly to women. Such activities included market gardening, the 
harvesting and the processing of certain forest products such as baobab fruit (Adansonia digitata), 
Mbepp gum (Sterculia setigera), the grain fonio (Digitaria exilis), and the fruit tree jujube 
(Ziziphus jujube). The involvement of women was predominantly related to market gardening 
activities and collection and processing of fruits from trees in the forest. WN also required there 
to be one woman to act as a representative of women of her village in the village representatives 
group in the structure set up by the project. 
 
The participatory approach employed by the project organized villagers into rural self-governance 
bodies called Forest Management Committees. The Forest Management Committees are three-
tiered structures that function outside the formal politico-administrative structure.19 The third or 
the lowest tier is constituted of villagers forming groups representing their respective villages at 
the meetings held by the second-tier level. The second tiers are called management committee 
                                                             
19 The institutions within the formal politico-administrative are the ones that have a legal status and formal in-built 
mechanisms of responsiveness and accountability 
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bureaus. These bureaus are the core executive parts of committees set up by noth projects. The 
second tier of the WN’s structure is accountable to the democratically elected Rural Council, 
represented by the President of the Forest Management Committee. Due to the reconfigurations 
made in 2012 by PROGEDE, however, the third tier has gained in importance and its 
accountability to elected Rural Council has diminished. 
 
The salient difference between the two projects lies in the hierarchical positioning of women in 
the management structures, which in turn determines how much influence and what kind of 
influence they can exert in decision making. WN requires that women participate in the decision-
making process at the bottom tier of the whole structure as a representative of women of the 
village while in the most recent PROGEDE forest management structure, the involvement of 
women is now required throughout the entire management structure. The presence of women at 
the top tier of the decision-making hierarchy in PROGEDE’s structure has been made mandatory; 
women can either play the role of the president, vice-president, secretary general, an assistant 
secretary general, a treasurer or an assistant treasurer provided that they constitute at least 50% of 
the executive bureau. The bottom tier of PROGEDE’s structure also is required to be composed 
50% of women. PROGEDE’s re-organization of the forest management structures it created 
inclined heavily in the direction of pulling in more women of the village communities to hold 
positions of power rather than only being a spokesperson. Although being a representative of 
other women of her village is in theory an important role in the bottom-up, participatory approach 
to the functioning of such institutions, the actual voicing of the needs and concerns by women 




Since there were no gender-based restrictions for the posts beholding executive and decision-
making powers in the WN structure, all20 of them except one, were unsurprisingly occupied by 
men. The village representative groups are in practice largely ‘tokenistic’ or often passive 
attendees. The majority of women in those groups are most of the time oblivious to how their 
participation could affect women. They just attend the meeting because a family member or a 
relative of theirs asked them to do so, with a few women being even unaware of their names were 
on the list of representatives (Fieldwork, 2012).  As pointed out by the women interviewed: 
women would often participate in meetings held in their villages but only the people who hold 
some kind of formal positions took the floor while women often find themselves not given the 
opportunity to speak. 
  
The exploitation of forest for the purpose of wood-based charcoal production is highly gendered 
in Senegal and this case shows the hindrances women face in balancing their asymmetrical 
position in entering a natural-resource-based productive sector as well as in spaces of social and 
political interaction in institutions that should in principle allow them to gain power with respect 
to forest resources. The inclusion of women in charcoal production is still at an embryonic stage 
in rural Tambacounda and the number of women charcoal producers is significant enough to be 
perceived as competition to groups of more established men charcoal producers. Rural women 
charcoal producers are not currently disruptive to any existing hierarchy, which might help in 
explaining why the gender aspect has not attracted a lot of resistance from the male members of 
                                                             
20 There were a total of 19 positions for the Sita Niaoule whole management structure. The Sita Nioule Forest 
Management structure is divided into 3 block-level management committees each consisting of 6 executive positions, 
plus one member of the Rural Council who presides over the whole Forest Management Committee. The members of 




the elite group. Although not numerically as significant as men in the charcoal sector, women 
charcoal producers in rural regions exist and women are becoming increasingly interested in 
entering the charcoal sector because of the wealth-generation prospects in that sector. Women 
charcoal producers are currently not common but the few who engage in charcoal production 
activities are found mostly working as ‘intermediaries’ in the charcoal chain, that is, they would 
mostly buy the charcoal from the surghas (migrant laborers) whom they have engaged or who 
them find already producing charcoal in the forests or other local producers and sell it to 
merchants. 
 
4.5 Forest-based Development Projects and Elite Capture in Rural 
Communities 
 
The newly created opportunities for extracting economic benefits from forests, especially through 
charcoal production is being captured by local elites. Elite capture is considered a hindrance to 
democratic culture (Lieten, 1996; Shah 2006). In the rural regions, forestry activities are the 
domain of men and the elites capturing benefits in the sector are men. Elite capture is about 
differentiated access to opportunities based on social, economic, political privileged positioning. 
The involvement of women in charcoal production in the villages is greatly influenced by who, 
among the men, dominate that sector at the local level. For instance, Khadija Sall21 entered the 
sector via higher up connections; her husband has been producing charcoal since several years 
and is also the president of the forest management committee. It is therefore necessary to identify 
who among the men are implicated in the elite capture and what they are capturing before 
                                                             
21 Names have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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engaging in examination of the gendered aspect of that capture. 
 
As the following depiction of the charcoal industry demonstrates, the members of the rural 
communities who benefit the most from charcoal are men, especially men who already have 
advantages – such as well-established connections with leaders and officials and knowledge about 
and ease in navigating the bureaucratic procedures as well as commercial activities. Moreover, the 
elites in the rural communities studied sought mostly to maintain control over their advantageous 
access to charcoal production through means and strategies that could be considered as corrupt 
and clannish. This observation is stated here not to demonize the local elite by overemphasizing 
their opportunistic exploitative role but to show where they are located on the elite conduct 
spectrum – a spectrum ranging from the materially and humanly deleterious exploitative elite to 
the benevolent elites who are willing to accommodate that the non-elite benefit from opportunities 
permitting some kind of advancement (Wong, 2013). 
  
Corruption is one way elite capture manifests itself. There is an array of corrupt practices 
associated with decentralized systems in developing countries (Shah, 2006). The ones most 
relevant to this case range from petty corruption through the bureaucratic system characterized by 
people holding official positions who accept bribes, award favors, and diversion of funds to 
regulatory capture or influence peddling that allows the capture of institutional apparatuses 
(Boone, 1992; Shah 2006). At the local level, that is, in the rural communities, patronage-based 
corruption is most prevalent wherein official position holders and other advantageously placed 
figure heads (like members of the Rural Council, officials of the forestry services or even 
executive members of the FMC bureaus) give preferential treatment to people with whom they 
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have pre-established relations (such as members of kin, friends, business partners) in return for 
bribes or are associated with the diversion of funds and the awarding of favors (Interviews, 2012; 
2013). 
  
Observation during fieldwork revealed that at all stages of the process of producing charcoal, 
from the paper work to the actual production of the product and to its sale: 1) men are the ones 
who deliver the documents in the formal institutions involved; 2) they are the ones who 
informally sell the circulation permits; 3) they are the ones who are the most important and 
influential members of the rural council, and 4) they are also the ones who are the members of the 
forest management committees created by the projects. The prevailing ‘personalism’ 
(Prud’homme, 1995) whereby official position-holders pay more attention to individual needs of 
those who are close to them than to public interest in general, therefore bringing in more 
personalism than professionalism to what they do, has a gendered aspect that tilts in the favor of 
men in the case studied. For instance, such proximity develops because the people who are 
members of the Rural Councils or the Forest Management Committees were born and live in 
those same rural communities, or are co-opted and seek to maintain good relations with the 
members of the rural communities they now inhabit in cases where they are outsiders (Fieldwork, 
2012; Tanzi, 1995). 
 
Some women did enter the charcoal sector. The women in the villages who succeeded in entering 
the charcoal industry were able to do so partly because they had a male relative who shared 
information with them or a husband who is already in the charcoal sector and has the adequate 
social and business connections the woman could tap into or knowledge by which they can learn 
 133 
 
the ropes of the trade. Other women, such as Aissata Sylla, can enter the charcoal sector because 
they hail from a family having an above average income. She is therefore able to harness greater 
financial security, allowing her to engage in activities other than subsistence agriculture. Charcoal 
production is one of Aissata’s income-generating activities, the other being trade. She trades 
peanuts, and cloth from Mali and now uses the money earned from charcoal to re-invest in those 
same trading activities. She is one of the two woman engaged in producing charcoal in this village 
of around 40 households. She started producing charcoal in 2009 and in 2012 she produced, 450 
bags of charcoal (slightly more than a truckload), which she sold at 1750 cfa francs per bag to 
another woman, a banaa-banaa (a middleman) in the neighboring bigger village.  
 
In addition to differential access to opportunities, men and women invest their incomes from the 
sector differently. Interviews and surveys converge to show that whenever men have the 
maximum control over charcoal cash, their priorities include the purchase of motorbikes, 
additional wives, agricultural equipment and rebuilding the house. Respect and social standing for 
men is derived the acquisition of status possessions like motor vehicles and material objects as 
well as cash that they can use and share with relatives and clients whereas women considered 
improved aspects of their personal lives as being important such supporting children, food 
security, household chores, marriage (Surveys, 2013). 
  
 




In the rural communities studied, men are asked or can ask others to sit at the head of tables, 
speak or ask others to speak on their behalf, and are given access to financially gainful 
opportunities. The needs and aspirations of women, whose conspicuous absence or silence 
prevails at all levels of forest management and political representation, are therefore overlooked. 
Only 6 out of 46 of the democratically elected members of the Rural Council of the Rural 
Community covered by Wula Nafaa were women. Such women, just like most of the other men 
who are Rural Council members, are recruited by party leaders to be on the electoral list based on 
their ability to convene crowds at meetings and to act as political outreach in the various localities 
of the rural community. Most of these women are barely literate and rarely take an active part in 
decision making. The Law No 2010-11 of 28 May 2010 required women to make up 50% of 
candidates on party lists from national to local level (Interviews, 2013; Arieff, 2013; UN Women, 
2011). This law will be applied as from the next set of elections. The initiative of increasing the 
number of women on the electoral lists being still at a nascent stage, it is yet to be seen how it 
enables women from all the socio-economic groups in those rural communities in the Senegalese 
context to have access opportunities created by national development policies (Childs, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, women who hold positions in the forest management structures, just women 
politicians, might not automatically become the representatives of all the women although being 
women, they might be thought of as being more familiar with problems other women encounter. 
Women who hold positions in those management structures become mouthpieces for other men, 
especially those whom the women want to associate with for building their political base or are 
related to (Fieldwork, 2013). Compliance with men’s interests might be more valuable in 
providing for women leaders’ own vested interests or that of their political parties (Cornwall, 
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2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Nanivadekar, 2006). While political interests of women 
holding positions of authority might sometimes overshadow their sensitivity to women’s needs 
and demands, female solidarity does have role to play when tapped to build the confidence and 
motivation needed at beginning stages of entry in forest management or the charcoal sector, 
previously unknown terrains to rural women (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Deininger et al., 2011). 
This was observed to exist to some degree in both Koar and Missirah in the form of women’s 
organization and groups would be the way women would usually use to engage in an economic 
activity. 
 
The repertoire of maneuvers that were used by those elite men to maintain control over the most 
profitable source of income from forests, that is, charcoal production, might not be available to 
most rural women. Such maneuvers consisted of involving only individuals who were in their 
network of friends, family and collaborators in discussions regarding charcoal as well as not 
partnering with people who were not in those networks for charcoal business or by actively 
excluding others. The women involved in charcoal production and trade did not form a 
homogeneous or cohesive group. Women hailing from more affluent families and upper social 
classes tended to gain more profit from charcoal production than women from poorer families and 
of lower social standing. This is because the more-affluent women were not as burdened with the 
productive roles and could thus devote more time and energy to income-generating activities. 
Most importantly their husbands were a source of capital, both in terms of providing financial 
support and providing knowledge enabling those women to enter the charcoal value chain. The 
women interviewed reported that the financial support is never in the form of the husband giving 
the women an amount of money to carry out her charcoal production activities but rather in the 
 136 
 
form of ‘loans’. Sometimes, women whose husbands are already involved in charcoal production 
would train themselves in charcoal production by accompanying the husband to the charcoal 
production site and helping with the tasks like the assembling of wood for carbonization. 
Whenever women would have sufficient means of their own would, they start producing the 
charcoal independently. Sources of finance varied based on the socio-economic status of the 
woman, and on the presence of financial institutions in their zone such as the micro-credit service 
in Koar or the Crédit Mutuel (a bank) in Missirah. 
 
Charcoal production is a male-dominated sector, from the beginning to the end of the whole 
production process as well as the marketing and sale of the product. The degree of involvement of 
women in charcoal production and sale still largely insignificant in the Tambacounda region. Elite 
capture is often accompanied with corruption. Although certain practices would be considered 
‘routine’ such as the giving of bribes, other corrupt activities require a deeper and more-intricate 
network of accomplices, and women might be excluded from those networks unless they have 
necessary social, economic or political capital to start infiltrating such networks. Previous 
analyses of women’s inclusion in forest management depict gender relations in an oppositional 
manner, that is, when men and women are in joint groups, the women end up being marginalized. 
Elite women might also be co-opted by the male elite resulting in women participating in the 
instrumentalization of the gender component of the policies by being complicit to men’s elite 
capture activities. Men would send women to follow the training and get the producers’ permit to 




As mentioned, local elites captured resources and opportunities brought in by the two project 
interventions. In the Rural Community where WN operated, villagers claimed that the Forest 
Services and the Local Elected Government were siphoning off permits for exploitation while the 
other villagers had charcoal left in the forests and needed to have those permits to sell their 
charcoal (Interviews, 2012, Tambacounda). Villagers explained that those siphoned off permits 
that allow for charcoal production and sale were being sold illegally at more than 700,000 cfa 
($US 1400) by the Forestry Services while the regular fee is 140,000 cfa ($US 280). It is often the 
banaa-banaas (intermediaries between big charcoal merchants and producers, they are usually 
outsiders based in the towns and cities) who can afford to buy permits at such high rates. This 
confirms a long-standing complicity between the banaa-banaas and the local forest service still 
thrives at the expense of local community members’ share of the market. In certain rural 
communities, other than this one, the relationship can be qualified as being overtly conflictual, 
whereby the local government has taken a stance against the corrupt clientelistic activities of the 
forestry service and are bent on denouncing the tight grip they have over access to forest 
resources and access to markets. Inequalities are deep between elite and those in the non-elite 
groups as illustrated by these corrupt activities. This is the context in which women who seek to 
benefit from the charcoal industry have to function. 
  
Policy action aimed at increasing women’s access to forest resources in rural Senegal has to 
operate against a backdrop where the institutions of participation have been co-opted by the elites, 
who are almost entirely male; or they are coopted by non-elite men engaged in patron-client kind 
of relationship with those elites. In the international development arena, gender has been accepted 
and used as a valid category of intervention and a constitutionally recognized (Dutta, 2009). The 
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inclusion of gender has become a policy norm and it is unquestioned. Albeit women in 
developing countries could benefit greatly from all the help they could get from development 
agencies provided that such kind of assistance is well formulated and properly targeted and the 
implementation monitored closely, merely pressing for the participation and representation in 
quantitative terms is insufficient. Numbers say little in such a highly stratified environment where 
their participation or inclusion is itself subordinate. 
 
4.7 The problem of one bird in the hand worth two in the bush or the 
dysfunctional correspondence between different types of participation 
 
There is a lack of correspondence between how participation is conceived at the design stage of 
projects whereby participation is functional and what it yields when it is implemented. At the 
design and planning stage, participation is an umbrella approach widely accepted as signaling an 
inclusive development planning process (Rahnema, 1992; Kothari, 2002). The participation-
related goals formulated at the planning stage are achievable and are often assessed to reflect 
positive performance of projects (Baviskar, 2004) but for such achievements to be meaningful 
and to have lasting effects, the participatory process initiated by the intervention needs to be 
transformative. It has to be transformative at various levels ranging from the community, 
household and individual so as to enable the mostly domestic-sphere bound rural women in the 
region of Tambacounda to become savvy charcoal businesswomen.  
 
The indicators hatched by the donor agencies, when measuring project outputs reflect 
advancement. In this case, indicators portray as advancement the increase in the number of 
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attendees to workshops and meetings and the share of allocated project budget spent. This also 
points in the direction that participation is construed mostly as a functional, fulfilling first and 
foremost the purpose of meeting project goals. Belonging to the realm of development orthodoxy, 
this type of ‘functional participation’ holds the functionality of a tool or medium trough which 
project action is carried out, even if it means that participation is to become only a ritualistic 
process at project implementation level. The transformative potential of participatory approach is 
limited to those familiar and able to partake in this ritual, in this case, the local elites. The 
transformation of women into economic actors on par with men in the political arena requires 
deeper changes at various levels (Parpart et al., 2002; Kabeer, 1999). Transformative participation 
is a type of participation less as an element in a formula and more as one attentive to contextual 







Fig.4.1. Types of participation associated with each stage of project life. The fluidity in how the ‘participatory approach’ is construed and used at each stage 
allows for contradictory potentials. It may promote simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion through the structures of participation or privatization. 
Stage of project  Type of participation associated with 
each stage of project 
 
Description of the participation 
 
How the participation of women is 
conceived, enacted, and assessed 
Formulation/design Functional  Securing the involvement of women to 
fulfill the formulaic purpose of 
participation in project intervention. 
Women’s attendance quotas to be met. 
Women enlisted as members of 
committees or as part of representative 
groups. 
Participation being a development 
orthodoxy shapes the approach utilized 
by projects to meet goals. Use of this 
approach signals bottom-up, 
inclusiveness, democratic, and gender 
awareness to stakeholders and 
audiences. Women as beneficiaries 
promises the redress (especially 
economic) of inequalities between 
genders. 
Implementation Consultative  Project facilitators to gauge the 
temperature of the situation.  
Forest management committees set up 
by projects organize meetings where 
women can participate to voice out their 
concerns 
Women are just heard or are made to be 
present during meetings and on 
committees. 
Whether or not the issues brought to the 
fore by women in the discussion is 
taken into consideration for future 
action is at the discretion of project staff 
or the heads of committees 
Evaluation Transformative This type of participation is considered 
to be the deepest type brought about by 
substantive changes in their 
empowerment as agents having critical 
consciousness and ability to demand for 
accountability 
The project is evaluated by the donor 
agencies in a manner such as to depict 
success but do not show how 
participation transformed the lives of 
poorer women and how the partnership 
with democratically elected local 
government has contributed to uplifting 
women. 
The type of participation observed in this case  Instrumental Women participate to allow the projects 
to achieve their goals. The gender gap is 
minimally reduced as most women who 
could participate were those in a 
privileged position or were connected to 
elite men. 
Women or any gender component of 
projects used by elites as instruments to 
their benefit instead of women in from a 
wider swath of the community. 
(Based on field data and inspired from Cornwall, 2003; Arnstein, 1969) 
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A look at the ‘Implementation Status and Results Report’ of one of the projects in Senegal offers 
insight in how the project’s success is evaluated. The current rating being ‘Highly Satisfactory’ 
with implementation rates indicating an increase of 145.15% for forests put under sustainable 
management from 2009 to 2014 and an increase of 210.28% in the production of charcoal in 
managed forests. This was accompanied by an increase in revenue from charcoal sale and other 
income-generating activities from US$ 18 million in 2009 to US$ 30 million in 2014. The report 
mentions that over 1000 women were trained in tree-cutting and charcoal production techniques 
and have become charcoal producers, but the total amount of revenue from charcoal produced by 
only women producers is not revealed in the report. The number of women present at the training 
programs far outnumbered those who were actively producing charcoal, mostly because of the 
novelty of the activity and the training is now needed to have a local producer’s license. The 
interviewed women who said they were planning on producing charcoal were from the less 
deprived households or/ and who had the support of male members of the family. 
   
Instead, the ‘success story’ of only two women are cherry-picked to illustrate that women are 
making substantial revenue from charcoal production: “For example, one lady that is producing 
charcoal mentioned that she bought a truck at US$14,000 and set up a business with a few 
employees; another widow working with her widows is making about US$ 2,800 every two to 
three months; etc. Participatory forest management has become a true wealth creation tool in rural 
areas.” (World Bank, 2015.) Albeit these two example are impressive and the earnings made by 
each of these women would be considered a big fortune by Senegalese standards, they are not a 




Further incongruities manifest themselves in the participatory approach during the 
implementation phase wherein participation is a consultative process for most villagers and 
vulnerable to domination by a few elite. In the end, participation of women in forest management 
is reduced to being a tool for project implementation, which is simultaneously instrumentalized 
by a few local elites to extract gains at the expense of the broader community. Women are just 
heard or are made to be present during meetings and on committees. Whether or not what women 
bring to the fore in discussions is responded to or not is at the discretion of project staff or the 
heads of committees. The project is assessed in such a manner as to depict the participation as 
positively transforming the lives of women with emphasis on the element of institutional 
partnership with democratically elected local government. 
 
Gender and development projects have become a category exemplifying the learning process of 
donor agencies who plan and fund such projects involving a gender component (Hulme, 1994). 
One of the actions taken by donors as a response to criticisms about the lack of inclusion of the 
voice of women in the planning and implementation of their projects was to activate a bottom-up 
channel involving consultation and using feedback from women in villages. However, this action 
turned out to be only information gathering exchanges between project staff and the women, with 
neither demonstration of commitment that the information provided would be used to bring the 
requested changes were made nor have the women seen any concrete actions based on their 
demands. The project was implemented mostly as it were designed by the institutions at the top, 
that is, the planners in the donor agencies and state. Even the decision to make gender one of the 
focal points in the projects was formulated by those higher-level institutions. 
 143 
 
Studies show that women in other settings preferred women’s only groups over mixed sex groups 
because they felt freer to discuss and develop their ideas as well as network with other women 
(Saito and Spurling, 1992; Sen and Grown, 1987). There were two types of women’s groups in 
the village covered by PROGEDE: one consisting of married women and the other composed 
mostly of unmarried women. The women interested in producing charcoal or already producing 
charcoal were members of the married women’s group and it was composed of women from 
different walks of life who were also either friends or relatives other male charcoal producers. 
 
Maimouna, one of the members from the married group of women, was the de facto 
spokeswoman of the group and described how women in their group were made to participate in 
the project. She said that the women worked in close collaboration with one the project 
facilitators/ extension workers who guided them about market gardening. She added that after 
extension agent had explained that to them the villagers have understood that the project was 
there to work in their interest. This belief was reinforced when they were able to observe how 
charcoal was beginning to yield revenues for villagers. At the time of the interview, the women in 
the group did not work in partnership with each other to produce the charcoal, the number of bags 
that the women producers in the village produced averaged only to 100-150 bags per producer 
largely insufficient to make a single truckload (usually 400 bags). The number of women 
producing charcoal in that one village are so small that even if they teamed up they would not be 
able to fill one truck. It is therefore much easier for the women charcoal producers to add their 
charcoal truckloads of men charcoal producers who produce enough charcoal to rent a truck or to 
just sell their charcoal to those men producers who have the means to transport the charcoal to the 
market. The women producers found themselves in situations where they have to sell their bags of 
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charcoal to banaa-banaas (intermediary merchants) who then transport and sell them in the cities. 
At the time this interview was carried out in 2013, Maimouna had begun to accrue enough capital 
to produce larger quantities of charcoal and was hoping that one day she will be able transport and 
sell all her charcoal to the cities without having to resort to intermediaries who intercept the 
bigger share of the profit. 
  
When the village women were consulted by the project staff about whether they would like to 
become producers themselves or not, the women expressed their desire to participate in the 
production of charcoal but they also pointed out their lack of means to engage in such an activity. 
A few of them took loans from the village’s “small bank” (microfinance organization sponsored 
by another project) but others in the group were unable to come up with the required collateral 
that would make them eligible borrowers. For the women in the PROGEDE zone, looking for 
sources of capital other than the husband is an important strategy because that would “allow them 
to work and no longer be under the yoke of the husband.” (Women Charcoal Producer, 
Interviews, 2013) They also did not want to impose financial burdens on the husband. Asking for 
the husband to invest in their charcoal production venture would make them feel dominated by 
the husband because they would be obligated to him (Interviews, 2013). 
 
The women appreciated certain project activities that helped them to transition from working in 
an ad hoc manner to a more systematic one now. Nevertheless, they claim that assistance with the 
marketing of their charcoal products is lacking. Further complicating the sale of their product is 
the remoteness of their village and the poor road infrastructure linking them to main 
transportation axes and urban nodes. The women constantly brought up the issue of how the zone 
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in which their village is located becomes inaccessible during the rainy season. Women may be 
doubly at a disadvantage here because the seasonal nature of the production of charcoal due to the 
road inaccessibility problem means that women would be left with no choice other than to cease 
or greatly reduce productive work (such as agricultural work) and domestic chores in order to 
produce charcoal22 unless they hire workers commonly known as surghas. Surghas are workers 
who offer labor in exchange of money and having their basic needs (such as shelter, food) taken 
care of. The surghas who are hired in charcoal production are often foreigners from Guinea and 
are of Peulh ethnicity. 
  
The 2013 decree issued by the Ministry of the Environment, regarding the charcoal production for 
that year stipulated that local charcoal producers, that is, the villagers who want to produce 
charcoal would not be allowed to hire surghas and would have to use only their personal labor in 
the production process (Decree No. 04.02.2013-000788 /MEDD/DEFCCS). Only the licensed 
urban-based merchants are legally allowed to have surghas. Such a prohibition discourages 
women from entering the charcoal sector because they are already constrained by their 
reproductive responsibilities and productive commitments limiting their availability for the 
seasonally restricted and the physically demanding charcoal-making activities. Women also find 
themselves in a situation whereby they cannot employ the other young men of the village because 
of the social stigma associated with working for somebody else. Aissata Sylla one of the women 
producers, reports that without the labor provided by the surghas, she might not have been able to 
produce charcoal on her own; due to the physically intense work of cutting down the tree trunks, 
                                                             
22 The charcoal production and storage is done on a yearly seasonal basis and charcoal cannot be stored beyond a 
certain time period as specified by the decree issued by the Ministry of Environment every year. 
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assembling the wood and making the charcoal. For the past four years, she has been hiring a 
surgha who would be responsible for the whole process of producing the charcoal and who would 
sell her the bags of charcoal (Interviews, Missirah, 2013). Even as partners, the division of 
responsibilities could be perceived as an instrument of subordination. The young men of the 
village would prefer to work for their own account rather than being relegated to the status of 
servant. However, a few foresters of the forest services have been lenient towards women 
producers as they were cognizant of these constraints and did not fine them or confiscate their 
charcoal for using surghas (Interviews, 2013). 
  
In addition to the above hindrances, women in the rural communities have to be able to break in 
the barriers imposed by the customary ways in which men get recruited in the charcoal sector; 
men would get in through their friends, kin members, political relations which make it difficult 
for women who lead their lives mostly in the domestic sphere and not necessarily in contact with 
well-connected men in the charcoal sector. The labyrinthine nature of how transactions are carried 
out is well illustrated by the situations through which local producers have to navigate through to 
get permits to transport and sell their charcoal to the cities. The informality of procedures is 
characterized by corruption practices widely perceived as greasing the wheels that make the 
system work (Wei, 1998; Meon, 2005). The head start that men have, especially those among the 
privileged classes, is that they have levels of political sophistication facilitated by higher 
educational attainment and knowledge of political ideological positions gained from interest in 
politics and from interaction with and exposure to public sphere. The same cannot be said of 
women in the rural communities studied. Most women do not have the same opportunity to be 
exposed to political affairs of the village so as to attain similar levels of empowerment as men in 
 147 
 
addition to the very restrictive nature of their traditional roles, which keeps them mostly in the 
domestic sphere. 
  
Indeed, women have to play multiple roles: productive, reproductive and community management 
in society. A staff member from one of the projects revealed what she thought about women’s 
inclusion. According to her, “women are considered to be the lynchpin in making development 
activities work. The well-being of the members of the household rest to a large degree on the 
shoulders of women.” Her take on the involvement of women echoes what the scholarship on 
development and women advances (Momsen, 1991; Sweetman, 2002; Kabeer, 2003; Rao and 
Kelleher, 2005). Bringing women into the private sector by getting them involved in charcoal 
production is not only about alleviating women’s financial and material poverty but about fighting 
the challenge of being excluded from decision making about forest-related resource allocation. 
Empowering women through creating an institutional space for women in the organizational 
structures like the forest management committees might be touted as being a step in what is 
considered to be the right direction, achieving equity in access to a resource. As Arnstein pointed 
out in her 1969 paper entitled “A ladder of participation”, “the idea of citizen participation is a 
little like eating spinach; no one is against it in principle because it is good for you. Participation 
of the governed in their government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy – a revered idea 
that is vigorously applauded by everyone.” Gender mainstreaming when included in a project is 
unlikely to face any resistance because uplifting the have-nots is after all one of the major goals of 
development policies and seeing past the normalcy of such an established approach would be 
considered as backpedaling the development process. 
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Some argue having at least some women benefitting from the project is better than none 
benefitting from it (Interviews, 2013). The caveat that has to be brought up with this line of 
reasoning is that it is a sweeping generalization that masks the problem of intra-group differences 
and the entrenchment of inequalities among of groups of women within the same society. Going 
for the one bird in the hand rather than two in the bush might be deleterious to the empowerment 
of women in the vulnerable groups. Going for the one bird in the hand signifies viewing women 
as numerical abstractions and having a certain number of women present at meetings and 
registering a the few women entering the charcoal sector as being satisfactory project 
achievements might end up having the opposite effect of reducing poverty. This is because those 
two birds in the bush represent the poorer women and the very ones that the projects’ actions has 
not been able to reach and have a positive transformative effect on their lives. Instead project 
action targeting women were taken advantage of by women in the elite group and has thus been 
strengthening the elite. Isolated or piecemeal moves, even when they are radical like the 
reservation of space for women on the electoral lists for rural council elections or in forest 
management structures, where women have to occupy a certain number of the positions means 
that the efforts to include women to have not been incremental. This case depicts how creating 
institutionalized spaces for women so that they can engage in one particular sector (forest sector 
in this case) is insufficient in empowering them to use those arenas effectively. Failing to invest in 
the women so that they can build themselves to become competent ‘representatives’ and office 
holders in the forest management committees just leaves those spaces prone to elite capture. This 
failure can be traced to the architects of the projects who assume that women in those societies are 
proficient citizens fully, capable of taking on whatever leadership roles based on values and 
expectations foreign to their own culture that are thrown at them. The qualitative data presented in 
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this paper through the portraits of women illustrate how women have been included to the benefit 
of the already privileged, regardless of gender. 
 
The pecuniary opportunities at stake being sizeable, villagers who are already well positioned (in 
terms of social status, economic condition, educational attainment) are chosen to take up roles 
that regulate access to forests or occupy those regarding the management of revenues from forest 
resources making the less publicly visible women appear as inept or uninterested candidates for 
such positions. One of the findings in Bandiaky’s study in Dialakoto, Senegal points out that most 
women were generally less qualified to be in those positions (Bandiaky, 2008). This finding of 
Bandiaky’s tallies with what was observed in Tambacounda during the recruitment of members 
for the third tier of the recently reconfigured forest management committees for PROGEDE ll. 
The third tier of the management structures is constituted by village-level representatives; that is, 
one man and one woman from each village. The selection criteria was based on voting for the 
most competent people be the representative, competency in this case being the ability to read and 
write French and count. The pool of women eligible for being on the management committees 
was so small or inexistent. Finding a woman who would fulfill the aforementioned criteria proved 
to be a difficult a task because of the low level of literacy among women in those villages and the 
recruiting teams23 had to forego of the voting process to then just select the most literate woman 
in the village who would be available to be a representative (Fieldwork, 2013). The skills set of 
women thus selected sometimes do not predispose them to be functional in the sort of public life 
that requires them to effectively convey the needs and aspirations of women in that villages unless 
                                                             
23 Convoys were sent to villages in the rural community and they consisted of high-ranking foresters from the forestry 
service in Dakar, a representative of the regional development commission, a staff of the PROGEDE, members of the 
Rural Council, a forester from the local forestry service 
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the women doing so have qualities and skills that they cultivated or possessed as an individual.24 
However, this might not be enough to ensure that women’s interests garner the political attention 
they require for action to be taken. Factors such as trust in and receptiveness to women’s 
leadership style, the lag time required for women to become as politically experienced as men, 
and charcoal (Bardhan et al., 2010; Chen, 2010; Cornwall, 2004). 
 
4.8  Conclusion 
Development processes affect women and men in different ways. Donor-funded development 
projects have the possibility of reducing or accentuating gender divisions within the institutional 
landscape. Gender neutral projects or policies that are designed not to interfere with gender 
inequity can deepen difference between how men and women of the same rural community can 
have access to a natural resource (Bandiaky, 2008; 2011). 
 
Gender-neutral projects and policies offer free rein to men to continue operating as dominant 
actors on what is already an uneven playing field. In this case they continue to dominate the 
spaces available for local-level representation. The cases of Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE in 
eastern Senegal provided insights into the ways that even gender-sensitive or women-promoting 
projects can reinforce gender-discriminatory practices in access to representation and economic 
opportunities. 
  
                                                             
24 Those would include oratory skills, confidence to express oneself in public as well as accurate and up-to date 
information about the project activities and the status of affairs in charcoal production which requires literacy and 
numerical skills and good network of people knowledgeable about the sector. They would also have to know all the 
administrative procedures and have the ability to liaise with different authorities or leaders. 
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The forest-based development projects considered in this study do not single out ‘elite capture’ as 
a problem or adopt actions that specifically counter ‘elite capture.’ Rather they adopt approaches 
that are believed to be inclusive or participatory. Evidence from this study reveals the 
pervasiveness of elite capture in the forestry sector in the rural zones. In this context, gender-
based corrective actions introduced by the projects reset new cycles of elite capture whereby elite 
women are co-opted by elite men in a manner that reinforces social and economic stratification 
and the continued exclusion of poorer women. The use of a gender lens sheds light on how 
historically persistent discrimination against women can be deepened by the participatory 
approach intended to correct asymmetries. The gender-equity approach taken in these projects 
disadvantaged certain groups of women in both representation and in access to profitable forest 
resources. 
 
Were women’s needs and aspirations addressed through the projects addressed in a decentralized 
forest management context? Empirical evidence from this study suggests that only a few women 
from higher socio-economic groups benefit from participatory projects or women who are 
requested to participate in management structures by well-intentioned project staff who also need 
to fulfill the project aims of having a certain number women present at meetings or as part of the 
management structure. It is nevertheless due to the dedication and enthusiasm of such project staff 
that some women were able to participate in charcoal production workshops and register for their 
local producer’s permit. However, the membership criteria to be part of the management 
structures such as the ability to read and write in French for holding higher level positions 
excluded many women right away in this region where female illiteracy is prevalent, especially 
among women from poorer groups. This automatically selected for women who had the privilege 
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to pursue at least a few years of education and are mostly from the better-off families to be part of 
the management committees with relatives or spouses in the charcoal business vouching for their 
participation on those committees. 
 
 Poorer and less-advantaged women just like non-elite men find their access to forest-based 
wealth generating activities obstructed by elite capture but unlike men they have to face 
additional hindrances due to their gender. Women have less leverage when they are targeted the 
same way male producers are by project designers and implementers. That is, women have less 
leverage then male producers when they, as an intended group of recipient for project support, are 
reached or are involved in project actions. Working though women’s groups might facilitate 
women’s empowerment in forest management. Women in the cases studied tend to have more 
clout when they are grouped and have a deeper involvement in women’s groups. 
 
This research investigated the status of women and the gender dynamics in two remote marginal 
areas to highlight the obstacles faced by women engaging with new forest-based income-
generating opportunities. Although Senegal has established democratic decentralization creating 
the space for local democratic representation, the nature of the devolution policies considered the 
rural communities as a unit without any discrimination among the needs or status of the various 
groups that constitute those rural societies. Senegal’s recent legislation about the inclusion of 
women at a 50/50 proportion on party listings at national level as well as local levels is a gigantic 
step towards involving more women in decision-making processes and leading to the inclusion of 
the vision of both genders constituting society. Experience in India shows that this approach is 
effective (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). It will be nevertheless necessary for women to 
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develop ways of being heard and not only seen in the decision-making arena. To date their 
participation remains skewed along socio-economic class lines and further damages the prospects 
for non-elite women.  
 
Tough questions remain about democratic decentralization and its ability to sustain the channels 
through which the benefits of project intervention and policy would flow to the segments of rural 
Senegalese society that need them the most. Evidence from this study demonstrate that subjecting 
institutions in charge of forest management to the democratically elected local government or 
having them function parallel to the democratically elected local government does open up spaces 
for engaging women from the local rural communities. There is still a need to strengthen reliable 
mechanisms for actually ensuring accountability and transparency in order to also overcome elite 
capture. 
  
Natural resource based development initiatives like the two projects discussed in this paper take 
place within a certain normative field that restrains how development takes place, with gender 
approaches within those initiatives dictating how women are involved in natural resource 
management as well as how women benefit from them. A deeper understanding of the recurrent 
inability of development projects to see local dynamics of hierarchy and subordination could help 
to push these projects to improve the situation of women. In Tambacounda, they are already in or 
wish to enter the charcoal sector. Projects have certainly made in-roads into involvement of 
women in the use of forest resources, but the balance that those projects sought to achieve is 
unlikely to come about within a project time frame. Whether or not the intervention of projects 
only places women in a better position to take advantage of the participatory space created for 
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thein institutions or merely contributes to buying time in order to bring about the deeper changes 
in social practices that would uplift women, the gendering the policy approach remains an 
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INSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION AND ELITE CAPTURE IN THE 
FORESTRY SECTOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
OF WULA NAFAA IN TAMBACOUNDA, SENEGAL 
 
5.1 Abstract 
In Senegal, the locus for development at the Rural Community level offered by democratic 
decentralization is an institution: the democratically elected Rural Council. In an effort to support 
wealth creation from forests in an environmentally sustainable and inclusive way, USAID-funded 
project, Wula Nafaa, provided assistance to the Rural Council and Rural Communities through 
capacity-building and consolidating institutional infrastructure. This paper examines how 
decentralized forestry is leading to new patterns of wealth accumulation in villages through the 
intensification of elite capture of the wood-based charcoal sector at the local level. The case study 
of charcoal production in the Rural Community of Tambacounda showed how institutions such as 
the Rural Council, that have the function of democratically representing local populations and 
Forest Management Committees (FMCs), created by Wula Nafaa to engage inhabitants in 
managing forests, have enabled only a small group of advantageously placed elites to grab and 
dominate the access to forest resources. Elite capture not only excludes poorer groups from 
entering the lucrative charcoal business and creates inequitable access for smaller producers but 
has implications for contributing to the existing spatial disparities in development between the 
remote rural regions and the urbanized regions of the country.  




Fostering participation of local populations in development projects is widely believed to be a key 
element in project success (Chambers, 1997; Kothari, 2002; Cornwall, 2002; 2003). In Senegal, 
improving effectiveness and fairness of the participation of rural communities in managing and 
gaining economic benefits from their forests has led to specific types of institutional 
configurations influenced by government policies and donor-funded projects. Urban-based 
merchants used to extract all of the profits  from charcoal production prior to the Senegal’s 1996 
decentralization laws allowing inhabitants of Rural Communities to commercially use and 
manage forests through democratically elected Rural Council (Ribot, 2002; 2003; 2004 ; 2005; 
2008; 2009; 2009; 2010; Boutinot, 2002; 2005). To facilitate the participation of inhabitants of 
Rural Communities and the sustainable use of forests, USAID introduced the Wula Nafaa project 
to boost local capacities and assist the Rural Council in managing forests. As the numbers in 
Table 4.1 show, the amount of charcoal produced by three main charcoal producing Rural 
Communities increased significantly since the implementation of decentralization legislation and 
Wula Nafaa’s re-organization of the forest management institutional landscape by creating and 
adding Forest Management Committees (FMCs). However, the wealth generated through 
charcoal produced by inhabitants of Rural Communities is accumulated by only a small group of 
local elite thereby crippling the horizontal spread of more profitable opportunities throughout a 
broader swath of the rural communities. A disproportionate amount of benefits is amassed by a 
few local elites who capture institutions connected to forest management, allowing them to 
control access to the resource for charcoal production. Elites who are economically, politically 
privileged are usually more educated and well connected, enabling them to market themselves as 
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more reliable interlocutors or middlemen between local populations and project staff.   
 
It was observed that although the local elites were inhabitants of those villages, the wealth was 
not retained in the villages. Pocketing millions of CFA francs from charcoal production and trade, 
the elites in the villages have accumulated enough wealth to invest the profits in the urban centers 
where acquiring assets yields more returns than the rural regions where there investments are 
perceived as far less viable (Lynch, 2005) . This type of by-pass effect whereby finances flow 
from villages in Rural Communities to cities like Dakar or Tamba which grow at the expense of 
rural regions is not conducive to diminishing the spatial disparities in development between the 
remote rural zones and the urbanized zones. Using empirical data, this paper shows how the elite 
capture of opportunities in the charcoal takes place through the institutions operating in a Rural 
Community in the region of Tambacounda in the eastern part of Senegal. By examining the local 
institutional configuration recognized by Wula Nafaa and the Central Government to manage 
forests and charcoal production, we uncover how elite capture finds its way to hinder equitable 
access to forests despite the combination participatory approach adopted by the project and the 
democratic representation function of the Rural Council. 
 
Institutional recognition involves the transfer of powers in terms of authority and resources from 
higher level institutions such as the National Government and international agencies to local level 
institutions they choose to partner with (Ribot,Chhatre & Lankina, 2008). Wula Nafaa (WN) 
created and recognized Forest Management Committees (FMCs) – structures organizing villagers 
into management units for each section of the Sita Nioule forest. With the addition of the FMCs 
in the lot of local institutions recognized to manage forests, the institutional landscape of the 
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Rural Community of Missirah consisted of the democratically elected local government ( the 
Rural Council),  the forestry services25 (the brigade) which is a technical offshoot of the Ministry 
of Environment and the FMCs. Authorities like the village chief and the sous-préfet play an 
important role in the life of villagers but they had been empowered to a much lesser degree by 
WN so they figured less prominently on the forest management institutional landscape.  
 
The overarching objective of the Wula Nafaa project was “to contribute to poverty reduction and 
sustainable local development by increasing the revenues to rural communities by handing 
responsibility to local authorities while encouraging decentralized, integrated and participatory 
resource management” (USAID, 2008). Wula Nafa’s attempt to integrate community-based 
natural resource management into a pre-existing decentralized local government, where the 
powers to manage access to forests has been devolved  from the Central Government to the 
democratically elected Rural Council offered the potential of enhancing democratic representation 
in matters of forest management and charcoal production in the rural community. In theory, 
representation, as it is established in local institutions, plays an important role in shaping the 
equity and efficiency dimensions of economic development. In practice, representation has been 
shown to shape how benefits from forestry resources are distributed within local populations 
(Ribot 2004; Bazaara, 2006; Ribot, Lund and Treue, 2010). Representation through a 
democratically elected government is a formalized link between the individual, household and 
community and state and is a process that can influence the political economy of access to forests. 
The democratic representation is conceptualized as a function of responsiveness and (downward) 
                                                             
25 The Forestry Services has its headquarters in the capital city, Dakar and has branches at district levels (such as the 
Regional Headquarters of Tamba) and at the more local level, the Brigades in the Rural Communities.  
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accountability (Przeworski, Stokes & Manin, 1999). Democratic representation is therefore a 
mechanism that can enable citizens to be active and exert influence on policy rather than just be 
mere subjects who have to endure the effects of policies applied to them. It is this empowering 
transformation, from subject to citizen, which can endow community members with the ability to 
influence those who govern them (Ribot, 2010, Przeworski et al., 1999). 
 
The findings reveal that the relationship of downward accountability established through the 
recognition of democratically elected local government was obstructed by elite capture. The 
elements of voice and sanction (both negative and positive) present in downward accountability 
allows for people to make those who govern responsive to their needs and aspirations. The 
creation of FMCs by the project WN opened an arena for villagers to participate directly in the 
management of their forests with the collaboration of the forestry services and under the 
supervision of the Rural Council. This combination of institutions with democratic representation 
(the Rural Council) and participatory (the FMCs) functions could be deemed as potent in terms of 
enhancing meaningful inclusion. Instead, it opened new channels for collusion among the office 
bearers of those institutions who maintain clientelistic relations with people they serve through 
those institutions. Members of the rural community, such as the poor and marginalized groups, 
who do not possess the necessary form of capital to enter the clientelistic relations are excluded 
from benefitting significantly from the local charcoal production opportunities. 
 
At the time when the fieldwork for this study was carried out, the Rural Council played the role 
more of an ‘opportunistic mediator' than a democratic representative between donor-funded 
projects and the elites in the local communities. The Rural Council is, by law, the gatekeeper of 
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the Rural Community, that is, any project action has to be approved by the Rural Council before it 
is implemented in the Rural Community under its jurisdiction (Republic of Senegal, 2003).  The 
Rural Council, being the democratically elected representative of the Rural Community, therefore 
also mediates the relations between the project and the community. However, the profitability of 
commercial exploitation of forests for producing charcoal not only led members of the Rural 
Council but also members of the FMCs to become opportunistic, diverting resources and 
opportunities towards themselves or a small set of village elites. Such intensification of elite 
capture of charcoal sector at local level meant that the goals of achieving fruitful and meaningful 
participation of rural populations through democratic representation and project action were only 
superficially met. The data, qualitative in nature, for this study was collected through observation, 
100 interviews and a survey of 140 households in the Tambacounda Region of Senegal from 
March 2012 to August 2013. 
 
5.3 Background 
The Tambacounda region, where Wula Nafaa intervened, is among the poorest and most remote 
in Senegal with income-generating opportunities being few. A 2001 study carried out by the 
National Statistics Agency of Senegal (ANSD) showed that Tambacounda had the highest 
number of people reporting they were in the ‘very poor’ category, more than any other region of 
Senegal. ‘Income-generating activities’ was identified as the most potent category of means to 
fight poverty compared to other means in both of ANSD’s 2001 and 2011 surveys on poverty. 
The 2005 and 2011 studies led by the ANSD on poverty showed the Tambacounda region as still 
 167 
 
being in the very poor category26. In 2005, 76.9% of the population in Tambacounda was 
surveyed as living in poverty and the figure was 62.5% for 2011. For both 2005 and 2011, 
Tambacounda was shown as experiencing the most severe type of poverty in the whole of Senegal 
(ANSD, 2011). The same surveys also revealed that over 90% of citizens throughout the country, 
from all the income groups thought that terminating corruption would contribute to a reduction in 
poverty (ANSD, 2011).  
 
When the commercial exploitation of forests was opened to Rural Communities in the late 1990s, 
it represented a much needed source of wealth creation in a region like Tambacounda. The 
implementation of Senegal’s progressive 1996 decentralization laws and 1998 forestry code 
allowed rural populations, represented by elected local councils, to rightfully manage and use 
their forests. Since then, progress has slowly been made in terms of local populations having 
access to forests in their rural communities. Every year, a set amount of charcoal, a domestic fuel 
in high demand in urban areas, is legally allowed to be produced in specific forested regions of 
the country. Negotiation meetings regrouping urban-based producers, charcoal merchants and the 
heads of elected local governments, that is, rural council presidents are held yearly by the regional 
headquarters of forestry services before the charcoal production campaign begins. The purpose of 
negotiation meetings are for making decisions regarding how the set amount of charcoal allowed 
to be produced each year would be divided between the two categories of charcoal producers: the 
urban-based producers and the rural producers would be allowed to produce during a particular 
year.  
                                                             
26 The survey:ESPS-II categorized the regions of the country in three categories: Very high poverty level (>60% of 





The recent cohort of Rural Council Presidents (RCP) elected since 2009 are aware of the 
significant revenues that charcoal production could bring in to their Rural Communities and 
especially to the coffers of the Rural Council. As a result there has been a marked increase in the 
number of requests made for forest management plans – a technical document legally required 
before the commercial exploitation of forests can take place (Republic of Senegal, 1994; 1998) - 
from RCPs who would like to see charcoal production take place within their jurisdiction. The 
decentralization of forest resource management brought along with it the hope that democratic 
representation would lead to a more effective participation of local rural populations. The Rural 
Council Presidents used their prerogative as representatives of their Rural Communities to 
endorse and to push for the increase in the share of charcoal production quantities allocated to 
their Rural Communities during those negotiation meetings convoked at the regional headquarters 
of forestry services. This is an example of the democratic representation aspect of decentralization 
in action. Beyond the point of securing a higher charcoal production limit, how the number of 
permits were distributed intra-locally was often dictated by logics other than those underlying 
democratic representation. The unfolding of the democratic representation was influenced the 
personal characteristics of the rural council members and their motives as well as the interests of 
other rural elites (Tendler, 1997).  
 
Local leadership has historically been the role of the village chief while the State possessed legal 
title over and controlled and managed the forests. The state-led decentralization initiatives have 
resulted in a re-coordination, re-organization of tasks and authority among already existing 
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institutions like the Rural Council composed of democratically elected members and newly 
created ones like forest management structures run by villagers.  The forestry services which have 
maintained a tight grip over forest resources since the colonial times and which have been the 
strong arm of the urban-based merchants in the exploitation of forests for charcoal retained their 
policing role. The forestry services also continued to act as the technical advisory service in the 
context of decentralization and during the implementation of forest resource- based development 
projects like Wula Nafaa (Boutinot & Diouf, 2007; Blundo, 1995;1998; 2011).  
 
Wula Nafaa27 adopted USAID’s Nature-Wealth-Power paradigm, whereby Nature=Environment, 
Wealth=Economic, Power=Social/Political, as the ideological roadmap guiding its plan of action. 
Wula Nafaa provided support to put into practice the decentralization reforms in the forestry 
sector  for which the Rural Councils do not receive any direct funding (fonds de dotation)from the 
central government (Republic of Senegal, 2003 ). Wula Nafaa aimed at reducing poverty by 
providing environmentally sustainable means of livelihood from forests. The project sought to do 
so by using a participatory approach involving the setting up of Forest Management Committees 
(FMCs) operated by villagers and by engaging the democratically elected local government to 
oversee the functioning of the FMCs.  
 
The members of the FMCs were inducted into their roles with training about financial and 
administrative aspects of the functioning of the committees such as book-keeping, organization of 
meetings and the roles of every institution involved. The forest guards (or technical agents) 
                                                             
27 Wula Nafaa meaning wealth from the forest in one of the local languages, Bambara 
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received technical training enabling them to supervise the cutting down of wood for charcoal 
production. The forest guards were also in charge of surveillance responsibilities and contribute to 
decision-making by inputting first-hand information. The FMCs created by Wula Nafaa are 
organized in three tiered structures with the top tier composed of the democratically elected local 
government and the second tier made up of the block-level forest management committees and 
the lowermost tier consisting of village representatives (each village sending a representative 
from various groups in the village: the village chief, a representative of charcoal producers, a 
representative for the youth, a distinguished citizens’ (notable) representative, a farmers’ 
representative, a women’s representative, a representative for animal herders, a forest guard. 
However, this last tier which could have been a most significant catalyzer for the effective 
participation of villagers only became a mere group of passive onlookers while the second tier of 
the structure, consisting of the block-level management committee, became the most powerful 
executive node of the structure.  
 
Although project designers paid heed to the criticisms about considering local populations as an 
undifferentiated mass of intended beneficiaries, the ways of maintaining a more democratic 
quality of the targeting was not adequate in this case. The inclusion of representatives could not 
avoid the negative discrimination against some of the groups within the societies where the 
project was intervening. The project ended up working with elites instead of a group of people 
more representative of the local population as whole despite the aforementioned efforts. 
Moreover, subjecting the whole forest management structure created by Wula Nafaa to the 
authority of the Rural Council only sharpened the appetite of many in those two institutions to 
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exchange favors around access to forest resources. 
 
5.4  The intensification of elite capture of the charcoal sector at the local 
level 
 
The re-organization in power among institutions brought about by decentralization and the 
introduction of FMCs was accompanied by the creation of positions of authority regarding forest 
management within those institutions.  The monetary benefits at stake being considerable, the 
elites colluded to capture those positions or co-opted those holding those positions within any 
institutions related to forest management so as to steadily divert and corner power and resources 
to their side. According to Bratton and van de Walle “formal political institutions are thoroughly 
steeped in and penetrated by, informal personal networks” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). In 
this case, clientelism was pervasive and blurred the boundaries of the formal and informal, 
highlighting the importance of the context when natural resource management is brought closer to 
the rural community. For instance, a feature of the context that is of relevance here is the 
proximity factor that creates a propensity for rural elites to build a network to maintain their 
stronghold on charcoal production; most of the people, especially most of the elites,  the villages 
know each other and sometimes already have long-standing relationships. 
 
 Respecting the canons of participatory approach in development, the rationale behind the 
creation of the FMCs by the donor-funded project was to increase direct participation of the 
villagers in the management of the forest and at the same time to circumvent corruption-led 
motivations of local governments to interfere with the management of forests and access to 
charcoal production (Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Smoke, 2008). Wula Nafaa’s creation and 
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recognition of FMCs which are entities outside of the formal legal politico-administrative 
structure were efficient in accomplishing the administrative and technical tasks, unburdening the 
Rural Council which would have not been achieve those with its limited resources28. The FMCs 
were not spared from elite capture as they became a resource for patronage and presented 
opportunities for embezzlement and trafficking. Often times, the presidents of the FMCs would be 
cronies of members of the Rural Council, who would also be most likely to associate with those 
who are socially, economically or politically close to them. 
 
A salient feature of Senegal’s Rural Councils is that the power distribution among the council 
members is highly skewed making it more of a one-man show than a team of representatives who 
have. The RCP is the mastermind behind decisions taken by the Rural Council and he is assisted 
by a couple of or a small group of cronies while the rest of the council consists mostly of 
members who are most of the time, mere onlookers during meetings and yes-men during voting. 
As one woman councilor put it, she stood for the elections and is part of the council because she 
likes politics, she likes carrying out campaigning activities. The majority of the councilors are not 
among the most highly educated members of the community or are not even the most aware or 
active regarding particular problems affecting the local community. The Rural Council members 
are chosen or put on the electoral list based on their ability to convene crowds at meetings and to 
act as political outreach in the various localities of the rural community.  
                                                             
28 The decentralization laws involved the devolution of authority to manage forests to the Rural Council but the law 
does not make provisions for any transfer of resources in the form of funds apart from the technical assistance that the 
forestry services have to provide to the Rural Council. 
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The avenues for using the formal mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness, meant to 
keep elected representatives in check and considered as built in the democratically elected local 
government system, are compromised because of the opportunistic behavior adopted by the 
members of the Rural Council regarding charcoal sector in their Rural Community. 
 
The synchretic advantage conferred when forest resources are managed by a mix of different 
institutions had only partially promoted democratic representation despite the administrative 
efficiency it has brought about. ‘Syncretism’ (Galvan & Richard, 2003) is the transformative 
process that ensues from the recombination of institutional elements of institutions having diverse 
characteristics. The FMCs have added distance between the local community and the Rural 
Council by being now the institution specializing in the management of forest and charcoal 
production. The Forest Management Committees in charge of the everyday running of forest 
management tasks as well as being now established as the first stop shop for responding to 
charcoal producers’ needs. Respondents to the surveys revealed that the Rural Council and its 
president were not the authority the people resorted to when they had to voice out their concerns 
and needs about charcoal production and forest management. This division of tasks among the 
institutions had led to efficiency in administering the management by relieving the Rural Council 
of dealing directly with the villagers but has also restricted the representation role of the only 
institution possessing formal-legal downward accountability and responsiveness obligations. In 
this case, the president of the FMC was a member of the Rural Council and a charcoal 
entrepreneur who made fortune. This member of the Rural Council/president of the 
FMC/chocroal niche elite was also notorious for conniving with forestry agents and politicians. 
This old stager wearing several hats was able to tap into his experience and use his position in 
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various institutions to become the local charcoal baron. 
 
The pecuniary benefits from charcoal production do not only accrue to individual rural producers 
but also to the Rural Council and the Forest Management Committees in the form of taxes 
charged on charcoal produced in the community’s forests. According to the Forest Management 
Plan (a document containing the technical and organizational prescriptions), 10% of the tax 
charged per each bag of charcoal sent to the cities goes to the Rural Council and around 60% of 
that tax29 goes to Forest Management Committee Fund and 10% for the running of the 
Management Committee. 
 
The cap on the quantity of charcoal that rural communities are allocated to produce every year 
had steadily been rising, partly due the commitment of pro-active Rural Council presidents, who 
were cognizant of the enormous potential of charcoal to generate revenues. The taxes paid 
constituted a sizeable inflow of millions of CFA francs (ranging from anything from tens of 
thousands to hundreds of thousands of dollars) into the Rural Council’s coffers incentivizing the 
presidents of Rural Councils to negotiate for a bigger share of the charcoal production allotments 
for their Rural Communities. The Rural Communities were allowed to produce more charcoal 
each year on the basis that they had demonstrated their capacity to produce the full quantity 
allotted to them the previous year. However, not everybody or anybody within those charcoal-
producing Rural Communities found themselves in a position to aspire to gain from the 
opportunities created through the opening up the charcoal industry to rural producers or the 
                                                             
29 The remaining 10 % of the tax is paid as remuneration to the forest guards (Agents Techniques) and the other 
remaining 10% goes to the villagers. 
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augmentation those production allotments. 
 
Fig. 5.1. shows the trend in the officially registered quantities of charcoal produced in the three 
main charcoal-producing forests in the Tambacounda region. The limit to quantity of charcoal the 
rural communities were allowed to produce each year experienced an overall increase over the 
years which signified that the Rural Communities were able to reach the production amount 
allocated to them. In the past (before 1996-1998), the amount of charcoal produced by rural 
producers used to be insignificant while now it is almost comparable to if not more than the 
urban-based merchants.  
Fig. 5.1. Quantities of charcoal allowed to be produced by rural-based and urban-based producers. 
Quantities are in quintals, 1 quintal= approximately 200 pounds. 
 Missirah/Kothiary forest Koar forest Sita Niaoulé forest 












2010 37 500 39 620 62 500 54 256 21 545 16 530 
2011 34 000 39 050 63 000 55 600 20 000 16 500 
2012 40 500 36 400 64 800 19 136 18 500 17 800 
Total 71 500 78 670 190 300 128 992 60 045 50 830 
 
(Source: IREF Tambacounda, 2013) 
 
 
This favorable evolution in the consolidation of charcoal production as a source of income for 
villagers however masks the shift in the monopoly over charcoal production and trade by the 
urban-based merchants to one by locally-based elite at the rural community level. After the onset 
of decentralization and with the advent of forestry-related projects such as WN, there was a 
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change on the elite capture scene; there was an intensification and a spread of patron-client 
relationships within the rural communities connecting to the charcoal sector. Prior to the 
implementation of decentralization laws and the changes in the 1998 Forestry Code, the foresters 
used to connive with the urban-based merchants to extract profits from charcoal made in rural 
areas (Ribot, 1995; 1999; Poteete & Ribot, 2011). Now the charcoal business is no longer the turf 
of the urban-based merchants and their long-standing allies, the foresters at the Forestry Services 
in Dakar. The many newcomers, that is, the rural-based producers have established themselves in 
the sector and have started co-opting any actor who could reinforce their ability to produce and 
sell more charcoal or to siphon off privileges that would allow them to do so. This aspect revealed 
the dynamism of elite domination which is characterized by a process of ‘elite continuity, 
transformation and replacement’ through which elites cooperate, compete and reconcile their 
differences (Wong, 2013; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013). This somewhat intractable nature of elite 
capture made it very pernicious to participatory initiatives of development projects (Platteau, 
2004; 2008). 
  
Specific kinds of elites develop in different contexts. In the villages of the Rural Community 
studied, the people constituting the group known as elites were not confined to ‘traditional elites’ 
but extended to include villagers who have attained high economic status and strong political 
connections. ‘Traditional elites’ are people in kin-based or hereditary government arrangements 
such as the village chief and his family. Another category of elites include those occupying 
positions of authority such as executive members of the FMCs, members of the democratically 
elected local government and a wider range of actors located even at an extra-local level such as 
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government officials especially forestry agents at the regional headquarters.  
 
The charcoal-related economic opportunities created for rural dwellers were grabbed by a small 
group of privileged villagers: the elites, at the expense of other groups consisting of poorer and 
marginalized villagers. Even when non-elites engage in charcoal production, they are faced with 
roadblocks set by the elites.  “…I want to opt out of the charcoal business. Things are too 
complicated: politics and running after those who control the issuing of the documents required to 
get my charcoal to the market in the cities.  I paid 815,000 cfa Francs (1630 US$) to a member of 
the rural council who is well connected to the Regional Forestry Services while the normal fee is 
140,000 cfa (280 US$) Francs for a circulation permit...,” recounted one of the villager. This 
experience is shared by the other non-elite producers who were increasingly aware of the corrupt 
activities of the elites holding office in the institutions who would siphon off permits and resell 
them at inflated prices that only the other elites would be able to afford. 
 
Using the elite capture perspective sheds light on the lacunae of participatory approaches adopted 
widely by donor-funded projects seeking to redress the unequal access to benefits from natural 
resources. There is a need to address the exclusionary practices resulting from elite capture in the 
villages because of the dearth of income-generating activities a remote region such as 
Tambacounda. When the participatory approaches themselves become prone to elite capture, they 
obstruct a wider swath of the rural population from benefitting from natural resources the 




5.5 Charcoal-related elite capture in Rural Communities 
The elites in the rural communities encroached on the charcoal sector by capturing opportunities 
offered by the project which were in the form positions within the forest management structures 
or through co-opting people holding such positions. During the initial stages of project 
implementation, it was mostly villagers who were members of the local elites who appealed to 
project staff with other members of the community not disproving of the selection of the . Being 
individuals having good communication skills, availability and attendance at meetings or initial 
project briefings, elites got handed certain positions of responsibility or resources to manage or 
were backed by the elites who were already in the charcoal industry and who would then pull the 
strings through them. Thus, began a new vicious circle of a project-capturing elites who gradually 
gained in prominence, skills and affluence which then enabled them to have more time and 
capacities as well as an enhanced ability to promote themselves as ‘bankable’ to the 
representatives or staff  and even gain acceptance of the local populations for subsequent project 
tasks. Elites are the ones who can transform themselves into development ‘agents’ allowing their 
obsequious followers or clients to take advantage from project resources while others are 
excluded (Beck, 2008). As a result, instead of improving the well-being of the poor and 
marginalized, projects have contributed in perpetuating the skewed power and resource 
distribution in favor of those who are already powerful. 
.  
The supply side of the clientelism that underlies most of the elite capture practices has long been 
mediated by the Forestry Services. Through their many tactics and strategies, the Forestry collude 
with those who have economic interests at stake in the lucrative charcoal business (Poteete & 
Ribot, 2011; Boutinot, 2005; Roniger, 2004). One of those tactics was the traffic of permits. To 
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control the amount of charcoal produced the Forestry Services issue documents called ‘permits’. 
Each year there are a limited number of permits that can be issued based the quantity of charcoal 
each rural community is allowed to produce. If a charcoal producer does not possess a permit, he 
or she cannot legally transport charcoal to the market in the cities. Villagers reported that in 2012 
they were told that there were no permits left for them when they still had truckloads of their 
charcoal lying in the forests, waiting to be sold. There were discrepancies in the delivery of 
permits with villages receiving fewer permits than they believed was due to them, while certain 
people including big urban merchants were able to exploit the forests beyond the amount 
allocated to them. This was because the permits were intercepted by the elite in the various 
institutions and then resold to buyers who could pay the inflated price. 
 
5.6 Reactions to elite capture of institutions and clientelist representation 
Can elite control be minimized?  In theory, the recognition of democratically elected local 
government offers the possibility of political leverage to citizens and opens spaces where people 
could influence those who govern them (Ribot, 2007; 2011; Przeworski, Stokes & Manin, 1999). 
In reality, changing institutional forms have not been equal to changing deeply embedded power 
relations and has not always mitigated the opportunism of local leaders. The presence of 
‘benevolent’ elites: individuals having the attributes of elites but who would engage in actions 
enhancing collective welfare of the community appears to be more serendipitous occurrences than 
prevalent mode of elite behavior in the zones studied (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Wong, 2013; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2013). An example of such a ‘benevolent’ elite was the Rural Council President 
(RCP) in a Rural Community where another forestry project was operating who was known as 
being very pro-active and progressive in advancing his Rural Community as a whole. The RCP 
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would actively look for sources of funding to address problems afflicting his Rural Community as 
well as networking with political actors at various levels. This RCP was also one of the leading 
figures in tipping the balance of charcoal production allocations in favor of the rural communities 
but his stalwarts on the other hand were involved in elite capturing. 
 
Every forestry-related project has a different approach to dealing with elite capture. To bring out 
the specificity of Wula Nafaa’s approach, we compared Wula Nafaa to another long-standing 
double-phased forestry project supported by the World Bank: PROGEDE. During its second 
phase, PROGEDE shied away from recognizing democratically elected local government by 
minimizing the involvement of the Rural Council in its forest management structure. This lack of 
trust in the local institution stemmed from the realization of the strengthening of the patron-client 
relations among the elites. Therefore, PROGEDE adopted what is termed as being a ‘counter-
elite’ approach which challenges the elites by not recognizing them (Wong, 2010). On the other 
hand, Wula Nafaa adopted an approach closer to the ‘co-opt elite’ style which suggests co-
operating with the elite. The project’s collaborative style was not formulated as a ‘co-opt elite’ 
one from the outset, but could be was observable only ex-post facto. Wula Nafaa worked in close 
collaboration with the Rural Council because that was prescribed by the donor agency through the 
‘power’/governance component of the Nature-Wealth-Power paradigm. Careful about not 
antagonizing the powerful local people as it could jeopardize the continued partnership between 
the project and Rural Council and eventually the successful completion of the project, the 
implementing staff saw to it that the project was carried out without excluding the elites despite 




The relationship between Wula Nafaa and the Rural Council was described as being a cordial one 
by the RCP who personally assessed the project as having handled the organization of the local 
communities in a very satisfactory manner. As mentioned earlier, Wula Nafaa put considerable 
focus on the ‘governance30’ aspect, regrouping villagers into Forest Management Committees to 
manage the forest and subjecting those committees to the authority of the Rural Council. By 
doing so, Wula Nafaa coordinated its aims with those of the central government, that is, aligning 
them with the decentralization process which according to the donor agency’s highest ranking 
official is about “respecting the sovereignty of State of Senegal’s”. The same RCP also expressed 
his discontentment with the second phase of the PROGEDE project while being very approving 
of the first phase of the same project. The difference in attitude of the RCP towards the two 
phases of PROGEDE can be explained by the modifications brought about by the project 
regarding the structure of the forest management committees. In PROGEDE’s most recent 
overhauling of its forest management committees in the zones covered by PROGEDE, the 
involvement of the Rural Council was reduced to only an auditing31 role. This is a marked break 
from the previous structure of the committee exiting during the first phase whereby the 
committees were run by the RCPs ‘men’ allowing the taxes paid in to those forest management 
committees to be misappropriated by the RCP and his coterie. Those committees were very 
loosely monitored and sometimes manipulated by people who are outside the committee such as 
charcoal middlemen (banaa-banaas). 
 
                                                             
30 Known as the ‘power’ component of Wula Nafaa’s development paradigm 
31  According to the new rules of PROGEDE’s forest management committees, the rural council would be able to 




5.7 Implications of the new patterns of accumulation triggered by the rural 
charcoal sector 
Why does local level elite capture matter? One could argue that the battle of loosening the grip of 
urban-based charcoal merchants on rural forests has been won because rural populations now 
have access to forests and are in charge of revenues generated by the charcoal sector. On the 21st 
August, 2013, the closing ceremony of Wula Nafaa took place on a celebratory note. “We have 
made a very visible impact,” reported the head of the implementing staff of the project. Indeed, 
true to its name, Wula Nafaa has generated wealth in the rural communities which as 
accompanied by intra-community distributional unevenness.  The rampant elite capture in the 
charcoal sector in the Rural Communities not only entrenches the disparities in the villages but it 
also contributed to deepening the differences in wealth accumulated between urban and rural 
regions. 
 
It is necessary to zoom out beyond the scale of the  Rural Community to see the implications of 
the new patterns of wealth accumulation lop- sided in favor of a small number of rural elites. The 
effects of this intra-village inequality in wealth accumulation contributes to the spatial disparities 
in levels of development between rural and urban zone through the continuation rural poverty 
cycles in the rural parts of Senegal while the urban centers grow.  Despite not two households 
possessing the same set of livelihood strategies, the lack of investment from rural elites or even 
outsiders in activities that might create more wealth generating impulses for the villages was 
stark. Rather, they re-invested in urban areas, depriving a remote rural region like Tambacounda 




This urbanward movement of capital generated by local producers of charcoal was mostly 
invested in real estate such as the purchase of land in town of Tamba or building a house in Dakar 
which were deemed more judicious uses of money earned from charcoal. There was a limit as to 
the amount and type of investment that a villager, especially a well-established elite, would be 
willing to make in the village itself. After building one’s family a zinc or concrete roofed house, 
purchasing equipment for cultivation, animals for transportation, agricultural purposes or herding, 
or motorized vehicle (usually a motorbike), those charcoal-sector elites rarely create any 
multiplier economic activities in their villages.  
 
Charcoal producers within a same rural community did not constitute a homogeneous group. The 
rural charcoal producers could be differentiated in terms of the degree of access each of them 
have to forest resources to produce charcoal. Having access to the forests for charcoal production, 
that is, the ability to draw benefits from it is defined by the extent they were part of or connected 
to an elite group. The elites already had an upper hand due to their privileged economic and social 
position endowing them with time, resources and connections gearing them to produce charcoal 
in a significantly profitable manner. The rest of the villagers become local surgas (paid laborers) 
who work to produce charcoal which they would sell to other villagers, mostly the elites. Selling 
to the elites  would fetch the non-elite charcoal producers a much lower price ( about 1300- 1800 
CFA francs per bag of charcoal32) compared to selling their product directly on the urban markets 
for about  4 to 5 times more ( between 5500 to 10000 CFA francs/bag depending on the size of 
the bag and the season). The non –elite charcoal producers do not benefit from charcoal 
production like the elite villagers who then have enough capital to hire more workers, produce 
                                                             
32 1 US$= approx. 500 CFA francs 
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more charcoal, buy exorbitantly high-priced permits under the table and arrange for transportation 
of the goods to the market.  For the non-elite charcoal producers who individually do not produce 
enough charcoal to fill one truckload, the revenues are smaller and depending on their familial 
situation, are most of what they earn is spent on basic needs, such as food, health care, clothing, 
agriculture. The wealth accumulation from charcoal for the non-elite rural charcoal producers 
ascends far less rapidly than the elites’. 
 
An example of this hierarchization (see Fig. 5.2.) of charcoal producers at local level was 
conspicuous in the case of neighboring villages of Guinguineo, Majially and Dianwelly in the 
Rural Community of Missirah. The first two villages were where the more important local 
charcoal producers resided and who also were rural elites. On the other hand, Dianwelly’s 
inhabitants were mostly charcoal producers involved in the actual production process, providing 
the labor for the chopping, stacking of wood, making of the kiln, carbonization of the charcoal 
and retrieving and bagging of the finished product. The technical agent of the FMC (in charge of 
supervising wood-cutting for charcoal production and the surveillance of the forest) resided in 
Majialy and one of the members of the Rural Council, who also held an executive position in the 
FMC as president of the Block-level  Management Committee resides in Guinguineo. Both the 
FMCs technical agent and the Rural Council member/ president of Block-level forest 
management committee were kin members involved in charcoal production and buy the charcoal 
produced by the villagers on Guiguineo as well as producing their own. The bigger producers in 
Guinguineo and Majially would then act as local middlemen, purchasing the products from the 




The growth charcoal sector in the Rural Communities caused an unprecedented inflow charcoal 
taxes to the Rural Council. Rural Councils. Before the recent boom in local charcoal sector, 
attempts to stimulate locally-based revenue generating activities were not very fruitful. For 
instance, the difficulty in enforcing the payment in rural taxes deprived already under-funded 
Rural Councils from a vital source of local revenue. Although financial benefits from forests have 
begun to replenish the coffers of the Rural Councils of rural communities where charcoal 
production takes place, the decision of how the Rural Council spends revenues accrued from 
charcoal taxes has become a contentious issue. Missirah’s PCR reported how his earmarking of 
revenues from charcoal taxes created many discontents among the villagers from villages 
engaging in charcoal production who did not agree that the taxes they paid be used for 
development purposes in other villages not producing any charcoal. Unable to generate enough 
financial revenues on their own to be reinvested in facilities and infrastructure in those non-
charcoal producing parts, the PCR deemed those parts of the Rural Community as being needier 
for funding. While the PCR himself was in favor of such kind of cross-investment, where revenue 
generated in one part of the Rural Community would be utilized to develop the other part of the 
Rural Community, the resistance to initiatives of spatially redistributing the benefits from 
charcoal production and the political interests of members of the Rural Council could shape how 
the Rural Community benefits from charcoal. 
 
As a villager in one of the Rural communities in the Tambacounda pointed out “most things look 
and are almost the same as they were 20 years ago, nothing has changed much, the roads are the 
same, the houses look the same. The lack of facilities still persists. The villages have not 
developed much like the big cities” (Interview, 2013). 
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Most of the villages in the rural communities studied were still waiting to be connected to 
electricity grids, to have accessible and safe transport routes during the rainy season, schools, 
health care posts, water pumps. Wula Nafaa’s main goal of poverty reduction through wealth 
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creation from natural resources was not assessed based on who benefits from the wealth and 
where the wealth goes but rather on indicators such as the level of revenue earned by assisted 
group enterprises, the cumulative number of enterprises assisted, increase in volumes marketed by 
assisted group enterprises (USAID, 2008). Projects opt for tangible measurable indicators to be 
quantified and presented in an over indicators that give a picture of where the lacunae is found. 
Doing the latter would undermine the success rating of the project outputs but would have 
contributed the long-term enhancement of what the project set out to achieve. Simultaneously the 
projects offer a palliative fix to inequities linked to poverty, leading to an emerging cycle of 
accumulation of wealth from charcoal production by the local producers that the project has 
helped to create. The project does act in combination with a number the pre-existing elements 
which are themselves a product of policy intervention of the Senegalese state, previous externally 
funded project actions and the local context.  
 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
Elite capture is not a permanent or static outcome (Wong, 2013; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013, 
Arnall et al., 2013). As shown by the case study presented in this paper, elite capture was 
becoming more localized. Various groups of elites: people in position of authority such as in the 
Rural Council, the Forestry Services and villagers who were socially and economically well-off 
joined forces when required to maintain control over decision-making processes and resources 
connected to charcoal production.  
 
The alignment of Wula Nafaa’s community-based natural resource management with 
decentralization of forest resource management in Senegal might have been potent with its 
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conceptual ‘wealth, power, nature’ triad bringing about an all-encompassing take on the 
application of sustainable development  in forest management and charcoal production, . 
However, the promotion of democracy through community based natural management could not 
unfold to its full potential because of the spread of elite capture at the local level facilitated by the 
set of institutions recognized to manage forest. Downward accountability is an in-built feature of 
the democratically elected local government but in this case, the Rural Council and its president 
were not the authority the villagers resorted to when they needed to voice out their concerns and 
needs about charcoal production and forest management. The expectation of a commitment to 
responsiveness from an authority which had delegated its responsibilities to manage forests to a 
structure whose members were not democratically elected proved to be a moot point because the 
FMCs were designed for managerial purposes and while having the FMCs run by the villagers 
checked the participatory approach box, it was not robust enough in terms of promoting 
democratic practices in forest management. The members of the FMCs were held accountable 
only to the extent that they demonstrated incompetency in accomplishing the duties assigned to 
them with respect to the position they held within the structure. Among the villagers who were 
more deeply involved in forest exploitation for charcoal production, the majority contacted the 
people whom they knew would be responsive to their demands regarding forests, namely people 
they had seen or heard being involved in forestry activities for a significant amount of time or 
through their personal network. 
 
Development agencies get served by dedicated in-country staff who need to make the project 
successful within certain time and budget constraints. Given such constraints, the project staff  
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tap into the local communities to collaborate with villagers perceived as most likely to be able to 
handle project implementation tasks. Among those capable of being of use to the projects were 
members of the elites or those already active in the charcoal sector, creating a co-dependence 
between the local elites and development agencies for reaching project goals. The institutional 
choices made by the higher level institutions opened the gates for collaboration between local 
elites in the Rural Community studied and the international development agencies and the Rural 
Council acted as the institutional platform for conforming to the democratic ideals regarding 
community based resource management. Such an institutional arrangement allowed the local 
elites to work their way towards strengthening ties among themselves and protecting their 
economic interests. The forest management structures set up by Wula Nafaa were vulnerable to 
institutionalization and managerialism with a division of tasks between the Rural Council and the 
FMCs. Albeit increasing the efficiency in terms of quantity of charcoal produced rurally, the local 
charcoal producers were thrust under the direct control of the elites who reside within their own 
communities. The FMCs being closer to the local communities and the villagers running those 
structures being more visible to the populations, they have become the ‘go-to’ person regarding 
forest-based charcoal production. Just like procedural democracy has not always resulted in 
substantive democratic outcomes in many African states, formal institutions such as 
democratically elected government have followed a similar kind of absorption in the 
Tambacounda context, meaning that the institutional infrastructure transposed by the state and 
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6.1 Concluding discussion 
In this dissertation, I examined the institutional aspect of decentralized forest resource 
management in Senegal to offer explanations about how access to the resource is shaped by 
institutions in a rural region receiving support from international organizations. The introduction 
provided the background against which the phenomenon of access reforms concerning wood-
based charcoal sector unfolds in the rural region of Tambacounda. This conclusion brings 
together what transpires from three analyses carried out in the three papers by the unifying theory 
of access (Ribot &Peluso, 2003). The analysis of access, which constitutes the fundamental 
concern of the three papers, is about who gets to benefit from wood-based charcoal production 
and in what ways. 
 
Theory tells us that an empowered local institution with formalized functions of democratic 
representation provides a robust democratic representation. The empirics in this research revealed 
that the local institutions chosen and recognized by governments and international development 
have led to a lop-sided pattern of empowered within local communities and formalized 
democratic elements. The conditions under which the governments and international agencies 
choose and recognize local institutions was a central concern of this study as it influenced the 
democratic nature of local resource management and use and the patterns of access to forest 
resources. By using this institutional optic to explain access the research revealed that the practice 
of development, including the local institutions through which it operates, is contingent not only 
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on the recipient developing country's context but also the economic and political situation in the 
part of the world where the projects promoting access originate. 
 
The democratically elected local government, the Rural Council, is the institution playing the role 
of democratic representation for the rural populations in their jurisdiction. However, being under-
resourced to shoulder the forest management responsibilities that they were entrusted with during 
the decentralization process, Rural Councils were given support through Forest Management 
Committees (FMCs) created by the two projects, Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE. Together with the 
Forestry Services, the Rural Council and the FMCs were chosen and recognized by the state and 
international agencies with varying amounts of authority and resources to manage access to 
forests. This co-management set-up had indeed led to an expansion in the administrative capacity 
to manage forests for charcoal production entailing an increase in charcoal production 
accompanied by an increase in the flow of financial revenues both for individual producers 
engaging in the activity and in terms of taxes for Rural Councils. 
  
The syncretic advantages meant to arise from this mix of institutions were offset by the circuits of 
elite capture running through and binding the institutions. The co-management strategy involving 
a division of tasks among the institutions led to a co-optive mode of operation among the various 
elites within those institutions, who would co-operate to strengthen their ability to monopolize 
access to profitable charcoal sector. As a result, other less-privileged villagers were more 
constrained in accessing forest resources despite focus on participatory approaches and 
democratic representation capacity of the chosen local institutions. Elite capture and access were 
inextricably linked as people who had elite privilege have the platform and the means to control 
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the access to the resource. The research analyzed how local institutional reconfigurations, that is 
the outcome of institutional choice and recognition, create, modify and sustain access. 
  
The findings show how some groups of people were able to control the access to forest resources 
while other groups had to maintain their access or gain access from those who monopolized it.  
The elites constituted the group of villagers who control access to forests and charcoal production 
at the rural level. Non-elite villagers then have to forego some of their benefits to the elites in 
order to gain or maintain access to charcoal production opportunities. For instance, the third paper 
describes how, by relinquishing of their access to market to the local elites who would buy their 
charcoal and resell it, the non-elite rural charcoal producers are able to benefit from that activity 
albeit not to the fullest extent of profitability. Despite the collective and democratic nature of the 
institutional configuration of forest access imputed through a choice of institutions formally and 
legally having or accepted as having representation roles, the ability to mediate the access of 
villagers’ to the resource was held by a small group of rural elites. 
  
Those who did not possess the adequate or the suitable “access qualifications” were subordinated 
to those who possessed them.  “Access qualifications” as explained in Chapter 2 are the 
characteristics possessed or acquired by individuals or groups allowing them to derive benefit 
from a resource such as forests (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The sufficient level and type of access 
qualification(s) permits the individual or group of individuals willing to use them to accumulate 
benefits depending on the niche.  Particular niches requires specific combinations of access 
qualifications. The group of people possessing the access qualifications that could be ‘banked’ 
within the niche is known as the charcoal niche elites, which in this case was the wood-based 
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charcoal sector. For instance, a charcoal niche elite at the village level would possess an access 
qualification like access to market itself mediated by access qualifications such as access to 
capital which also enhances access to labor, therefore augmenting the ability of that individual to 
produce more and sell more charcoal. Capture of the profits from the charcoal business was 
further enabled by access to authority, that is, though collaboration or collusive relations with the 
Forestry Services officials. The Forestry Services officials have their own set of access 
qualifications that they tap into to draw benefits from the charcoal business; they use the access 
qualifications conferred by their position as formal bearers of authority and technical knowledge 
related to forests. Villagers who had the qualifications of access through social identity like 
having the attribute of being male or qualifications of access via negotiations of social relations 
such as being socially well-connected thus providing a social conduit to collaborating with the 
elites possessing access to authority or capital qualifications, the foresters of the Forestry 
Services. 
 
Such subordination in access to the forest’s productive opportunities would be considered by 
elites as well as many non-elites as a mutually beneficial type of exchange.  As a result, villagers 
outside of the charcoal niche elite group did not have a need to overcome such a subordinating 
arrangement because of the advantages that this subordination provided them with, albeit locking 
them in it and bolstering the elites’ domination of the charcoal sector. Resistance to elite control 
of access was mainly from those who aspired to have their share of control over access to 
charcoal but who were not able to secure control over access already monopolized by the elites. 
The equitable access to forests was further stymied when permits for transporting charcoal to 
urban markets and money from one of the bank accounts where charcoal taxes were deposited 
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disappeared in circuits of fraud. The Rural Council President in this case, having opened the 
account under his name, could manage or retrieve funds as he or his ‘partners’ pleased.  
 
“People and institutions are positioned differently in relation to resources at various historical 
moments and geographical scales. The strands thus shift over time changing the nature of power 
and the forms of access to resources” (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). In this study, the relevant historical 
moment that led to a repositioning of institutions and people was the 1996 onset of the most 
recent process of decentralization reforms in forestry where the national government devolved the 
forest management powers to the Rural Communities, represented by the democratically elected 
Rural Councils. Higher-level institutions, the international agencies and the State are the 
architects of policies and crafters of project interventions. The higher-level institutions have thus 
enabled a switch of access to forest resources from the hands of urban-based merchants into those 
of the peasants in rural zones. Although projects are labeled ‘demand-responsive’, the design and 
planning of the projects are still rigidly top-down with the higher-level institutions providing the 
normative framings and prescribing the institutional forms of access. The choice and recognition 
of local institutional partners is shaped by a combination of considerations and determinants. The 
‘studying up’ method was used to identify the attributes that the higher-level institutions look for 
in the local institutions. Those attributes were categorized as: efficiency, integrity, democracy and 
participation, reliability which provided the principle anchoring for considering and determining 




When the projects and policies land in the sites where they are to be implemented, they bring sets 
of prescriptions about actualizing access to forest resources in the recipient rural communities. 
The higher-level institutions have the ability to select the arenas that citizens in rural zones are 
going to engage in order to have access. By the dint of their structural position that endows them 
with the privilege of choosing and recognizing their local institutional partners, the higher-level 
institutions also define who can have access to the institutions chosen. Couched in the goals of the 
project interventions was the discourse about fostering democratic local climate leading to the 
achievement of environmental and developmental objectives was. Decentralization carries with it 
this promise of democratic representation and provided a legitimizing ideological scaffolding for 
USAID to recognize the Rural Council as their local institutional partner. Likewise ‘participatory 
approach’ has become a development orthodoxy, a necessary ingredient thrown in the mix to 
attest of the social justice potential of the project and used as a principle for organizing 
institutions. The strong belief in the theoretical validity and relevance that policy champions and 
project designers have while formulating the project goals or influencing the State’s policy 
decisions does not tally well with the purpose and objectives of the implementing and evaluation 
staff. The pressure on the implementing staff to ‘manufacture’ success (Baviskar, 2004; Mansuri 
and Rao, 2004) out of projects they are working for and their positionality set the tone for the type 
of interaction the project has with the other institutions. 
 
The analysis of access is the cross-cutting axis of inquiry, with the framework of institutional 
choice and recognition (Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina, 2008) and the concept of democratic 
representation (Przeworski, Stokes & Manin, 1999) provided the theoretical foundation for this 
study. The initial hypotheses acted as a point of departure for the research questions that were 
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answered by focusing on three features characterizing salient problems related to access to forest 
resources in the two Rural Communities of Tambacounda: Missirah and Koar. The first paper 1 
entitled “The process of Institutional choice and recognition for the decentralized forest 
management in charcoal-producing zones of Tambacounda, Senegal” unpacks the various stages 
of the institutional choice process and delineates a set of attributes considered by higher-level 
institutions while recognizing local institutions.  
 
The second paper “Instrumentalizing gender: When elite capture intersects with gender-focused 
actions of forest resource management projects in Senegal” examined the attempts to create 
access based on one type of social identity, that is, gender. The paper probed the effects of 
institutional choice through emphasis on projects’ efforts to extend access to women, a group of 
rural society previously excluded from charcoal production. While project-induced positive 
discrimination towards women brings access reform for rural women to enter the predominantly 
male realm of forest management and charcoal production business, the quality of the access for 
women is impaired by elite capture. Building access for such a group not traditionally involved in 
a forest-related income-generating activity required a more sequential approach to endowing 
women with access qualifications. Such an approach did not quite fit the projects’ time, budget 
and scope frames. As a result, participation in charcoal production and trade can only be afforded 
by elite women, that is, women who have access to capital, labor, knowledge, authority and social 
identity often through their husband or other male relatives.  
 
Although attempts were made to facilitate women’s access to authority and institutions by having 
positions reserved for women in the FMCs and having women representatives from villages 
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during meetings, the ability to use this access is dependent on those women having other kinds of 
access qualifications prior to participating in forest management. The institutional demand for 
rural women to be available time-wise and resource-wise, who meet literacy criteria to hold 
positions or play roles in forest management was not met by the supply. The paper questions the 
gender-focused project action that uses participatory approaches.  
 
The third paper brings out the rural development implications of inequitable access to income-
generating opportunities by linking institutional choice and recognition to elite capture in local 
communities. As John Friedmann (1974) pointed out in his report to the USAID “, the task of 
developing the rural economy is a task of enormous complexity.”  Indeed, it remains so as is 
highlighted by this case of the differentiated access to forest resources which is exacerbated by 
opportunistic elites setting up shop in the institutions charcoal sector. Regional programs aim at 
integrated forms of rural development compared to functional programs to which the projects 
tackle one single constraint. The projects examined in this study were more akin to functional 
programs with their most important goal being to kick start village-based charcoal production. 
Such functional projects have clearly delimited objectives and are considered effective in 
stimulating a specific type of development, making them appealing to planners and higher-level 
institutions (Lele, 1975). The question that surfaces is how can the commercial exploitation of 
local natural resources can benefit the Rural Community as a whole? Under current arrangements, 
the capture of the control of the access polarizes accumulation of wealth into the hands of a small 
group of elite; capturing enough wealth that it increases their ability to relocate investing it 
outside of the zones where it was generated.  
 202 
 
The institutions chosen and recognized by the projects and the central government to manage 
forests and charcoal production at the local level contributed to creating differential access to 
wood-based charcoal sector among various groups of villagers.  
 
Attempts to level the access field through access-enhancing actions benefitted mostly those who 
were already advantageously positioned to use their access qualifications. Endowing the local 
populations with the access qualifications through project interventions included helping launch 
partnerships between local charcoal producers and financial institutions and helping to build local 
knowledge of the charcoal business through charcoal chain initiation trips, holding charcoal 
production training workshops. Such attempts opened doors for villagers who were ready to enter 
the charcoal sector and promoted awareness but they were often too abrupt and rushed from the 
outset and in their closing. The attempts not being part of a continuum of access qualifications 
building process did not suit villagers who were not equipped with the suitable bundle of initial 
qualifications.  
 
The research also identified some important patterns in the reinvestment of revenues from 
charcoal – by elites and by the rural councils. The urban pull for investment is strong because of 
the clear advantages that urban centers have over rural regions for capitalistic gain. Rural areas or 
even hinterlands of urban zones in developing countries often suffer from the shadow effect of 
cities or big towns that have the capacity to attract and absorb investment as well as offering 
higher rates of return. The legacy of French colonization in the creation of a core-periphery 
format of urbanization led to the neglect of vast areas of rural Senegal that the state and 
international organizations have been trying to remediate since independence. The Rural 
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Communities in a region like Tambacounda have limited capacities to retain and absorb the 
revenues generated by activities such as charcoal production. The data obtained from the 
interviews and surveys revealed that when the earnings of an individual rural producer is 
considerable, the extent of the amount of the locally earned revenue that is invested in situ does 
not exceed a certain limit. That limit is determined by each household’s own bundle of livelihood 
strategies and expenditure priorities. The type of housing and other assets such as vehicles and 
animal herds possessed by the household provided reliable proxies of wealth. The relocation of 
wealth is an important characteristic of the flow of resources from rural zones to urban zones in 
Senegal. 
  
The dearth of high growth potential investment opportunities in the rural areas and the low 
threshold population necessary to support a more diverse base of specialized goods and services, 
compounded by problems of poor accessibility and infrastructure makes rural zones unappealing 
for developing financial investments. The urban-bound flight of revenues earned by peasants is 
not only driven by the lure of monetary gains but having links with urban zones widens life 
options. Most post-primary education institutions, health-care centers and other administrative, 
financial services as well as formal employment are located in urban regions. The flux of people 
to cities and towns being greater, rents for accommodation are also higher.  Houses in urban 
regions that are owned by villages become a convenient stop points while on business not only for 
the owners but also to extended family members, offer accommodation for younger members of 





The taxes levied on charcoal production have replenished the coffers of Rural Council that 
otherwise would have been dry because of the difficulties in enforcing the payment of rural taxes 
and the paucity of taxes from other sources. However, this inflow of wealth from a public 
resource brought about its lot of distributional complications in the form of tensions over which 
villages of the Rural Community were going to have access to the charcoal tax funds for local 
development. The villages participating in charcoal production and contributing to the taxes 
proclaim their sense of entitlement to those funds, therefore inclined to contest decisions of the 
Rural Council to invest charcoal-generated funds for developing needier villages of the Rural 
Community but which do not produce charcoal.  
 
Although presented in a critical light with respect to democratic representation, the two projects 
studied, Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE have contributed to diversifying the livelihood earning 
portfolio of the peasant in the Tambacounda region. It has to be pointed out that not each and 
every Rural Community in Senegal can have access to forest resources for charcoal production. In 
2013, there were discussions about reconfiguring decentralization by creating regional level 
development hubs instead of having the Rural Councils shoulder responsibilities of managing 
development at local level. Since the 1996 onset of decentralization, Rural Councils across 
Senegal have struggled to establish local bases of revenue generation in rural zones. Remodeling 
decentralization based on physiographic zoning so as to better tap into the potential specific to 
each zone as well as a recentering of fiscal responsibilities and roles from Rural Council to a 
higher order of local government, the regional councils, is now being considered by the 
Senegalese Government. The pooling of funds from the various Rural Communities located in 
different regions would concentrate resources sufficient to produce stronger development spurts 
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across the region instead of islands of prosperity in a few Rural Communities.  
 
The pro-urban bias involving the bypass of rural zones as recipient regions of financial flows have 
long existed prior to the opening up the charcoal sector to inhabitants in the rural zones. Such a 
preference for the core at the expense of the periphery has existed since the colonial times with 
the difference in post-colonial times being that the trend is perpetuated when the revenues 
generated by the inhabitants in the peripheries (the villages) is diverted to the core or semi-cores. 
As mentioned earlier, higher scale governance arrangements could be developed to gather local 
funds with the goal of retargeting investment locally. Rechanneling funds locally would support 
development at the Rural Community level.  There is an opportunity here for development policy 
to attend to regional re-arrangements and rescaling of flows of wealth. 
 
The findings showcased in this triad of papers each focusing on an analytical entry point so as to 
bring out the various dimensions of reforms around access to a natural resource. The 
decentralization of forest resource management remains liminal. Despite that it now certainly has 
the administrative artillery, its potential for democratic representation has been thwarted. The 
decentralization of forest resource management instituted a reform in terms of opening access to 
forest resources but enhancing the quality of the access still remains a work in progress. The 
projects filled some of the lacunae by providing support to local communities for commercially 
exploiting forests for charcoal production. The mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness 
of the institutions chosen and recognized had their effectiveness respectively subdued by the 




The importance of contextual realities remain pertinent: socially ascribed attributes such as 
gender and economic standing intersect with the institutions chosen and recognized for 
decentralized forest management and participatory approaches get thrown into market-based 
reform molds to support existing or trigger new hierarchical relationships. 
  
6.2  Contributions and future directions 
The findings and arguments put forward in this paper corroborate with existing scholarly work. 
What demarcates this set of papers from the rest of the body of scholarly work on the study of 
charcoal production and trade and the related forest management is that it examines access to 
forest resources in a decentralized context through: the ‘studying-up’ dimension in paper 1, the 
participatory approach in gender in development dimension in the second paper, and the spatial 
and rural development dimensions is brought to the fore in paper 3. Each of these can be useful to 
policy makers, planners, project designers for charting rural development interventions since each 
provides insights into how hierarchies are generated or reproduced. Making the institutional 
choice and recognition a more reflexive process might be necessary for what Friedmann (1987) 
called the ‘double-learning loop’ to take place in higher-level organizations. 
 
The first learning loop pertinent to this study is about higher-level institutions learning how to 
achieve the project and policy goals of creating a more democratic institutional landscape at the 
local level, promoting inclusiveness regarding forest-resource based economic opportunities in an 
environmentally-sustainable manner. This first learning loop takes place through the feedback 
provided by evaluations of projects. The second learning loop consists of learning how to bring 
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modifications to the ways of creating equitable forms of participation, questioning the persistent 
inability of significantly closing gaps in inequality in the local communities the projects 
intervene. Such modifications involves bringing about changes at deeper levels such as at the 
value-system level by auto-critically reflecting on the goals, values and strategies of the 
organization. Through Senegal’s charcoal sector, this dissertation adds new analytical angles from 
which to assess the distributional outcomes of decentralization interventions. The findings and 
observations put forward in Chapter 5 call for more attention to the search for effects of 
decentralization not restrained at the local level but to the patterns that decentralization has with 
respect to a specific sector intra-locally and inter-regionally. 
 
Analysis of the conditions under which choices are made and the effects of recognition led to the 
identification of the factors influencing how higher-scale institutions make these institutional 
choice decisions, therefore pointing to possible directions of change. Only after comprehending 
the logic behind institutional choices and the effects of recognition on local representation, the 
successes and shortcomings, can we best feed that learning back into higher-scale policy 
processes. With its clear focus on the influence of institutional arrangement on policy 
effectiveness, this research incorporates the apropos dimension of geographical research engaging 
with policy. As depicted in this set of three papers, local institutional configuration, including the 
capture of its control by the local elites, can significantly influence the local communities’ 
prospects of earning a livelihood from forests and the extent to which development initiatives 
have a positive impact on people’s life, especially pertaining to poverty reduction and production 




This research furthers the knowledge so as to strengthen the ties between geographical research 
outputs and empirical policy studies, unearthing the dynamics among the different types of 
institutions at multiple scales indicated the links between the institutional landscape in a decentralized 
forest management context in Senegal and the rural development outcomes. The type of local 
institutions that were endowed with the authority and financial, material, technical resources to 
regulate and manage natural resources, in this case forests, were accessed mostly by the rural elites, 
thereby shaping the extent to which the rural populations were excluded from the economic 
opportunities that the rural charcoal sector represents. The findings from this research are expected to 
serve towards building a roadmap that will help navigate through the process of institutional choice 
and recognition, contributing towards governance-tool development and policy-influence efforts 
relevant to higher-level project designers and policy makers. 
 
There was a need to stress the relevance of local capture because projects using the participatory 
approach are prone to elite capture which obstructs a wider swath of the rural population from 
benefitting from natural resources, the management of which they have been entrusted with. This 
becomes an even greater dilemma especially if it is in a region which is remote and suffering from 
a dearth of income-generating activities. This study depicted the kind of context in which 
programs like the UN’s Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) would be unfolding in Senegal and therefore draws attention on the problems that would 
need to be attended to, namely the existing exclusionary practices resulting from elite capture as 





It extends the existing conceptualization of elite capture by defining it using Peluso and Ribot’s 
(2003) Theory of Access. By deepening the way to identify the elites using the qualifications of 
access, it was showed how elites are produced. Using this more refined way of conceptualization 
of elites allows more precision in understanding the type of elite and knowing about the type of 
elite This is slightly different from the concept of elites as commonly identified in the literature, 
that is, because I proceeded to look at what is being captured (e.g. illegally diverting resources, 
controlling institutions, manipulating politicians), by whom and for what ends. What has until 
now added to the elusiveness ‘elite capture’ concept is that most of the studies comprise as 
starting point the definition of the concept by providing what might be a close variant the 
definition provided in Persha and Andersson (2014), that is, elite capture being a process by 
which individuals with superior political status, economic, educational, ethnic and other social 
characteristics which leaves gaps in outlining the factors that brought. 
  
The definition of elites and elite capture that I propose in this dissertation is based on the concept 
of ‘niche elite’. This concept is particularly applicable for a more systematic technique of 
identifying elite capture in specific natural resource-related productive activity which in the case 
studied, is a charcoal niche elite. Conceiving niche elite capture as a function of possessing and 
acquiring access qualifications based on Ribot and Peluso’s Theory of Access offers the potential 
to trace how capture by the charcoal niche elite was occasioned, for instance the institutional 
factors, the social or economic characteristics that enabled a specific group of people to benefit 
from charcoal at the expense of others who do not possess the suitable combination of access 
qualifications. Distinguishing the different groups of elites and the mechanisms of access capture 
could be carried out in future studies. This adds to the discussion about elite capture in Lund and 
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Jensen (2013) and several other scholars (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; 
Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Platteau, 2004; Arnall et al., 2013; Wong, 2013; Persha & Andersson, 
2014) about the fluidity of ‘elite capture’ which describe the elite capture problem occurring and 
how it should be investigated. The contribution has been to provide a concrete guide about how to 
chart this fluidity by using the ‘niche elite’ concept and access qualifications. The relevance of the 
application of ‘niche elite’ and access qualifications in development practice was brought out in 
paper 3.  Isolating elites per niche, in this case, the charcoal sector, makes it possible to establish a 
matrix of interaction among individuals and among groups with the access qualifications 
indicating the capture methods and the constitution of those groups. The concept of ‘niche elite’ 
lends itself to longitudinal studies to show evolution over time of the elite capture as well as 
multiple cross-sectional studies involving other elites capture of other niches at the local level, 
such as cotton, peanut, other forest products. Comparison between and among niche elites can be 
useful in detecting the similarities and differences in strategies used by each niche elite to, 
patterns in access qualifications in order to better spot the problems  The similarities or 
differences gathered through cross-sectional studies would provide evidence about common and 
tenacious problems. Such comparative research could influence the business models for natural 
resource exploitation that are offered to rural inhabitants.  Villagers not possessing the sufficient 
access qualifications are confronted with business models imposed on them by projects and 
policies.  
 
This study focused on access qualifications with regards to institutions and the findings show how 
the access qualifications with respect to democratic institutions or making use of other structures 
such as FMCs varied among individuals in the local community. Ribot, in his paper on 
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commodity-chain analysis as a policy tool, (Ribot, 2005) shows that middlemen amassed a 
disproportionately large share of the profits from charcoal commerce compared to the 
woodcutters who produced the charcoal. One of the projects studied took a few villagers on a 
training trip from Tambacounda to Dakar to initiate them to the various steps in the charcoal 
supply chain but this attempt did not result in significant success as far as disintermediation was 
concerned nor the diffusion of the information about the chain throughout the Rural 
Communities. 
 
Policies, current development orthodoxies and bureaucratic practices might still provide the 
broader normative codes dictating institutional choice and recognition and project format to meet 
the client’s needs. One way to handle this lacunae is to conceive projects as ‘cradle-to-cradle’ 
projects (rather than cradle-to-grave where there is a definite start point and end point) whereby 
project implementation is considered a cycle. More emphasis from the higher level institutions on 
the ‘product’ and ‘product characteristics’ than on the consumers/clients and consumption. This 
reinforces the double-learning loop of higher-level institutions.  
 
The combination of Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina’s (2008) ‘Institutional choice and recognition’ 
framework with Merilee Grindle’s conceptualization of the process of policy formation and 





Through the recognition component, I explored how the micro-dynamics of access played out in 
the villages and the choice component expanded the analysis to include the broader contextual 
factors such as the meta-positioning of higher-level institutions with respect to aid and natural-
resource based development policy and practice. 
 
The way ‘participation’ is construed at the various stages of project design and implementation 
and how it is reified on the ground were identified based on the interviews, observation and the 
rhetoric in the project and policy documents. Tracing how ‘participation’ morphs through those 
stages shed light on disjunctures between the logics of higher-level institutions for recognizing 
institutions based on conformity to accommodating participatory approaches and how the 
recognized institutional mix end up reinforcing  trends of exclusion of poorer, marginalized 
women. The choice and recognition of local institutional partners did not offer secure institutional 
arrangements for non-elite women who did not have the suitable set of access qualifications. 
 
Methodologically, the bimodal gaze adopted during the research underlying this case study sets it 
apart from most case studies about the outcomes of donor-funded projects and state policy in 
developing countries wherein the researching gaze is concentrated on the ‘recipient’ communities. 
The contribution has been to use a method of inquiry and data collection that weighs in the extra-
local institutional factors, mainly covered in paper 1, as much as what happens at the ‘bottom’, in 
the villages. 
 
The "studying-up" approach (Nader, 1974) used in Chapter 3 allowed the exploration of the 
process of institutional choice and recognition to show how local institutions are chosen by 
 213 
 
higher-level institutions and the underlying reasons for choosing and recognizing certain 
institutional configurations over others for managing forests and charcoal production. Turning the 
research gaze towards the other end, that is, the international organizations and the national-level 
institutions instead of focusing only on those who 'receive' projects revealed the mechanisms 
connected to access are determined extra-locally, molded by the interests of the state and 
international actors. The projects are designed as following ideological constructs imagined by the 
international agencies, academics, consultants and other policy champions located in western 
countries and influenced by the political-economic priorities of those countries.  
 
The three papers lay the groundwork for future research on decentralized forest resource 
management and development project-supported forest exploitation. Future research could 
include investigating the contribution of wealth from forest resources to the coffers of Rural 
Councils and to the well-being of villagers for judicious channeling of those funds for rural 
development priorities. The search for ways of creating more transparency in governance and 
management of the resource is inextricably linked to creating more stable mechanisms of 
downward accountability. The critical approach adopted towards participatory processes, the 
gender-affirmative and democratic representation does not mean that one should be completely 
opposed to them because of the pitfalls presented in this set of papers. Quite the contrary: those 
are deemed too important to be discarded and it is necessary to include in one’s thinking point of 
departure the costs and time required for decentralized development to take root. In the light of 
the available evidence, it is important to temper excessive overreliance on formulaic use of and 
expectations from participatory development and democratically representative processes. 
Systematic experimentation and continuous assessment is needed rather than indiscriminately 
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imposing the development dictates and policy trends along with keeping in sight the upstream 
factors because of significant influence that higher-level institutions wield on institutional reforms 
and policy change in rural zones in developing countries. 
 
Questions that require attention include: How can projects and governments create stepwise 
processes of building access qualifications for the poorest of the poor? What kinds of programs or 
policies can help rework the meaning of gender or caste or age hierarchies, the patterns of access 
through particular families or particular social relations to governing authorities, the criteria for 
licensing and permitting producers, such that the poor might have a more equal chance at 
attaining the resources and means they need to produce and market forest products for their own 
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The activity calendars chart out the main activities of different groups of people in the sample of 
villages surveyed for this method of data collection. The information was gathered during focus 












Calendar 2012-2013: Koar, Women (married) 
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Obtaining the loan     ON ON ON ON ON 
Clearing of the fields 
2011- youths started to make charcoal. In 2010, 
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May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 
Charcoal 
Production 
ON ON Continued only by those who devoted themselves to charcoal production  ON 
Production 
begins by those 
who have 
completed 
agricultural tasks  




End of production season, so 












charcoal on the 
market so they 
can sell their 
products at a 
higher price 
   
Agriculture  clearing sowing Cultivation Harvest End of 
harvesting 
Transportation of 
millet leaves, hay 




       Sale of products   
Availability of 
food 
   Hunger gap, lean 
season between two 
harvests. 
50% of people buy 
cereals 
Quantity depends on family size and on the capacity to 
cultivate.  
   
Market 
Gardening 
   Only women do it during the dry 
season. Men do it during the 
rainy season 
      
Rainy season      
Accessibility  Between  1-15 August tracks cannot be accessed Better 
accessibility 
     
Health 
Expenditure 
 Health expenditures are highest during the rainy season (malaria, diarrhea, flu, 
stomach infections) 
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Charcoal 
Production 



























‘Winter’ in Dakar 
 
1500-2500 CFA francs (big 
bag) 
Agriculture Harvest    Weeding/ 
clearing 










20th Jan For sustenance        
Availability of 
food 
     Starts to 
decline 
 Worst situation  Plentiful   





       Malaria , dysentery    
Accessibility        Accessibility to village hindered by an 
























             




    sowing Beginning of 
weeding 





Sale Sale Payment           
Availability of 
food 
Abundance        Least 
available 
   Abundance 
Rainy Season       Least rainy  Most rainy     
Health 
Expenditures 
       
Dysentery 
   
Malaria 
   
Accessibility            
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May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 
Domestic 
Chores 
 Drawing water from the well for cooking, grinding millet, sweeping the floor, doing the laundry 








    Buying clothes, shoes, earrings, 
rings, necklaces, preparations for 
wedding 







 Depends on the number of people 





harvest harvest   declines declines 
Market 
Gardening 
         Lettuce, cabbage, carrots, 
tomatoes, okra 
Rainy season             
Health 
Expenditures 
  Malaria       
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May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr 
Charcoal 
Production 

























        More revenue from 
charcoal because of 
the cold weather in 
Dakar. 
   







harvest harvest Abandon the fields   Harvest 
Revenues 
Agriculture 

























End of harvest 





       Starts   Harvest Harvest 
Apiculture Harvest Placing the hives        Harvest 
Baobab fruit Picking 
of fruits 
      Picking of 
fruits 
    
Rainy season             
Domestic 
Chores 
            
Health 
Expenditure 






Interview guide for elected local government officials 
“Representatives” of local communities were interviewed so as to assess their skills and abilities 
to make informed decisions regarding decentralization and surrounding policy-driven external 
interventions. Their responses about how they execute ‘representing’ were matched against the 
responses and interests of local communities interviewed. Additional prompts were be used with 
great care not to lead the interviewee towards any particular response. 
 
 Election of officials and nature of powers  
1. How many candidates usually run for local government elections (rural council)? 
2. People with what types of background (professional, academic, social, ethnic, political) 
are most often seen to be running for elections at the local level? 
3. Who are those who are most likely to get elected? 
4. How are the candidates to the elections chosen? 







1. What does your work consist of?   
2. What specific set of powers do you legally exercise over forests? 
3. What can you do with those powers?    
4. What are the most important forestry decisions you make? 
5. How important is forestry decision-making compared to decisions you have to make about 
the other various sectors? What portion of your time is devoted to forests? What portion to other 
areas—which ones?  
6. What decisions have you made with respect to forest resources in the past or are in the 
process of making? 
7. How did you make each decision?  
8. What was your role in the decision-making process? 
9. What influences this decision-making? 
10. To whom were your decisions important? Did they like your decisions? How did they 
respond? Did they say anything about how you should decide before or after you made your 
decision?   
11. To what extent would you say you have discretionary powers (freedom for using powers)?   
12. Regarding which aspects do you have discretionary powers? What kinds of freedom do you 
have and regarding which aspects? 
13. Which of powers transferred to you can be considered as secured rights? 
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14. Apart from the local community, towards whom else do you have to be accountable / to whom 
else are you answerable? 
15. Which of the powers transferred to you are privileges and can be removed by higher-level 
institutions? What are the duties you perform that can be taken away by , for instance, the forestry 
services? How and why would they do that? Please give examples. 
16. Do you have complete control over the funds allotted to your institution or to what extent do 
you have control over managing the funds? 
17. What are the discretionary powers you have specifically related to the funds transferred to 
you? 
18. Do you have freedom to do what you want or are there earmarks or mandates from higher-
level institutions regarding forest management? 
 
 Funding 
1. What are the sources of funding for the institution? Taxes, fees, donations, funds 
transferred from the state? 
2. What is the proportion of funding from each source? 
3. What are the external (extra-national) sources of funding? 
4. How are the funds managed? Who manages the funds with respect to forestry resources? 
5. Can you describe how the money is collected, how it flows through the system? 
6. How much freedom do you have over funds received from each source? 
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7. What are the possibilities of raising additional revenues at a local scale? 
 
Accountability relations and mechanisms and responsiveness 
1. How do you learn about what local people need or want?  
2. How do people make their forest-related requests to you? Do they come to talk to you? Do 
they write to you? 
3. What demands do they make around forestry?  
4. Could you describe how you/ your institution respond/s to the people’s demands? Could 
you tell me this by giving me examples of how you responded to local community’s demands 
concerning forest resources?   
5. Could you give examples whereby you were unable to respond to people’s requests/ 
demands although you wanted to? 
6. How did they react when you/ your institution could not respond to their demands? What did 
they do? 
7. What actions or decisions did you take following their reaction to your inability to respond to 
their demands? 
8. How did the local people react when you/ your institution were/ was able to respond to the 
local people’s demands? What did they do? 
9. What do you think they can do, but have not yet done so, if you are unresponsive/ responsive? 
10. How do people communicate their demands and concerns regarding forests to you? 
11. How do you communicate back to them when needed? 
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12. Can you describe the orders or instructions you receive from other institutions? Please specify 
which source-institution for each instruction/order. 
13. Which institutions is your institution answerable to regarding the powers transferred to you? 
14. How are elected local officials/ local institution (your institution) are negatively sanctioned by 
higher-level institutions? Can you describe the negative sanctions (punitive/ corrective)? 
15. When are negative sanctions applied? Are they formal/ informal? 
16. Can you tell me about the instances whereby any such negative sanctions have been applied in 
the past? 
17. How did you and your predecessors react to such negative sanctions? 
18. How are elected local officials/ local institution (your institution) are positively sanctioned/ 
rewarded by higher-level institutions? Can you describe the positive sanctions? 
19. When are formal and informal positive sanctions applied?  
20. Can you tell me about the instances whereby any such positive sanctions have been applied in 
the past? 
21. How did you and your predecessors react to such positive sanctions? 
22. Are there institutions/ people that were averse to the decisions you took or any of your 
practices? Which ones? 
23. How do they express/manifest their disapproval? Do they take any actions against you? 
24. Is your institution rewarded for the actions accomplished/ action taken? When? How? 
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25. What are the rewards? 
 
Additional questions 
27.  Have you ever observed any of these being exercised or function with respect to forest 
resources? 
28. How effective have they been in helping people make their demands and  you responding to 
their needs?  
- Referenda 
- legal recourse through courts 
- third party monitoring by media 
- NGOs  
- Independently elected controllers 
- public reporting requirements for governments 
- performance awards 
- taxation 
- Central government oversight of local government? 
 
29. How were the institutions involved in the examples that you just described established? 
30.  What are the factors that affect the people resorting to those institutions? 
31. How has each of the following contributed towards the local community having more 




-embededness of leaders in their community 
-belief systems of leaders and their communities 
-civic dedication and pride of leaders 
-widespread participation 
-social movements 
-threats of social unrest and resistance 
 
Representation 
1.  What does your work as a representative of the local communities consist of? 
2.  How do people communicate with you? 
3. Who are those who communicate with you: make their concerns known, participate in 
decision-making activities?  
4. What are the concerns that people have about forests? 
5. How do you get to know about them?  Did people report anything to you? Was it an 
observation? 
6.  To what extent do you think you are responsive to the people who come to you with 
concerns regarding forest resources? 
7. Who are those people who are most active is seeking your help/advice regarding forest 
resources? 
8. What are the hindrances to representing all the different groups of people you are 
supposed to represent? 




10. What are the mechanisms set-up to allow the participation of such groups of people in 
decision-making as well as in inclusion in the distribution of any benefits? 
11. How do members of local community participate in decisions you make, actions you take 
regarding forestry resources? 
12. Who are the people who are most likely to participate? Who are those who usually 
participate? 
13. How do you make people participate in decision-making or actions related to forest 
resources? 
 
Interview guide for members of the local community 
These questions were asked to members of the local community, at the rural study sites, to obtain 
an insight about the degree to which people expect or feel their priorities have been fulfilled 
through the local institutions chosen and recognized to manage forests. Attention was paid to 
community members’ knowledge of their rights and functions in forest management before and 
after program implementation as well as the degree to which they trust and feel represented 
through their rural council president in comparison to the other institutions available to them. 
 
Participation in PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa 
1. How do you use the forests?  
a. What do you look for in the forests? 
b. What do you do in the forests? 
c. Where in the forests? 
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d. Are there any conflicts over forest use? 
e. Are there any forest resources to which you cannot have access? Why?  
f. Are there problems of any sort with forest use? 
 
2. Who else uses the forests?  
a. Who are they? 
b. What for?  
c. When?  
d. What do they do with what they extract from the forests?  
e. What are your opinions about their activities? 
   
3. What does the government or forest service go about managing the forest? 
4. What is the role of the rural council? What does it actually do? 
5. What do you think can they (rural council) do or should be doing? Why?  
6. To what extent are you satisfied about how (i) the government (ii) the rural council are 
dealing with forest management? 
7. What are your concerns related to the forests? 
8. What are you concerns with respect to the implementation of PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa?  
9. Do you know anybody who participates in PROGEDE/ Wula Nafaa? (If  answer is  ‘NO’, 
skip to ‘Accountability’ section) Who are they? (yourself/ family member/ neighbor/ 
friend/relative)? 





11. Why are you/they participating in PROGEDE/WF? 
a. What are you/they expecting out of their participation in the project? 
b. What led you/them to participate in the projects? 
c. Are the reasons for sustained/ continued participation in the project different from 
initial reasons for participation? Have they changed? 
d. Why have they changed? 
12. Have the expectations about the projects been met? 
13. Which ones have been met and which ones have not been met? 
14. Why do you think PROGEDE/WF have been not been able to meet your expectations or what 
do you think made it possible for them to meet your expectations? 
 
Accountability 
1. Can you please describe instances when you have not been satisfied with the local 
government’s performance, as in, them not being able to respond to your demands regarding 
forest resources? 
2. What did you do when they could not respond? 
3. Did you complain about it? To whom and how? Did anybody take any action with respect 
to your complaints? 
4. If you did not complain, why didn’t you do so? 
5. If you didn’t take any other action regarding lack of responsiveness, why did you do so? 




7. What do you think you can do when your representatives do not respond adequately to 
your demands? 
8. What did the local government do with regards to your reaction to their unresponsiveness? 




1. Which decision-making processes related to forest management are you involved in?  
2. Describe those processes and the actors involved? 
3. What was your status or title as participant? 
4. To what extent do you think that your participation is effective? Your voice is heard and 
taken into consideration and results in the kind of benefits you expected? 
5. How do projects involve you? 
6.  Do they ask your opinions? Do they listen to your opinions when you give them?  
 
Representation 
7. How are the people/ you represented at the local level?   
8. How do you make your concerns about the forests heard? 
9. Whom do you go to if you have a problem/ concern or an idea to express concerning 
forest issues? 
10. Who takes what you say into consideration?  





1. Do you get what you have asked for pertaining to forest resources from your 
representatives? 
2. To what extent were the authorities responsive? When are the representatives most 
responsive? When do you think your needs and aspirations are most likely to be taken into 
consideration and acted upon? 
3.  About what are they responsive (the types of demands to which they are most responsive, 
mediumly responsive, least responsive)? 
4. If you had to compare, which institutions are more responsive to your requests concerning 
forest resources? 
5. Who do you go to when you have problems?  
6. Do you ever go to the RC? PRC? Can they do anything?  
7. Which institution/s serve/s your interests regarding forestry resources? 
8. Which institution/s serve/s the interests of the community as a whole (overlooking aspects 
of status, income, ethnicity, political allegiance)? 
9. With whom do you usually team up (members of the local community) with when you 







Interview guide for project officials 
This interview guide is for project officials: 
- USAID and PROGEDE officials 
- The implementers of the projects:   
(i) the employees of the US based contractor, International Resources Group (IRG) who 
implement Wula Nafaa 
(ii) Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Energy. 
  
The purpose of these questions was to go to the very heart of the analytical objectives of this 
project, investigating the narratives driving institutional choices of higher-level institutions. The 
answers to these questions contributed to the analysis of framings about power and 
participation/representation in the forestry sector, at the same time bringing to the surface the 
strategies  forestry programs implemented in the study sites use  to challenge unequal 
relationships. Fathoming   the types of ‘skills’ such as the understanding of the democratization 
process, the necessity for fair representation among government and non-governmental and 
international organization enabled the hemming in the ideological positioning of those who make 
the things happen. 
Variables:   
-criteria for choosing institutions 
-past performance of different types of institutions 
-perception of institution(s) chosen 




Who makes the institutional choice?  
1. What is your role in the institution you work for?  
2. What are the aims of your organization by implementing this project? 
3. What are the factors does your organization take into consideration while choosing 
institutions they seek to work with (in general)? 
4. What are the reasons for choosing the local institutions your project is currently working 
with? 
5. Who are those involved into making the decision of choosing which institutions to work 
with (in general and in Senegal for this particular project)? 
6. The  share and type of involvement of actors in the higher-level institutions: 
(i)Who participates in the decision making-process? 
(ii) At what stage of the decision-making process? 
(iii) Regarding what aspect in choosing the institutions? 
7. How do you perceive the process of how local institutions are chosen and recognized? 
8.  What are the aspects you strongly concur with and believe to be the forte of the project? 
9. What do you disagree with? What do you think could benefit from change? 
10. How do you think those changes could be brought about? 
11. Who needs to act to bring about those changes? 







What influences the choice? 
1. What are the criteria for choosing the institutions currently working for PROGEDE/Wula 
Nafaa? 
2. Why was the representative local government not recognized? 
3. Identifying the current intervention style of the donor agencies.  
i) What are the discourses held by the organization that you work for? 
ii) Is there anything that you would conceive differently? 
4. What kind of objectives does the institution you work for favor? Objectives that favor the 
procedural matters of democracy or the instrumental objectives? 
5. Could you please tell me about the long-term  implications of the choice of institutions 
for: 
(i) Justice: do the institutions you chose allow for broad-based involvement of local 
people?  
(ii) The formation of citizenship: do the chosen institutions encourage the 
enfranchisement of the local people into citizens  
(iii) Sustainability: Are long-term stability and sustainability possible? 
(iv) Scaling-up and replicability: to what extent do you think the same process of the 
choice can be replicated elsewhere in Senegal? 
 
Representation, Participation and Pluralism  
1. Could you tell me what democracy stands for you? How did you come to such a 
conceptualization of democracy? 
2. What do you understand ‘participation’ to consist of?  
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3. How do you think it can be made to happen? 
4. How do you design participation in your projects? 
5. What do you understand ‘representation’ to consist of?  
6. How do you think it can be made to happen? 
7. How do you design participation in your projects? 
8. According to you, which types of institution(s) would best serve the democratic and 
representation needs of local communities? 
9. Why do donors and governments select institutions such as user groups that are given the 
same powers as and function in parallel to elected local governments? 
10. Do any of the institutions set up through your project compete with the elected local 
government concerning the management of forest resources? 
11. Which powers are similar and which powers are dissimilar between the competing 
institutions and the elected local government? 
12. To what extent do the non-representative institutions possessing similar powers as the 
elected local government undermine representative authorities or strengthen them?  
13. What variety of institutions does the local community members have regarding institutions 
can represent them?  
14. Which group wants what kind of representation? 
15. Who gets what kind of representation through which institution(s)? 
16.  How are the non-representative institutions accountable to representative authorities when 








Questionnaire for ‘Studying-Up’ 
Number of years in current post: 
Brief description of duties: 
Highest academic qualification: 
Gender: 
Age: 
1. How would you define what ‘democracy’ (We would like to hear about your definition 
based on your training and work/personal experience)? 
2. Natural resource management projects often use a participatory approach.  How would 
you define ‘participation’? 
3. What are the factors influencing the participation of local people in projects? 
4. What do you think are the factors taken into consideration when choices are made 
regarding who should get what power?  
5. Why do you think it is important to have a gender strategy in the implementation of the 
project? YES  NO 
6. Do you think that a specific gender strategy is necessary in the implement the overall 
project?  YES  NO 
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7.  Is the fact that the project supports women-specific activities enough to consider it gender 
sensitive? YES  NO 
8. Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of core agencies in Senegal in the 
formulation of policy regarding forest resources? 
(a) many new policies originate from the higher level core agencies.   
(b) some new policies originate inside the higher level agencies and they are important  "filters" 
for policy ideas that come from political parties, private elites  and the executive, often 
reshaping these ideas in the process.   
(c) they rarely initiate new policies, but are important in turning  policies that originate in the 
political arena into programs that can be implemented.   
(d)  they rarely initiate new policies because many of the new  economic policies  originate 
outside of the country  (e.g. with the World Bank, the USAID or other international donors) 
and the local economic agencies mainly have the role of implementing them. 
(e) Other…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. What prospects for promotion can someone who enters one of these agencies (e.g. through 
a higher civil service examination) early in his/her career reasonably expect?  
(Note: Assuming that there are at least a half dozen steps or levels between an entry-level 
position and the head of the agency, how would you characterize the possibilities for 




(a) in most cases, he/she will move up one or two levels but no more.   
(b) in most cases, he/she will move up three or four levels, but unlikely to reach the level just 
below political appointees.   
(c)       if performance is superior, moving up several levels to the level just below political 
appointees is not an unreasonable expectation.   
(d)       in at least a few cases, could expect to move up several levels within the civil service and 
then move up to the very top of the agency on the basis of political appointments.   
 
9. Thinking about Senegal’s case, which ones of the following would you say  
occur(s) today? 
(a) When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide  
who gets the job.  
(b) When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants  
decide who gets the job.  
(c) Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system.  
(d) The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials.  
(e) Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector.  
(f) Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee  
for the rest of one’s career.  
(g) Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public  
procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid.  
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(h) When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat 
some groups in society unfairly. 
(j) When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with 
which they have strong personal contacts.  
(k) Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private sector managers 
with roughly similar training and responsibilities.  
(l) The salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance.  
(m) When found guilty of misconduct, public sector employees are reprimanded by proper 
bureaucratic mechanisms. 
(n) Women are proportionally represented among public sector employees.  
(o)  Key ethnic and religious groups in society are proportionally represented among public sector 
employees.  
(k) Public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on information about 
abuses of public power to the media.  
(l) Government documents and records are open to public access. 
(m) Abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media. 
 
10. Could you please indicate three points that you consider fundamental for the good 
implementation of forestry-related projects. 
A …………………………………………………………………………………………… 




Questionnaire for households (carrés) in villages of the Rural Communities 
 
Serial No. : 
 
1. What is the total number of people in this household? 
 
2. What is the total number of household members who are involved in forest-based activities? 
 
3. How many persons from this household are involved in the charcoal sector? 
 
4. How many persons from this household are involved in the agriculture? Specify what crops? 
 
5. How many persons from this household are involved in other activities? Specify what activities 
 
6. What do you/household member do with the revenues earned from charcoal? 
i)  buying food 
ii) buying animals 
iii) buying equipment, agricultural tools 
iv)  Other uses 
(Additional) 
v) buying motorbikes 




7. Who is the authority first contacted regarding forest issues/ problems? 
(i) What has been the reaction of the first authority contacted? 
 
8. Who is the second authority contacted regarding forest issues/ problems? 
(i) What has been the reaction of the second authority contacted? 
 
9. Who is the third authority contacted regarding forest issues/ problems? 
(i) What has been the reaction of the third authority contacted? 
 
10. Do you participate in meetings? 
 
11. Are you active during those meetings? 
 
 
12. Are there ‘migrants’ in this household? 
(i)  What country have they migrated to? 
 
13. Type of  house:  
 
 
 
 
